COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED February 26, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before Higginbotham, P.J., Vergeront and Bridge, JJ.
¶1 BRIDGE, J. U.S. Oil Company, Inc. appeals a judgment of the circuit court finding that U.S. Oil materially breached a contract for the sale of property owned by U.S. Oil and ordering U.S. Oil to convey title to the property to AMBR Enterprises upon tender of the purchase price. It contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that there was a breach because AMBR’s complaint did not allege that a breach occurred on the date identified by the circuit court, nor did AMBR present evidence at trial which indicated that AMBR considered the contract to be in breach on that date. It also argues that, pursuant to a provision in the contract addressing the acceptability of title at closing, it was excused from conveying title to the property to AMBR. Finally, it argues that even if it did breach its agreement to convey title, a subsequent addendum to the contract cured that breach under the doctrines of waiver or novation. We reject each argument and affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 U.S. Oil is a wholesale and retail distributor of petroleum
products. U.S. Oil and Texaco Downstream
Properties, Inc., were the owners of approximately thirty-eight acres of
property located in
¶3 In the spring of 2003, AMBR contacted U.S. Oil officials about purchasing approximately thirteen acres of the vacant portion of the property. Apparently, U.S. Oil had concerns regarding AMBR’s use of the property because of the potential for complaints regarding the existing semi-tanker truck traffic at the tank farm. AMBR advised U.S. Oil that the construction of mini-storage units was one of the proposed purposes for buying the property. U.S. Oil was satisfied that this usage would be compatible with the tank farm.
¶4 On approximately June 19, 2003, AMBR and U.S. Oil entered into a written contract for the purchase of the thirteen acres. Although the property was still owned in part by Texaco at the time the contract was signed, Texaco was not a party to the contract. The contract provided in part that AMBR would pay U.S. Oil $242,900 for title in fee simple to the parcel with a closing date set for no later than July 15. The contract specified that time was of the essence as to acceptance, occupancy, and closing. The contract further provided that upon payment of the purchase price at closing, U.S. Oil would deliver “merchantable title” to AMBR consisting of a “warranty deed … free and clear of all liens and encumbrances ….” No condition restricting the use of the property by AMBR was included in the contract.
¶5 Before
¶6 On May 31, 2005, after U.S. Oil had succeeded in obtaining full ownership of the land, U.S. Oil and AMBR executed a final addendum. This addendum provided for a new closing date “no later than July 31, 2005,” and stated that tax proration would be based on 2005 tax bills. The addendum provided that all other terms of the offer to purchase and prior amendments remained the same. In addition, the May 31 addendum provided as follows:
The parties hereby agree that, despite the time that has elapsed since the last activity on this transaction, it remains the parties’ intention to comply with all terms and conditions of the Offer to Purchase dated June 17, 2003, as amended, and to close on the sale of this property as soon as practical.
¶7 It appears that at the time the parties entered into the May
31, 2005 addendum, they were unaware that on May 9, the
¶8 In the meantime, U.S. Oil learned that AMBR no longer intended to restrict its use of the property to the building of mini-storage units. On July 7, 2005, U.S. Oil sent AMBR a letter stating that the transaction could still be closed at the same price. It stated that a condition of doing so, however, was AMBR’s commitment to placing mini-storage units on the site, as originally discussed. U.S. Oil then sent a second letter to AMBR advising it that the transaction would not be closed on July 31 on the basis of impossibility due to the moratorium, which prohibited the splitting of lots in the Village.
¶9 After the moratorium was lifted, AMBR filed suit for specific performance. Following a trial to the circuit court, the court found that U.S. Oil materially breached the contract when it failed to deliver merchantable title to AMBR on April 16, 2004. The court entered a judgment for specific performance in favor of AMBR, which required U.S. Oil to convey the property to AMBR upon tender of the purchase price. The execution of the judgment was stayed by the circuit court pending the outcome of U.S. Oil’s appeal. We reference additional facts as needed in the discussion below.
DISCUSSION
Breach on April 16, 2004
¶10 U.S. Oil first contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that a breach of contract occurred on April 16, 2004. It argues that AMBR did not allege in its complaint that there was a breach on that date, and that AMBR did not present evidence at trial which indicates that AMBR considered the contract to be in breach on that date. The circuit court rejected U.S. Oil’s argument. The court ruled that the evidence presented at trial “demonstrated [U.S. Oil’s] indisputable material breach on April 16, 2004” and that the evidence “has been available to and known by all parties for years prior to the trial.” The court also ruled that U.S. Oil failed to show that it suffered any prejudice from AMBR’s assertion of an April 16 breach.
¶11 When an issue is not raised by the pleadings but is tried by
either the express or implied consent of the parties, the issue will “be
treated in all respects as if [the issue] has been raised in the
pleadings.” Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2) (2007-08).[2] Section 802.09(2) authorizes the circuit
court to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof at trial, see Hess
v. Fernandez, 2005 WI 19, ¶15, 278 Wis. 2d 283, 692 N.W.2d 655,
but the failure to do so is not, in all circumstances, detrimental to the trial
of those issues. See § 802.09(2). A court may
treat the complaint as amended, even though no such amendment was requested,
where the opposing party has been fairly apprised of the issues involved and
the variance between the pleadings and the proof has not misled the opposing
party to his or her prejudice. Goldman
v. Bloom, 90
¶12 At trial, there was both testimony and argument with respect to U.S. Oil’s breach of contract on April 16, 2004. U.S. Oil was thus fairly apprised that the breach of contract on that date was a question involved in this case. Moreover, U.S. Oil has offered no proof establishing that the failure to formally amend the pleadings to allege April 16 as a date of breach was prejudicial to it in any respect. We therefore conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that a breach of contract occurred on April 16, 2004.[3]
Failure to Convey Clear
Title on April 16, 2004
¶13 U.S. Oil next argues that it was excused from conveying title to the property to AMBR because Texaco was still a partial owner of the property on April 16, 2004. U.S. Oil contends that, as a result, it was unable to convey clear title to AMBR on that date, which it claims voided the contract. To support this contention, U.S. Oil relies on a provision in the offer to purchase addressing the acceptability of title at closing. This provision provides that if title is unacceptable for closing, the buyer may object. If the buyer does so, the offer “shall be null and void.”[4]
¶14 The circuit court rejected U.S. Oil’s argument, ruling that the clause protected AMBR, rather than U.S. Oil. The court stated that U.S. Oil knew when it executed the initial contract in 2003 that it did not have merchantable title to the parcel. By agreeing to deliver merchantable title nonetheless, it knowingly assumed the risk of nonperformance. U.S. Oil disputes the court’s conclusion, arguing that the quoted language protected U.S. Oil as well as AMBR because the language prevented AMBR from suing U.S. Oil, and released U.S. Oil from further obligations with respect to the agreement.
¶15 The construction of a contract for the sale of real estate
presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Galatowitsch v. Wanat, 2000 WI App
236, ¶11, 239
¶16 The language of the provision relied upon by U.S. Oil is clear and unambiguous. It provides the buyer the right to object to title and the right to waive those objections. Under the terms of the provision, the agreement becomes null and void only if the buyer does not waive objections previously made to the acceptability of title. This provision does not afford the seller, in this case U.S. Oil, the right to assert deficiencies in title as a defense to the enforceability of the agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court properly ruled that U.S. Oil may not rely on this provision as a defense to its breach of the contract.
Waiver and Novation
¶17 U.S. Oil argues that, even if it did breach its agreement to convey the thirteen acre parcel to AMBR by failing to close on April 16, 2004, the subsequent addendum signed by AMBR on May 31, 2005, cured that breach under the doctrines of waiver or novation.
Waiver
¶18 In support of its claim of waiver, U.S. Oil relies on the fact that AMBR was aware of U.S. Oil’s failure to convey merchantable title on April 16, 2004, but did nothing until May 31, 2005, when it agreed to a new closing date. The circuit court ruled that the execution of the May 31 addendum, in and of itself, did not constitute a waiver or forgiveness of U.S. Oil’s prior breach. It determined that additional evidence beyond the terms of the May 31 addendum would be required to demonstrate an intent to waive on AMBR’s part, but the record was devoid of any evidence of an agreement by AMBR to release U.S. Oil from the consequences of its prior breach.
¶19 Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
known right. Christensen v. Equity Coop.
Livestock
¶20 Citing Ricchio v. Oberst, 76
Novation
¶21 U.S. Oil also argues that the May 31, 2005 addendum constituted
a novation of the parties’ prior agreements which ultimately called for an
April 16, 2004, closing date. In general
terms, novation is the substitution of an existing obligation with a new
agreement or obligation. Navine
v. Peltier, 48
¶22 Whether novation has occurred depends on two factors: (1) whether the facts show consent by the
parties, and (2) whether there was sufficient consideration to support the new
obligation. See id. at 594. The alleged existence of a novation presents
a mixed question of fact and law. Siva
Truck Leasing, Inc. v. Kurman Distribs., 166
¶23 As to whether the facts show consent, U.S. Oil contends that novation can be implied from the conduct of the parties. In particular, it argues that, at the time of the final addendum, the parties reached a new agreement with a new closing date. From this, U.S. Oil argues that it is reasonable to conclude that this new agreement was a substitution for the parties’ prior agreement, apparently on the basis that AMBR had forgiven earlier breaches of contract.
¶24 As we discussed above, the circuit court declined to infer from the May 31, 2005 addendum that AMBR forgave U.S. Oil’s April 16, 2004 breach. Moreover, the court ruled that there is no indication that AMBR intended the May 31 addendum to constitute a “new agreement” which would substitute for the parties’ prior agreement. The May 31 addendum states that the parties agree to amend the June 17, 2003 offer to purchase, and that all other terms of the offer and subsequent amendments remain the same.
¶25 The drawing of an inference on undisputed facts when more than
one inference is possible is a finding of fact which is binding upon this
court. “It is not within the province of
… any appellate court to choose not to accept an inference drawn by a fact
finder when the inference drawn is a reasonable one.” State v. Friday, 147
CONCLUSION
¶26 For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court for specific performance.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] The moratorium was repealed on September 8, 2005.
[2] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[3] Because
we conclude that a breach of contract occurred on April 16, 2004, we do not
address U.S. Oil’s argument that it was excused from performing the contract on
July 31, 2005, on the basis of impossibility due to the
[4] The provision provides in full as follows:
TITLE ACCEPTABLE FOR CLOSING: If title is not acceptable for closing, Buyer shall notify Seller in writing of objections to title by the time set for closing. In such event, Seller shall have a reasonable time, but not exceeding 15 days, to remove the objections, and the time for closing shall be extended as necessary for this purpose. In the event that Seller is unable to remove said objections, Buyer shall have 5 days from receipt of notice thereof, to deliver written notice waiving the objections, and the time for closing shall be extended accordingly. If Buyer does not waive the objections, this Offer shall be null and void. Providing title evidence acceptable for closing does not extinguish Seller’s obligations to give merchantable title to Buyer.