COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED May 19, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Raymond L. Morrison, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment and orders of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 FINE, J. Raymond L. Morrison appeals a
judgment entered after he pled guilty to two counts of robbery with the use of
force. See Wis.
Stat. § 943.32(1)(a). He
also appeals orders denying his motion for postconviction relief. Morrison claims that the circuit court: (1) erred when it denied his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without a hearing under State
v. Machner, 92
I.
¶2 Morrison was charged with robbing Sarah Bare on
¶3 Morrison was also charged with robbing Christina Cruz on
¶4 On
¶5 As noted, Morrison pled guilty to two counts of robbery with the use of force. The circuit court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of eight years and four months of imprisonment, each with an initial confinement of four years and two months and four years and two months of extended supervision. Morrison’s postconviction motion claimed, for the reasons that we discuss below, that his trial lawyer gave him ineffective representation.
II.
A. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
¶6 Morrison claims that the circuit court erred when it denied
his ineffective-assistance claim without a Machner hearing. See
Strickland
v. Washington, 466
¶7 In his postconviction motion, Morrison claimed that his trial
lawyer should have moved to suppress the witness identifications because the
line-up, he contends, was impermissibly suggestive. In support, Morrison attached to the motion
three police reports. In the first
report, Detective Joanne Blake wrote that on
¶8 According to the second report, written by Detective Peter Panasiuk, when Bare viewed the line-up, she circled “yes” to Morrison and “no” to the other subjects on her form. Panasiuk then talked to Bare, who told him that “she [was] 100 percent positive” that Morrison was the robber.
¶9 In the third report, Panasiuk wrote that when Jennifer Clark, a witness to the ice-cream-shop robbery, viewed the subjects, she circled the number for Morrison on her form. According to Panasiuk, he then interviewed Clark, who told him that she had initially circled “no” on the form because Morrison was not wearing a headband, but changed her answer to “yes” and that “she was 100 percent positive” that Morrison was the robber.[2] Panasiuk also wrote that when Cruz viewed the line-up, she circled “yes” for Morrison on her form when Morrison entered the room. According to Panasiuk, after the line-up Cruz told him that she was “absolutely sure” that Morrision was the man who robbed her.
¶10 Morrison also attached two affidavits executed by him to his motion for postconviction relief. In the first affidavit, he claimed that “[f]rom [his] observations during the line up,” he believed that all of the witnesses were in the line-up room at the same time and were able to “communicate with … or … influence each other’s choices in some fashion.” Morrison further averred that:
The report does not state that the line up for each witness occurred separately or that the witnesses were sequestered or instructed not to talk to each other. In fact, I could tell from the room I was in through the window that there were six people in the viewing room.
In his second affidavit,
Morrison claimed, without elaboration, that
¶11 Based on these materials, Morrison argued that the line-up was unduly suggestive because the witnesses viewed the line-up at the same time and orally discussed their identifications with the detectives.[4] We disagree.
¶12 A defendant seeking to suppress the evidence of an eyewitness
identification bears the initial burden of establishing that the identification
procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Powell
v. State, 86
¶13 Morrison’s claim that the line-up was impermissibly suggestive is conclusory and undeveloped, and is based wholly on his self-serving speculation—he does not present any evidence, by affidavits executed by the witnesses or otherwise, that the witnesses improperly communicated with each other. Indeed, the Record shows that the witnesses wrote their answers on individual pieces of paper and did not talk to the detectives about those answers until the line-up was complete. Accordingly, Morrison has not alleged facts sufficient to show that, had his lawyer filed a motion to suppress, he would have prevailed. See Corgain, 5 F.3d at 9–10 (group viewing of line-up not unduly suggestive where witnesses did not speak to each other and identification was by secret ballot); Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, 332 F.3d 1036, 1048–1049 (7th Cir. 2003) (line-up not unduly suggestive when two witnesses whispered to each other during line-up concerning fear that suspect might be able to see them). The circuit court properly denied Morrison’s postconviction motion without a Machner hearing.[5]
B. Sentencing Discretion.
¶14 Morrison contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion because it did not: (1) apply the sentencing objectives to the facts of this case or explain the length of Morrison’s sentences, particularly in light of his rehabilitative needs, see State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶43, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 558, 678 N.W.2d 197, 207 (sentencing court must “identify the factors that were considered in arriving at the sentence and indicate how those factors fit the objectives and influence the decision”); or (2) adequately consider what he alleges are mitigating character traits, including his age, family background, alleged remorse and acceptance of responsibility, and his post-arrest cooperation with the police.[6] We disagree.
¶15 Sentencing is within the discretion of the circuit court, and
our review is limited to determining whether the circuit court erroneously
exercised that discretion. McCleary
v. State, 49
“(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant’s personality, character and social traits; (4) result of presentence investigation; (5) vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the defendant’s culpability; (7) defendant’s demeanor at trial; (8) defendant’s age, educational background and employment record; (9) defendant’s remorse, repentance and cooperativeness; (10) defendant’s need for close rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; and (12) the length of pretrial detention.”
¶16 The circuit court considered the appropriate factors when it sentenced Morrison. It correctly described the crimes as being “very serious,” noting that Morrison used a box cutter during the bookstore robbery and punched the victim of the ice-cream-store robbery.
¶17 The circuit court also considered Morrison’s character, including his age, employment skills, acceptance of responsibility, and “severe cocaine addiction.” It commented that while Morrison had a young daughter “who does need a father,” this was not enough “to dissuade [him] from continuing to use cocaine.” The circuit court also noted that Morrison had a significant criminal record going back to 1987, and that despite “numerous occasions” for treatment, he had been “unwilling to deal with [his] cocaine problem”:
I don’t doubt in any way the severity of how addictive cocaine is. However if you can’t deal with it and you continue to commit crime, society has no alternative. We have treatment programs apparently that can deal with this, and however good those programs are, unless the person that has the addiction is willing to follow through on them, they are of no avail, and I believe you are in that classification at this point until such time as you show us that you mean it and will refrain free of drugs.
It determined that Morrison had “significant rehabilitative needs” which had not been “accomplished through supervision” and needed to be addressed “in a confined setting.”
¶18 Finally, the circuit court found that Morrison was a “threat to the community”: “[H]e has not shown that he can deal with [his cocaine addiction], and as a result of that he is a threat to the community which is exhibited by the two victims in these two crimes.” It explained, based on all of the factors, that probation was “clearly not appropriate” and that periods of supervision were necessary to “transition [Morrison] back into … and … protect the public.” It concluded that consecutive sentences were warranted because the crimes were “separate offense[s] committed days apart.” The circuit court fully explained Morrison’s sentences and the reasons for them.
C. Eligibility for Earned Release and Challenge
Incarceration Programs.
¶19 A circuit court’s determination of whether a defendant is eligible for the Challenge Incarceration or Earned Release Program involves: (1) a threshold determination of whether the defendant is statutorily eligible under Wis. Stat. §§ 302.045(2) or 302.05(3)(a), and then, (2) an exercise of discretion showing the circuit court’s reasons for its decision on the defendant’s ultimate eligibility. See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(3g), (3m); State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 160, ¶8, 246 Wis. 2d 744, 749, 632 N.W.2d 112, 115.
¶20 The circuit court determined that Morrison was not “eligible for either the boot camp [Challenge Incarceration Program] or Earned Release Program because of the serious nature of these offenses.” The nub of Morrison’s argument is that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion because it did not explain its reasons for finding him ineligible. We disagree.
¶21 While a circuit court must state whether the defendant is
eligible or ineligible for the Challenge Incarceration and Earned Release
Programs, it is not required to make “completely separate findings” as long as
“the overall sentencing rationale also justifies” its eligibility
determination. State v. Owens, 2006 WI
App 75, ¶9, 291
By the Court.—Judgment and orders affirmed.
Publication in the official reports is not recommended.
[1] The Honorable William Sosnay accepted Raymond L. Morrison’s guilty pleas, sentenced him, and entered the judgment of conviction. The Honorable M. Joseph Donald issued the orders denying Morrison’s postconviction motion.
[2]
It is not clear from the Record whether the headband references when
[3] Morrison claimed that Daroszeski changed her answer. The Record shows it was Clark, not Daroszeski, who changed her answer.
[4]
In his brief-in-chief on appeal, Morrison contends that the line-up was
“flawed” because he was “in the same position for the simultaneous viewing
instead of holding three different line ups and placing him in different
positions.” He did not raise this issue
in his postconviction motion.
Accordingly, we do not address it.
See Wirth v. Ehly, 93
[5]
In a one-sentence argument, Morrison also claims that his trial lawyer did not
“explain any of the legal principles and constitutional protections to his
client so his client could make an informed decision of whether he would agree
with counsel’s waiver of constitutional rights at the plea and waiver of
pretrial motions.” Morrison does not
provide any legal authority to support this argument or explain how this
information would have affected his decision to plead guilty. Accordingly, we do not address the issue further. See State v. Pettit, 171
[6]
Morrison also claims that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion because it failed to “explain” why it did not impose the lesser
sentences recommended by his lawyer. A
sentencing court, however, is not bound by sentencing recommendations. See State v. Johnson, 158
[7] Morrison also claims that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied his postconviction motion for sentence modification. For the reasons discussed above, the circuit court properly denied Morrison’s postconviction motion.