COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED January 27, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT III |
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Plaintiff-Respondent, v. George F. Barnes,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
¶1 BRUNNER, J.[1] George Barnes appeals a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). He contends the court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop because there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Deputy Edward McKillip of the Bayfield County Sheriff’s
Department stopped Barnes on December 12, 2007.
At the hearing on Barnes’ suppression motion, McKillip testified that at
approximately 7:00 p.m., after dark, he was patrolling
¶3 McKillip closed the distance between his and Barnes’ vehicles and observed Barnes continue to swerve, with his tires touching the centerline four times and the “partially snow-covered fog line area twice.” While Barnes’ tires did not cross the centerline, McKillip testified that Barnes would have collided with an oncoming vehicle traveling in the same manner. McKillip stated his observations of Barnes’ vehicle touching the centerline and fog line occurred over a distance of about one-quarter of a mile. On cross-examination, McKillip admitted he could not remember the sequence in which the four centerline touches and two fog line touches occurred, but he reiterated the line touches occurred in the course of swerving.
¶4 The trial court concluded McKillip had reasonable suspicion to stop Barnes. The court found that Barnes was weaving and his vehicle touched the centerline four times and the fog line twice, which constituted more than merely weaving within his lane. The court further found that McKillip was behind Barnes for several miles, but his observations occurred over a shorter distance. The court also relied on McKillip’s testimony that Barnes’ driving on the centerline would have caused a collision with an oncoming vehicle driving in the same manner.
¶5 The court also made a number of statements that Barnes
criticizes on appeal, contending they were not supported by evidence in the
record. For example, the court stated
the stop occurred near the “darkest stage of the season” and also that it was a
Friday, a “fish fry night.” The court
also referred to its knowledge of
In fact, I think a reasonable argument can be made that, because it is a narrow passage lane, the driver has to be even steadier of hand, and make sure that they keep their course true, as opposed to a great big wide thoroughfare, where there is a great deal of weaving that can occur quite safely.
The court also noted that the wheels of Barnes’ vehicle being on the centerline raised the inference that the frame extended beyond the center of the two-lane road.
DISCUSSION
¶6 To perform an investigatory traffic stop, an officer must
have a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed, or is about
to commit, a law violation. State
v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶11, 260
¶7 For an investigatory stop to be constitutionally valid, the
officer’s suspicion must be based upon “specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
the intrusion” on a citizen’s liberty. Terry v.
¶8 In State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶26, 301
Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, our supreme court refused to adopt a bright-line
rule that weaving within a lane of traffic, by itself, gives rise to a reasonable
suspicion for a traffic stop. Instead,
the court examined the totality of the circumstances and concluded that
reasonable suspicion justified the stop.
¶9 Here, we conclude McKillip had reasonable suspicion to stop Barnes and investigate whether he was driving while intoxicated. Under Post, the reasonable suspicion inquiry is not simply whether Barnes was weaving within his lane, but instead focuses on the totality of the circumstances. See id., ¶26. In Post, the court’s analysis of the totality of the circumstances focused primarily on the details of Post’s weaving. See id., ¶¶29-37.
¶10 Like in Post, Barnes was not weaving slightly within his lane. Barnes’ swerving repeatedly brought his vehicle into contact with both the centerline and fog line. Moreover, while the tires of Barnes’ vehicle did not cross the centerline, McKillip testified Barnes would have collided with an oncoming vehicle driving in the same manner. For such a collision to occur, some portion of Barnes’ vehicle necessarily breached the center of the roadway. Thus, Barnes’ swerving was not confined to his traffic lane.[2] The swerving also occurred in the evening, at 7:00 p.m., but the timing is not as significant as the swerving itself.
¶11 Barnes points to our supreme court’s statement in Post that the facts there presented a close case, see id., ¶27, and he argues the weaving here was less severe than in Post. Barnes also contends the court inappropriately considered facts not in the record. Comparing this case to Post, Barnes argues there was no testimony of Barnes traveling in an S-like manner, that McKillip could not recall the specific sequence of the six line touches and admitted some line touches on a given side may have been consecutive, and that Barnes was weaving less severely than Post in a narrower traffic lane. Barnes also argues that his driving was “exemplary” for most of the several miles McKillip was behind him, and that McKillip only observed the line touches over one-quarter of a mile.
¶12 First, contrary to Barnes’ assertion, there was no evidence suggesting that any of his driving was exemplary. While McKillip was behind Barnes for several miles, he was not observing Barnes’ driving until, from a distance, he noticed Barnes swerving. Only then did he catch up to Barnes and observe Barnes’ driving more closely.
¶13 As for McKillip’s failure to describe Barnes’ driving as “S-like,” nothing in Post requires the use of this terminology. McKillip specifically and repeatedly described Barnes’ driving as swerving. For example, when pressed about whether any of the line touches on a given side could have been consecutive, McKillip responded they could have been, but as part of swerving. Thus, the possibility of consecutive line touches did not negate McKillip’s testimony of swerving; it just meant Barnes did not necessarily touch the fog line or centerline every time he swerved left or right.
¶14 Further, that Post’s weaving in a larger traffic lane may have been wider than Barnes’ weaving in a narrower traffic lane does not make Barnes’ driving less suspicious. Unlike in Post, Barnes drove on the lines marking the boundaries of his traffic lane. Also, Barnes’ driving caused his vehicle to cross the center of the roadway.
¶15 Finally, we address Barnes’ challenge to the facts he contends were
not in the record, yet were relied upon by the trial court. Because our review of the historical facts is
de novo, this challenge only affects what historical facts we consider. See
Powers,
275
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2). It is also an expedited appeal under Wis. Stat. Rule 809.17. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted.
On January 22, 2009, the Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals denied Barnes’ motion for a three-judge panel.
[2] We note that, with limited exceptions, driving left of center on a two-way roadway is a traffic violation, which would provide an independent basis for stopping Barnes. See Wis. Stat. § 346.05.