COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED June 9, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
Appeal No. |
2008TR7225 |
|||
STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
|||
|
DISTRICT I |
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
City of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Amey R. Delugeau, Defendant-Appellant. |
||||
|
|
|||
APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
¶1 FINE, J. Amey R. Delugeau appeals the judgment convicting her of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant as a first offense, see Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), and the trial court’s order denying her motion to suppress the evidence of her intoxication. The only issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Delugeau’s motion to suppress because of what she contends was an illegal stop. We affirm.
I.
¶2
¶3 Guse told the trial court that he was driving “a marked black
and white squad car” when he first saw Delugeau driving east on
¶4 Guse followed Delugeau for some twenty blocks when Delugeau “pulled into” the parking lot “across two parking spaces.” Guse testified that the office building “had burglaries in the past” and was across the street from an automobile dealership “where we’ve had numerous vans and tires stolen.” According to Guse, he then made what he called “a field interrogation stop” to see what was up because he “felt that it was strange that [Delugeau’s] car had pulled in there and parked across two spaces.” None of the businesses served by the parking lot was open. Guse told the trial court that he thought the driver was either lost or impaired, especially because “[a]t that time of night there’s a high possibility that that person could be impaired.” Until he approached Delugeau’s car, Guse did not know the sex of the driver or how many people were in the car because the “windows were tinted.”
¶5 As noted, the trial court denied Delugeau’s motion to suppress the evidence of her intoxication, rejecting her contention that the stop was unlawful. The trial court ruled that the officer had “a reasonable basis to approach [Delugeau’s] car once it was parked in a parking lot where businesses were closed, at 3:00 [sic] in the morning, and the straddling two parking spaces.” On our de novo review, we agree.[1]
II.
¶6 We evaluate de novo whether
a traffic stop violates a driver’s constitutional rights. State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶8, 301
The determination of reasonableness is a common sense test. The crucial question is whether the facts of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training and experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime
¶7 Delugeau was driving below the speed limit and weaving even
though she and the officer were the only cars on their stretch of road at the
time. Guse, based on his experience,
testified that this indicated that the driver might be impaired. This and Delugeau’s pulling into a parking
lot around 3:15 in the morning when the businesses served by the parking lot
were closed and had been the victims of burglaries, and across the street from
another business from which property had been taken was sufficient to cause
further inquiry because from the totality of the circumstances Guse could
reasonably “conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” See Terry v.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] The
City did not argue and the trial court did not consider whether Officer Guse
could have stopped Delugeau’s car under the community-caretaker doctrine.