COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED May 6, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT II |
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State of
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Tracey L. Hansen,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
¶1 BROWN, C.J.[1] Tracey L. Hansen appeals her conviction for operating a vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration on grounds that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. She asserts that the officer did not see her violate any traffic laws, but dismisses the fact that the officer observed the vehicle she was driving improperly exit a parking lot of a bar at 1:30 a.m. and then suddenly disappear while the officer was following her in his squad, only to be spied again, parked behind a closed office building. We conclude this behavior was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.
¶2 Hansen also argues that the results of her blood alcohol test should be suppressed because the person who drew her blood did not testify at trial and the State did not otherwise submit evidence to show that person’s position and qualifications and the manner in which the blood test was drawn. However, the law is well settled that blood test results are admissible so long as they are properly authenticated. The officer’s testimony and the Blood/Urine Analysis form provided that authentication by showing that the results were from Hansen’s blood and the blood was drawn by a medical technologist. Therefore we affirm Hansen’s conviction.
¶3 The relevant facts are brief and undisputed. On October 6, 2007, at about 1:30 a.m., a Whitewater police officer saw a vehicle in a bar parking lot exit the lot on the left side of the driveway where a vehicle would typically enter the lot. The officer decided to follow the vehicle, travelling about fifteen miles per hour, one hundred feet behind it. But when the officer followed the vehicle onto another street, he lost sight of it. The officer found this unusual. So, he drove around the block for a minute or a minute and a half and found the vehicle parked in a parking lot behind a closed business. The officer then stopped his squad car, blocking the vehicle, and confronted the driver, who he identified as Hansen. We will relate additional facts necessary to Hansen’s blood test argument when we address that argument.
¶4 The first issue in this case is whether the officer had
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory (Terry)[2]
stop. Hanson argued before the circuit
court and argues here that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory stop, and thus, the evidence was obtained illegally. The circuit court denied Hansen’s motion,
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion at the time he initiated the
investigatory stop. We review de novo whether
the facts constitute reasonable suspicion.
¶5 Terry allows police to stop citizens when they have reasonable
suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶21,
241
¶6 Hansen points out that the officer did not see her violate
any traffic laws. It is true that the
officer could not tell whether she unlawfully exited the bar parking lot and he
did not see her weave or drive erratically or violate any other traffic
law. And, had Hansen driven on without
any road violations, and without disappearing, there would have been little or
nothing to justify the stop. In fact, we
surmise that the reasonable police officer likely would have concluded that her
behavior in the parking lot, though perhaps a technical violation of the rules
of the road, was innocent.
¶7 But, as she was being followed by the officer after leaving the
bar, she did a disappearing act. The
officer went around the block and hunted around for her before locating her parked
behind the closed office building. Actions
displaying evasion or flight may properly give rise to reasonable suspicion
when viewed in the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶75,
294
¶8 The circuit court asked the right rhetorical questions: “What is somebody doing in a parking lot behind a building that’s closed at 1:30 in the morning? Was she attempting to elude the police officer because it was odd that she vanished so quickly?” We agree with the implicit holding of the circuit court that the sequence of these events would lead a reasonable police officer to suspect that Hansen was trying to evade the officer, trying to shake him, trying to hide. It was therefore good police work for the officer to investigate whether Hansen’s conduct was, in fact, designed to avoid being detected for a crime. We conclude this was a valid Terry stop.
¶9 The second issue is whether Hansen’s blood alcohol test results were properly introduced at trial. Hansen contends that the results were inadmissible because the State did not have either the person who drew Hansen’s blood, or her supervisor, testify at trial or otherwise submit evidence showing the position and qualifications of the person doing the blood draw and the procedures or methods used.
¶10 To authenticate the blood alcohol test results at trial, the
State offered the arresting officer’s testimony and introduced into evidence a Blood/Urine
Analysis form. The Blood/Urine Analysis
form shows that a medical technologist collected the blood specimen: the medical technologist signed her name on
the form under the section “Specimen collected by” and checked “Med. Tech.” to
indicate that she was a medical technologist at the hospital. The arresting officer also testified at trial
that he was at the hospital and observed the medical technologist draw Hansen’s
blood, package and seal the blood in a box and fill out the Blood/Urine
Analysis form. The officer then took
custody of the sample and had it transmitted to the
¶11 The law is that the results of a blood alcohol test mandated by
statute are prima facie correct and admissible so long as the results are
properly authenticated.
Blood may be withdrawn from the person arrested for [operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration] … to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol … in the blood only by a physician, registered nurse, medical technologist, physician assistant or person acting under the direction of a physician.
¶12 The proof required for authentication is not contained in a
bright line rule. Rather, the degree of
proof necessary to establish a chain of custody is a matter within the trial
court’s discretion. See B.A.C. v. T.L.G.,
135
¶13 We conclude that the officer’s testimony at trial and the
Blood/Urine Analysis form sufficiently prove that the results were from a blood
test of Hansen’s blood drawn from a qualified person. The form shows that the person who drew
Hansen’s blood was a medical technologist.
And, the officer’s and the certified analyst’s testimony establishes
that the blood drawn from Hansen by that person was indeed the blood used in
the chemical analysis at the hygiene lab leading to the results admitted at
trial. Therefore the results are
admissible. Once admissible, challenges
to the qualifications of the operator and the facility, the methods of
operation or the accuracy of the equipment are challenges to the weight of the
evidence, not the admissibility.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.