COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED March 4, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT II |
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Emerging Energies, LLP,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Defendant-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Brown, C.J.,
¶1
¶2 EE develops renewable energy sources including wind energy. In 2005, it applied for a conditional use permit
(CUP) under ch. 24, “Wind Energy System Ordinance,” of the 2004 Manitowoc
County Code, to build a seven turbine wind energy system in the town of
ch. 24, “Large Wind Energy System Ordinance” with an effective date of May 1,
2006. The board of adjustment (BOA)
considered EE’s application in the spring and summer of 2006 and issued a CUP
on July 17, 2006. Following the advice
of Manitowoc County’s corporation counsel, BOA issued the CUP under the 2004
version of ch. 24.
¶3 Opponents of the proposed wind energy system promptly filed a certiorari action in circuit court. The court found that BOA erred in applying the 2004 ordinance because the newly revised 2006 ordinance was in effect when BOA voted to issue the CUP. The court remanded the application to BOA to reconsider it under the terms of the 2006 version of ch. 24. EE did not appeal the circuit court’s decision. Rather, it began the process of amending its application.
¶4 Before submitting an amended application, EE filed this
declaratory judgment action making a challenge to the validity of a number of
provisions of ch. 24. EE asserts that
the ordinance conflicts with Wis. Stat. § 66.0401(1)
(2005-06)[1]
and negatively impacts any wind
energy system proposed for construction in
¶5 The circuit court denied EE’s motion and dismissed the case, finding that EE’s complaint was “not ripe for judicial determination.” The court held that the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 66.0401(1) were to be applied on a case-by-case basis and EE could not mount a “facial” challenge to the statute. Rather, it had to go through the permit process and, if a CUP was denied, it would have to seek judicial review. EE appeals.
¶6 Our proper standard of review, when we are evaluating the
circuit court’s legal conclusion that EE’s case was not ripe, was dissected in Olson
v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶¶32-39, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749
N.W.2d 211. Here, we are reviewing both
the court’s grant of summary judgment to
¶7 EE argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that
this case was not ripe for judicial determination.[2]
It starts with the proposition that, on
its face,
¶8 Relying on Olson, EE contends that it “only
needed to show that the conduct of
¶9 Loy v. Bunderson, 107
(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it.
(2) The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy—that is to say, a legally protectible interest.
(4) The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.
¶10 In Olson, the supreme court defined the ripeness needed to entitle a party to a declaratory judgment action:
[A] plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment need not actually suffer an injury before availing himself of the Act. What is required is that the facts be sufficiently developed to allow a conclusive adjudication. As we [have previously] stated, “the facts [must] be sufficiently developed to avoid courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” The facts on which the court is asked to make a judgment should not be contingent or uncertain, but not all adjudicatory facts must be resolved as a prerequisite to a declaratory judgment.
Olson, 309
¶11 Whether EE’s case is ripe is dependent on Wis. Stat. § 66.0401(1):
(1) Authority to restrict systems limited. No county … may place any restriction, either directly or in effect, on the installation or use of … a wind energy system ¼ unless the restriction satisfies one of the following conditions:
(a) Serves to preserve or protect the public health or safety.
(b) Does not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency.
(c) Allows for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency. (Emphasis added.)
¶12 The circuit court held the issue was not ripe because the
statute prohibits restrictions on the installation or use of a wind energy system. The court reasoned that EE’s case was not
ripe because there are no restrictions imposed against the use or installation
of the seven wind turbines EE is proposing for its site in the town of
¶13 We are in agreement with the circuit court. First, the statute clearly requires that a county’s wind energy system’s ordinance be considered on a case-by-case basis because the statute specifically refers to a wind energy system; it does not refer to any wind energy system. A proposed restriction may be valid if it “serves to preserve or protect the public health or safety” or it “does not significantly increase the cost of the system” or it does not “significantly decrease its efficiency” or it “allows for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency.” See id. The final three constraints on county imposed restrictions are quantitative, the specifics of the restrictions and of the proposed wind energy system must be known before the court can decide if a restriction is invalid. For example, without specifics it would be guesswork to decide if the restriction “allows for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency.” See id. In this case, without sufficiently developed facts about the wind energy system, it is impossible for a court to declare that the ordinance is in conflict with the statute. Therefore, EE’s facial challenge to the ordinance is not ripe for adjudication.
¶14 Second, EE’s attempt to challenge the ordinance as it is applied to its proposed seven turbine wind energy system fails because it would be pure guesswork to decide how BOA would apply the ordinance to EE’s proposal. The ordinance gives BOA wide discretion in fashioning and issuing a CUP.
The Board will grant a conditional use permit if it determines that the requirements of this ordinance are met and that granting the permit will not unreasonably interfere with the orderly land use and development plans of the county. The Board may include conditions in the permit if those conditions preserve or protect the public health and safety; do not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency; or allow for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency.
¶15 The ordinance lists fourteen conditions the board may consider, Manitowoc County Code § 24.08(3)(a)-(n) (2007), and then provides:
The Board may waive or reduce the burden on the applicant of one or more of the factors in sub. (3) if it concludes that the purpose of this ordinance is met. The installation and continued operation of the large wind system or wind farm system are contingent upon compliance with any conditions that are set by the Board.
¶16 Contrary to EE’s assertion, the affidavits from its experts
detailing how the ordinance will impact its proposed wind energy system are not
enough to make the case ripe for a judicial determination. Those affidavits fail to take into
consideration the discretion BOA has in issuing a CUP. While EE’s experts may perceive a conflict
between provisions of the ordinance and EE’s proposed wind energy system, it is
impossible for a court to tell if BOA will perceive the same conflict. It is also impossible for a court to know how
BOA will fulfill the ordinance’s mandate that conditions it impose “preserve or
protect the public health and safety; do not significantly increase the cost of
the system or significantly decrease its efficiency; or allow for an
alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency.”[3]
¶17 Olson is of no help to EE.
In Olson, the Town of
¶18 Olson is easily differentiated from this case. In Olson, the Town had given
conditional approval of Olson’s plat subject to his obtaining and transferring
ten TDRs. Because Olson had demonstrated
more than a passing interest in developing his property, the supreme court held
that the case was ripe for adjudication.
¶19 In conclusion, EE’s facial challenge to Manitowoc County Code ch. 24 is not ripe for adjudication; Wis. Stat. § 66.0401(1) requires a case-by-case approach because the information needed to evaluate the impact of the ordinance on the proposed wind system is quantitative. EE’s “as applied” challenge is likewise unripe because the opinions of its experts fail to take into consideration the discretion vested in BOA.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] This
court is somewhat at a loss as to the type of challenge being mounted by
EE. In its amended brief in the circuit
court, EE informed the court, “Consequently, the court and counsel must analyze
the county’s ordinance for any proposed wind energy system in
“A facial challenge contends that a law or section
thereof cannot be constitutionally applied to any set of facts, and an as
applied challenge argues that the provision challenged is unconstitutional only
as applied to the facts of the case under consideration.” MDK, Inc. v.
Because EE did not argue an “as applied” challenge to
the circuit court we could decline to address the “as applied” challenge raised
before us.
[3] We point out the obvious; this language in the ordinance is copied verbatim from Wis. Stat. § 66.0401(1).