COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED May 22, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Higginbotham, P.J., Dykman and Bridge, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. James Armbrust appeals an order denying a motion for relief from a default judgment. The issue is whether his attorney’s untimely filing of the answer should be imputed to Armbrust. Under the facts of this case, we conclude Armbrust was blameless and default judgment was inappropriate. We therefore reverse and remand.
¶2 Frances Vetterkind commenced an action alleging Armbrust failed to pay on a promissory note. Armbrust’s attorney filed an answer four days late. Vetterkind filed a motion for default judgment and, at the motion hearing, Armbrust’s attorney stated he misunderstood the effective date of the statutory change from forty-five to twenty days in which to answer a complaint under Wis. Stat. § 802.06(1).[1] The circuit court acknowledged, “there may have been some confusion about when it was going to be effective,” but found no excusable neglect and granted the motion for default judgment. The court subsequently denied Armbrust’s motion for relief from judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a), (c) and (h). This appeal followed.
¶3 A circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 is reviewed
subject to an erroneous exercise of discretion standard. Connor v. Connor, 2001 WI 49, ¶27,
243
¶4 We turn first to whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion by denying relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a), which provides that a party may be relieved from a judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Cases from our supreme court have discussed excusable neglect in the context of imputing the conduct of an attorney to the client.
¶5 In Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. Wiegel,
92 Wis. 2d 498, 514, 285 N.W.2d 720 (1979), the court stated that an
attorney’s failure “may constitute excusable neglect on the part of the client,
when the client has acted as a reasonable and prudent person in engaging a
lawyer of good reputation, has relied upon him to protect his rights, and has
made a reasonable inquiry concerning the proceedings.” The court concluded that the circuit court’s
exercise of discretion “may or may not call for imputation, depending on the
facts of each case.”
¶6 In State v. Smythe, 225
¶7 Under the facts of the present case, we conclude the untimely
answer should not be imputed to Armbrust. First, nothing in the record demonstrates that
Armbrust acted imprudently in engaging his attorney or relying upon his
attorney to protect his rights. As a
practical matter, a layperson ordinarily cannot be expected to supervise his or
her attorney in answering a complaint. This
is not a case involving protracted proceedings without inquiry by the client,
or conduct by the attorney which should have raised the client’s suspicions. See
Charolais
Breeding Ranches, 92
¶8 Moreover, there is no evidence of Armbrust’s complicity. To the contrary, his attorney admitted on the record in open court that, “the only fault is my own.” We also note the circuit court’s observation that, “there may have been some confusion about when [the statutory change] was going to be effective.” Accordingly, we are unable to discern from the facts of this case conduct by the attorney that may be properly imputed to the client.
¶9 In order to obtain relief from a default judgment, the person
against whom it has been entered must also show that he or she has a
“meritorious defense” to the action. See J.L.
Phillips, 217
¶10 Therefore, we cannot uphold the circuit court’s conclusion as a
proper exercise of discretion. We
reverse specifically as to the issue of imputing the negligence of the attorney
to Armbrust. We need not reach the issue
of whether additional subsections of Wis.
Stat. § 806.07 justified relief from judgment. See
Gross
v. Hoffman, 227
¶11 Our reversal of the default judgment in the case should not be
interpreted as an impairment of the court’s power to grant default or effectuate
other sanctions to facilitate the efficient administration of justice in the
appropriate circumstances. See Smythe, 225
By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.