COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 29, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. E. P. Wallace, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Wedemeyer[1] and Fine, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. E. P. Wallace appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree reckless homicide and battery, and from a postconviction order denying sentence modification. The issues are whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict for the reckless homicide, and whether the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict against Wallace for (the lesser included offense of first-degree) reckless homicide, and that the trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion when it imposed a thirty-year sentence on a dangerous drug dealer with a criminal record who perpetrated a homicide. Therefore, we affirm.
¶2 Wallace was a drug dealer.
Chaveon Brodie sold crack cocaine.
Wallace gave Brodie and her boyfriend, Jerry Taylor, $500 worth of crack
to sell. Brodie went to buy orange juice
and cigarettes, and could not remember whether she took the crack with her or
left it at
¶3 Wallace was charged with first-degree intentional homicide, intimidating a witness, and battery. The jury found Wallace guilty of the lesser- included offense of first-degree reckless homicide as a party to the crime, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1) (2003-04) and 939.05 (2003-04), and battery, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) (2003-04).[2] The trial court imposed a thirty-year sentence for the homicide, comprised of twenty-two- and eight-year respective periods initial confinement and extended supervision, and a nine-month concurrent jail term for the battery. Wallace moved for sentence modification, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Wallace challenges the homicide conviction as to the sufficiency of the evidence, and as to the length of the sentence.
¶4 Wallace contends that there was insufficient evidence to support
the homicide conviction; specifically, he claims that the testimony of the prosecution’s
lead witness was uncorroborated, and that she lacked credibility, as evidenced
by her tentative and evasive responses.
We disagree; Brodie’s testimony was not inherently incredible, and as
such, the deficiencies in and lack of corroboration for her testimony and her
credibility were matters for the jury to evaluate. See Johnson v. Merta, 95
¶5 First-degree reckless homicide has two elements: that the
defendant (1) “recklessly cause[] the death of another human being [and (2)]
under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life.” Wis.
Stat. § 940.02(1). Brodie
testified that Wallace was struggling with
¶6
[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If any possibility exists that the trier of fact could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it believes that the trier of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence before it.
State
v. Poellinger, 153
¶7 Wallace moved to dismiss the charges and to strike Brodie’s testimony, contending that she was so tentative that she was unable to prove the State’s case, and that Wallace was denied the right to any “meaningful cross examination” because most of Brodie’s responses consisted of “I don’t know [or] I don’t remember.” Nevertheless, the trial court decided that Brodie’s testimony was sufficient to allow Wallace a meaningful cross-examination, and was sufficient to allow the jury to evaluate Brodie’s responses and her credibility, and denied both motions.
¶8 Our review of the evidence also demonstrates that Brodie’s
testimony was consistent with the testimony of each neighbor, and could be
appropriately reconciled with the other evidence and reasonable inferences from
that evidence to prove Wallace’s guilt. We
agree that Brodie’s testimony was not inherently incredible as a matter of law,
and was sufficient to allow the jury to evaluate Brodie’s credibility, weigh
and reconcile the evidence, and find the facts.
See id. at 506-07; Johnson, 95
¶9 Wallace also contends that the trial court erroneously
exercised its sentencing discretion because a thirty-year sentence was unduly
harsh and excessive for a homicide in which he was not the shooter. Although the jury found that the State had
not proven that Wallace had the requisite “intent to kill,” it found that
Wallace had caused
¶10 Our principal focus is whether the
trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion.
When a
criminal defendant challenges the sentence imposed by the [trial] court, the
defendant has the burden to show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in
the record for the sentence at issue.
When reviewing a sentence imposed by the [trial] court, we start with
the presumption that the [trial] court acted reasonably. We will not interfere with the [trial]
court’s sentencing decision unless the [trial] court erroneously exercised its
discretion.
State v. Lechner,
217
¶11 The primary
sentencing factors are the gravity of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the need for public protection.
State v. Larsen, 141
¶12 The trial court addressed each of the primary sentencing factors. The trial court explained that “[a]ny crime that involves loss of human li[f]e … is an extremely serious crime.” The trial court continued to explain that nothing
compare[s] to the loss of life by the victim himself who has been deprived of his life, of continuing to live and enjoy life or to his family who won’t have him anymore, and [the trial court] know[s] that there’s really nothing that anyone can do, least of all [the trial court], to make that right. What happened on that day is final with respect to that victim. That’s what makes homicide such a serious crime, and that has to be reflected in the sentence … impose[d] today.
The trial court addressed Wallace’s character. While the trial court has sentenced convicted defendants with a “worse” character than that of Wallace, the trial court commented that Wallace “hardly [has] the conduct and the background of a law-abiding person who is trying to show that [he honors] his responsibilities, with respect to the community, as an ordinary citizen or as a father.” The trial court was extremely troubled that Wallace was involved in drug-dealing at the time of the homicide. The trial court summarized its assessment of Wallace by concluding that “[t]he circumstances of the crime reveal that the defendant is an extremely dangerous person to have behaved as he did on the day in question.” The trial court concluded its remarks by explaining that it must impose a sentence that will punish the defendant and protect the community from him. The trial court properly exercised its discretion.
¶13 Wallace also claims that the trial court did not impose a
sentence that met the minimum custody standard, namely that imposed the least
amount of confinement necessary to meet the sentencing objectives. See State
v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶23, 270
required to impose the least severe sentence that accomplishes the sentencing goals. [The trial court’s] sentencing goals here are to reflect the seriousness of this crime, to punish the defendant for having taken a human life in the manner in which [he] did … and to protect the community from Mr. Wallace.
In response to that same criticism in his postconviction motion, the trial court further explained that it “found that 30 years was the least severe sentence that would address the extreme seriousness of the offense, the particular character of the defendant, and the need for protection in the community.” Additionally, the trial court explained that it applied each of the primary sentencing factors in meeting the minimum custody standard, which we previously addressed. We are satisfied that the trial court’s explicit comments at sentencing, and more detailed comments in its postconviction order directly explain how it exercised its sentencing discretion in meeting the minimum custody standard.
¶14 Incident to Wallace’s other sentencing challenges, he also contends that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh and excessive. Preliminarily, Wallace’s sentencing challenges are predicated on his claim that he was not the shooter. The jury and the trial court judge presiding over that jury trial found Wallace guilty of first-degree reckless homicide. Consequently, the trial court properly imposed sentence for that offense.
¶15 “A sentence well
within the limits of the maximum sentence is not so disproportionate to the
offense committed as to shock the public sentiment and violate the judgment of
reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the
circumstances.” State v. Daniels, 117
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5. (2005-06).