COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED June 9, 2009 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals	NOTICE
	This opinion is subject to further editing.� If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.� A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.� See Wis. Stat. � 808.10 and Rule 809.62.�

Appeal No.�	2008AP2022	Cir. Ct. No. 2007CV4450
STATE OF WISCONSIN���			IN COURT OF APPEALS
			DISTRICT I
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Tyrone Davis Smith, ����������������������� Petitioner-Appellant, ����������� v. David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division of Hearings and Appeals, ����������������������� Respondent-Respondent.

����������� APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:� charles f. kahn, jr., Judge.� Affirmed.�

����������� Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Kessler, JJ.

�1������� PER CURIAM.   Tyrone Davis Smith, pro se, challenges a circuit court order upholding the revocation of his parole.� We affirm.

BACKGROUND

�2������� Smith was convicted in 1995 of attempted first-degree intentional homicide while armed, and the circuit court imposed a fifteen-year sentence.� Smith was released to parole in August 2004, with a projected discharge date of May 23, 2009.� The state of Mississippi accepted transfer of Smith�s supervision pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision.� Smith absconded from Mississippi supervision, however, and his Wisconsin parole agent, Nicole Patterson, issued an apprehension request.�

�3������� Smith was arrested in Wisconsin in July 2006.� Patterson did not seek revocation of Smith�s parole at that time, and Smith was released from custody.� A few days after his release, Smith signed amended �Rules of Supervision,� noting on the form that he did so �under undue influence and duress.�

�4������� In November 2006, Smith was arrested by Milwaukee police and charged with sexually assaulting S.T., his eleven-year-old cousin. �S.T. testified at Smith�s preliminary examination and described the sexual assault.� The court commissioner found probable cause to bind Smith over for trial.� Patterson then served Smith with notice that the Department of Corrections, Division of Community Corrections, recommended revocation of his parole.� Following a hearing, an administrative law judge in the division of hearings and appeals concluded that Smith sexually assaulted S.T.� Accordingly, the administrative law judge entered an order on January 27, 2007, revoking Smith�s parole.

�5������� Smith appealed the parole revocation to the administrator of the division of hearings and appeals. �The administrator affirmed, and Smith next sought certiorari review in the circuit court.� The circuit court affirmed in turn, and this appeal followed.�

DISCUSSION

�6������� On review by certiorari of an administrative decision revoking parole, we review the decision of the agency, not the decision of the circuit court.� See State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 710, 717, 566 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Ct. App. 1997), aff�d, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).� Our review is limited to four issues:� �(1) whether the agency stayed within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable, representing its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or determination in question.�� State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 2004 WI 96, �12, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 681 N.W.2d 914, 917.�

�7������� When the Department of Corrections is satisfied that a parolee has violated rules or conditions warranting parole revocation, the department must afford the parolee an administrative hearing.� Wis. Stat. � 304.06(3).� Unless the parolee waives the hearing, a hearing examiner from the division of hearing and appeals conducts a revocation hearing and enters an order either revoking or not revoking parole.� Ibid.� Smith argues, however, that the Department of Corrections could not pursue revocation in his case.� In Smith�s view, the department lost personal jurisdiction over him as a result of alleged irregularities in the department�s administration of its rules during his community supervision.� We disagree.�

�8������� �[T]he DOC ... retain[s] jurisdiction over a parolee until the parolee�s date of discharge from the entire sentence.�� DOC v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 34, �31, 279 Wis. 2d 223, 242, 693 N.W.2d 703, 712, see also Wis. Stat. � 302.11(6) (parolee remains subject to all conditions and rules of parole until expiration of the sentence or until discharge by the department).� The supreme court determined �that the legislature intended to provide the [Department of Corrections] with jurisdiction to enforce offender accountability throughout the term of parole, until the expiration of the entire underlying sentence.�� DOC, 2005 WI 34, �21, 279 Wis. 2d at 236, 693 N.W.2d at 709.� Smith�s sentence remained in effect and he had not been discharged at the time of the revocation proceedings. �Therefore, the department had jurisdiction over Smith.

�9������� Smith further asserts that he could not be disciplined or revoked for violating the rules of supervision because he never agreed to follow the rules and signed the �Rules of Supervision� form under duress.� Smith is incorrect.� Every parolee is required to �[a]void all conduct which is in violation of state statute.�� Wis. Admin. Code � DOC 328.04(3)(a) (Dec. 2006).� In this case, the Department of Corrections pursued parole revocation because Smith sexually assaulted a child. �The department�s authority to revoke Smith�s parole for committing crimes did not depend on Smith�s written agreement to follow the law.� See State ex rel. Rodriguez v. DHSS, 133 Wis. 2d 47, 52, 393 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Ct. App. 1986).� In Rodriguez, this court rejected the argument that a probationer�s community supervision could not be revoked for committing a criminal act absent a signed probation agreement. �We explained:�

[a] petitioner cannot seriously contend that a probationer can violate the criminal laws of this state without affecting his or her probationary status, even without signing a probation agreement.� The purpose of probation is to rehabilitate the person and help the person lead a law-abiding life.� By further violating the criminal statutes, the probationer violates the whole concept of probation.

Id., 133 Wis. 2d at 52�53, 393 N.W.2d at 107. �Our comments in Rodriguez are equally applicable here.

�10����� We can quickly dispose of Smith�s claims that his parole was revoked unlawfully and that the revocation was arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable.� Smith bases these claims on his assumption that the revocation proceedings were tainted by a jurisdictional defect.� Because Smith�s assumption is erroneous, his claims based on that assumption are without merit.

�11����� Finally, Smith contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he violated the terms of his parole.� We disagree.�

�12����� The division of hearings and appeals, not this court, weighs the evidence presented at a parole revocation hearing.� See Van Ermen v. DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d 57, 64, 267 N.W.2d 17, 20 (1978).� �A certiorari court may not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the [division].�� Ibid.� Rather, this court�s inquiry �is limited to whether there is substantial evidence to support the [division]�s decision.�� Ibid.� The division�s factual findings are conclusive if any reasonable view of the evidence supports them.� See State ex rel. Ortega v. McCaughtry, 221 Wis. 2d 376, 386, 585 N.W.2d 640, 646 (Ct. App. 1998).

�13����� The evidence presented in this case satisfies the applicable standard.� S.T. testified at the revocation hearing that she was eleven years old and in the sixth grade.� She described waking up in her living room with Smith on top of her.� S.T. testified that Smith was �rubbing against [her], like humping.�� S.T. stated that she was wearing �sleeping clothes� with a top and a bottom and that Smith was wearing clothes that she could not describe.

�14����� The evidence presented at the revocation hearing also included an excerpt of the testimony that S.T. gave during Smith�s preliminary examination.� In that testimony, S.T. explained that she awoke on November 23, 2006, and Smith was moving on top of her.� He was wearing blue jeans and a red shirt, and his �private part,� which felt �like a banana,� was touching her buttocks.�

�15����� S.T.�s father, Hal S., testified at the revocation hearing and confirmed the accuracy of an earlier statement that he gave regarding S.T.�s allegation against Smith.� According to Hal S., his daughter woke him during the night of November 23, 2006, by screaming that Smith had tried to rape her.� Hal S. discovered Smith kneeling by the couch where S.T. had been sleeping.� Hal S. called the police after observing that Smith had no shirt on and his zipper was open.

�16����� Detective Phillip Simmert, the investigating officer who interviewed S.T. after the incident, also testified at the revocation hearing.� He described S.T. as �very shook up, almost catatonic .... Her body would alternate between shaking and being very rigid.��

�17����� Patterson testified that Smith gave a statement denying any sexual contact with S.T.� Smith elected not to testify.�

�18����� In his appellate brief, Smith relies primarily on what he considers a �major inconsistency� in the evidence, namely, the different descriptions offered by S.T. and Hal S. regarding how Smith was dressed during the assault.� The administrative law judge acknowledged some discrepancies in the testimony, but deemed those discrepancies �minor.�� The administrative law judge concluded that S.T. was �truthful and reliable� and that nothing discredited S.T.�s description of waking to find Smith pressing his penis against her clothed buttocks and �humping� her.

�19����� We defer to the division�s credibility findings.� State ex rel. Washington v. Schwarz, 2000 WI App 235, �26, 239 Wis. 2d 443, 455-456, 620 N.W.2d 414, 421. �The finder of fact �not only resolve[s] questions of credibility when two witnesses have conflicting testimony, but also resolves contradictions in a single witness�s testimony.�� State v. Owens, 148 Wis. 2d 922, 930, 436 N.W.2d 869, 872 (1989).

�20����� Substantial evidence deemed credible by the fact-finder supports the conclusion that Smith sexually assaulted S.T.� Smith�s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence lacks merit.� For the foregoing reasons, this court must uphold the order revoking Smith�s parole.

����������� By the Court.�Order affirmed.

����������� This opinion will not be published.� See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.