COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 9, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT IV |
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State of
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. December Dawn Irwin,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
¶1 HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J.[1] December Dawn Irwin appeals her judgment of
conviction based on a jury verdict for operating while intoxicated and
operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration, third offense. Irwin argues she is entitled to a new trial
because the prosecutor violated Wis.
Stat. § 971.23, the discovery statute, by failing to disclose a
prosecution witness until two days before trial, and by failing to prove good
cause for the failure to disclose. We
conclude that the prosecutor’s disclosure was not contrary to
§ 971.23(1). We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On
April 30, 2007, Gary Lindgren, a part-time emergency medical technician (EMT),
discovered a car crashed into a tree in the City of
¶3 In
the early morning hours after the accident, Officer Sybers briefly interviewed
Samantha Olson, an EMT present at the accident scene. Sybers did not mention his conversation with
Olson in his accident report. In August
2007, defense counsel submitted a discovery demand seeking a list of witnesses
the State intended to call at trial. The
name of Samantha Olson was not disclosed to the defense at this time. In September 2007, the court scheduled a
trial date of November 28, 2007.
¶4 On
Monday, November 19, 2007, the prosecutor informed Irwin’s attorney by email
that Officer Sybers would be contacting a new witness who may have seen Irwin
driving while intoxicated before the accident. Two days before trial, November 26, the
prosecutor provided to defense counsel the name of a new witness, Samantha
Olson, and provided a written statement from Olson one day before trial stating
that she had seen Irwin driving while intoxicated before the accident. Additional facts relevant to the disclosure
of Olson’s name are provided in the discussion section.
¶5 Irwin filed a motion in limine to exclude Olson’s testimony, alleging a discovery violation under Wis. Stat. § 971.23 because the disclosure of Olson’s name was untimely, and the State had failed to show good cause for the lateness of its disclosure. The court denied the motion but allowed defense counsel an opportunity to interview Olson before beginning the trial. The jury found Irwin guilty on both counts, and the court entered a judgment of conviction on the operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration charge.
¶6 Irwin moved for a new trial, reasserting the alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.23. The court rejected Irwin’s motion, concluding that there was not a discovery violation because the disclosure was made within a reasonable period before trial, and even if the disclosure was untimely, the prosecutor showed good cause and the admission of Olson’s testimony was harmless. Irwin appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Irwin contends that the State violated the criminal discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23, by failing to disclose Olson as a witness until two days before trial. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23 requires a prosecutor to disclose to the defendant certain materials and information within its possession, custody or control “within a reasonable time before trial.” Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1).[2] Among the information that must be disclosed is a list of all witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at trial. Sec. 971.23(1)(d).
¶8 Alleged violations of Wis.
Stat. § 971.23(1) are evaluated in three steps. See State
v. Rice, 2008 WI App 10, ¶14, 307
¶9 The requirement to disclose under Wis. Stat. § 971.23 includes not only evidence in the
prosecutor’s actual possession, but any evidence the prosecutor should
reasonably possess. State v. DeLao, 2002 WI
49, ¶22, 252
¶10 Irwin contends that the prosecutor failed to meet his obligation to disclose Olson’s name within a reasonable time before trial by making the disclosure two days before trial. Officer Sybers identified Olson as a potential witness and interviewed her within hours of the accident. Irwin contends that, in the months following the accident, the prosecutor failed to exercise due diligence by not obtaining Olson’s name and the substance of her testimony from Sybers. Irwin contends that this untimely disclosure was not harmless error because Olson’s testimony was the only direct evidence the State produced to refute Irwin’s planned defense, which was that she was not operating the vehicle at the time of the accident.
¶11 As a general rule, information within the possession of
investigators, but not personally known to the prosecutor, is imputed to the
prosecutor. DeLao, 252
¶12 By November 19, 2007, Officer Sybers came to suspect that a
witness, presumably Olson, had seen Irwin operating her vehicle before the
accident. On that date, the prosecutor
emailed the following disclosure to defense counsel: “The arresting officer (Sybers) tells me he
might have a witness who saw [Irwin] drive away from the tavern alone shortly
before the accident. He’s trying to find
that witness today. I’ll keep you
posted.” November 19, 2007, was the
Monday before Thanksgiving, and Officer Sybers
testified that he was off work that week.
Sybers did not obtain a written statement from Samantha Olson until
November 26 declaring that she saw Irwin get behind the wheel and drive away
from the tavern alone. This statement
was faxed to defense counsel on November 27, the day before trial.
¶13 The
State asks us to engage in a straightforward prejudice analysis in determining
whether it violated the witness disclosure requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1),
citing Fredrickson v. Louisville Ladder Co., 52
¶14 Nonetheless, we conclude for different reasons that the trial court did not err in determining that the disclosure of Olson’s name was within a reasonable period of time before trial under Wis. Stat. § 971.23. Critical to our analysis is the fact that the prosecutor disclosed to defense counsel nine days before trial the basic substance of Olson’s testimony, if not Olson’s name. We acknowledge that because the prosecutor did not provide Olson’s name at that time the email itself did not fulfill the requirements of § 971.23(1)(d). However, because the prosecutor’s email apprised Irwin nine days before trial of the likely existence of a witness who would challenge Irwin’s planned defense that she was not the driver of the vehicle, the defense had sufficient time within the meaning of Harris to effectively use Olson’s name once it was disclosed two days before trial. The email gave defense counsel a fair opportunity to review counsel’s strategy and, if necessary, to gather additional information relevant to Irwin’s defense. Further, the email gave counsel information that allowed him to be prepared for the pre-trial interview of Olson when she was made available two days before trial. Irwin does not explain how the disclosure one day before trial deprived defense counsel of the opportunity to make effective use of the witness and her testimony. Accordingly, we conclude that, under the circumstances, the prosecutor’s disclosure of Olson’s name two days before trial was disclosure within a reasonable time before trial within the meaning of § 971.23(1).
¶15 This case is distinguishable from DeLao, wherein the
supreme court excluded a statement of the defendant that was disclosed during
the first day of trial. DeLao,
252
¶16 Because we conclude that the disclosure of Olson’s name two days before trial did not violate Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1), Irwin’s arguments that the State failed to show good cause and that the disclosure was not harmless error, which are both predicated on the existence of a violation of § 971.23(1), do not pertain.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(d) (2007-08). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2]
What a district attorney must disclose to a defendant. Upon demand, the district attorney shall, within a reasonable time before trial, disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney and permit the defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy or photograph all of the following materials and information, if it is within the possession, custody or control of the state:
….
(d) A list of all witnesses and their addresses whom the district attorney intends to call at the trial. This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal witnesses or those called for impeachment only.