COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 24, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT IV |
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City of Mineral Point,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Patrick C. Ford,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
¶1 DYKMAN, J.[1] Patrick Ford appeals from a judgment and an order following a guilty verdict for driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). Ford argues that the City of Mineral Point failed to provide sufficient evidence of venue, and therefore he was entitled to dismissal at the close of the City’s case in chief.[2] We disagree, and therefore affirm.
Background
¶2 In October 2006, City of
¶3 At the close of the City’s case-in-chief, Ford moved to dismiss the case against him due to the insufficiency of evidence proving venue. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found Ford not guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration.
¶4 Ford then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
again arguing that the City failed to establish proof of venue in its
case-in-chief. The trial court denied
the motion. The court said that, from
“unmistakable geographic references to Mineral Point” at trial, an
Standard of Review
¶5 A motion
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict shall only
be granted if “the court is satisfied that, considering all credible evidence
and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a
finding in favor of such party.” Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1). We “give substantial deference to the trial
court’s better ability to assess the evidence.”
Weiss v. United Fire and Cas. Co., 197
¶6 We review a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict de novo, applying the same standards as the trial
court. Logterman v. Dawson, 190
Discussion
¶7 Ford argues that he was entitled to dismissal after the City
rested its case-in-chief because the City had not presented sufficient evidence
of venue in
¶8 “[V]enue refers to the place of trial, the particular county
or district or similar geographical area within which a case is to be
heard.” State v. Corey J.G., 215
¶9 As an initial matter, Ford argues that a motion to dismiss at
the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief precludes a court from considering
subsequently offered evidence. We agree
that we are so limited. In reviewing a
motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, we consider “only
the proof which [has] been offered by the plaintiff at the time it rested its
case.” See Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 176
¶10 The parties agree that there was no direct proof that the
traffic violation occurred in
where no witness expressly states that the crime was committed in the county as charged, but there are references in the evidence to various localities and landmarks at or near the scene of the crime, known by or probably familiar to the jury, and from which they reasonably may have concluded that the offense was committed in the county alleged, the venue is sufficiently proved.
¶11 In Piper v. State, 202 Wis. 58, 61, 231 N.W. 162 (1930), the
defendant was prosecuted for practicing medicine without a license in his shop,
located on Fond du Lac Avenue. A police
officer for the City of
¶12 Here, Pilling testified that he is a police officer for the
City of Mineral Point and that he was performing his normal patrol duties when
he stopped Ford’s vehicle on
¶13 Ford argues that Piper should be distinguished in
that the landmarks referenced in Pilling’s testimony are not unique to
¶14 Ford contends that his case is analogous to State
v. Wiedenfeld, 229
¶15 Finally, Ford contends that the trial court erred in taking
judicial notice of the fact that the streets and landmarks in Pilling’s
testimony are located in Mineral Point, Iowa County, Wisconsin. Ford frames this argument as an appeal from
the court’s denial of his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. However, our review of a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is de novo, and thus we need not reach
the trial court’s reasoning. Moreover,
Ford has not advanced any argument as to why he is entitled to judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and we therefore decline to address this issue
further.
By
the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in
the official reports. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(c) (2005-06). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] The
court’s final order is labeled as a denial of Ford’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. At the
hearing on Ford’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the parties
argued over whether the motion was properly labeled, as it challenged the trial
court’s denial of Ford’s motion to dismiss at the close of the City’s
case-in-chief. The order states as its
purpose: “To reconsider the motion of
the defendant, Patrick C. Ford, made at the time plaintiff rested its case
during the jury trial held September 27, 2007, for dismissal on lack of
sufficiency of the evidence to prove venue in
[3] Ford
does not argue that the streets and landmarks identified by Pilling were not in