COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 1, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Wedemeyer and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 CURLEY, P.J. Warren Jamaal Wells appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree intentional homicide while using a dangerous weapon, as a party to the crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.63 (amended Feb. 1, 2003), and 939.05 (2001-02).[1] Wells seeks a new trial, contending that his confession was improperly entered into evidence when his pretrial motion to suppress was denied. He claims that his confession was not voluntary because it was elicited by coercive acts and undue pressure from police. We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances surrounding Wells’ interrogation, the police were neither coercive nor applied undue pressure to overpower his ability to resist. Because Wells’ confession to police was voluntary and properly admitted into evidence, we affirm.
I. Background.
¶2 On February 27, 2004,
¶3 Beginning on the night he was arrested and continuing for the next three days, Wells was interviewed by police four times. He was provided his Miranda rights before each interview, but waived them each time.[2] The first interview lasted from 10:47 p.m. until 3:37 a.m. the next morning, approximately five hours. Wells told police that he was at his girlfriend’s house and then a friend’s house on the evening of the shooting, that he only knew of the shooting through television reports, and that he did not know any of the various people shown to him in police photos. He signed a written statement of the first interview.
¶4 The second interview of Wells occurred approximately four hours after the first on March 1, 2004. It began at approximately 7:30 a.m. and ended at 3:30 p.m., lasting approximately eight hours, during which there were several breaks. During the interview, Wells refused to state the addresses of the residences he claimed to be at on the evening of the shooting and again denied having any part in the shooting. He refused to sign a written statement of the second interview.
¶5 Wells’ third interview with police occurred twelve hours after the second interview and lasted for approximately fifty minutes. It took place from 3:59 a.m. to 4:47 a.m. on March 2, 2004. Wells continued to refuse to identify his friend’s home address. He declined to sign a written statement of the third interview.
¶6 Wells was interviewed by police a fourth time, for approximately ten hours, from 8:42 p.m. on March 3, 2004, until 6:40 a.m. on the morning of March 4, 2004. This interview occurred forty hours after the third interview. During this interview, Wells admitted to shooting Blucher using “a black .25 caliber semiautomatic handgun with six bullets in the clip.” He also acknowledged recognizing the three eyewitnesses who identified him. Wells claimed that he had actually been firing his gun at the three witnesses because he had heard they were trying to kill him, and that Blucher “must have been walking off the porch, and walked into the gunfire.” He apologized to the police for waiting so long to admit to shooting Blucher. Wells signed three of the six pages of the written statement of the interview; declining to sign any page with his admissions to the shooting. Later that day, Wells was charged with first-degree intentional homicide while using a dangerous weapon, as a party to the crime.
¶7 In a pretrial motion, Wells sought to suppress his statement to police made in the fourth interview in which he admitted to shooting Blucher. He claimed that police had extracted a false statement from him through coercion by speaking of Jesus Christ and the movie The Passion of the Christ, showing him a picture of his pregnant fiancée and telling him he would never see her again, repeatedly telling him they did not believe him, and repeatedly telling him he was guilty.
¶8 The court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, finding that Wells evidenced that he did not feel undue pressure to confess because he had the ability to decline signing portions of his written statements, he was provided with sufficient breaks and creature comforts, he was advised of his Miranda rights and chose to waive them, and his act of crying during the final interview was “entirely consistent with coming to grips with incriminating one’s self with such a serious crime.”
¶9 A jury found Wells guilty of first-degree intentional homicide while using a dangerous weapon, as a party to a crime. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with eligibility for extended supervision after forty-five years. Wells now appeals based on the denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police made during the fourth interview.
II. Analysis.
¶10 Our standard for reviewing a motion to suppress an inculpatory
statement involves mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Backstrom, 2006 WI App 114,
¶9, 293
¶11 If Wells’ confession was not voluntary, then, under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, his confession would not be
admissible. State v. Agnello, 2004 WI
App 2, ¶8, 269
The personal characteristics to be considered may include the defendant’s age, education and intelligence, physical and emotional condition, and prior experience with police. These must be balanced against police pressures and tactics used to induce admission, such as the duration of the questioning, the general conditions under which the confession took place, any excessive physical or psychological pressure brought to bear on the [defendant], any inducements, threats, or other methods used to compel a response, and whether the defendant was informed of his right to counsel and right against self-incrimination.
¶12 Based on the standard above, in order to determine whether Wells’ confession was voluntary, we must analyze and balance his personal characteristics against the police pressures used to induce his admission.
A. Wells’ Personal
Characteristics
¶13 Wells claims that because he was only twenty years old, was
uneducated, had a minor criminal record, and had no experience with police
interrogations, he was highly susceptible to giving in to police
pressures. However, his personal
characteristics do not place him in the category of being “uncommonly
susceptible to police pressures.” State
v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶46, 261
¶14 The record shows no evidence of Wells having a “weak mind.” At the time of the interviews, Wells was twenty years old, which was sufficient to categorize him as an adult for police purposes of investigating his possible involvement in the homicide of Blucher. See Wis. Stat. § 938.02(1). He had acquired a tenth-grade education and was able to read and write, with nothing suggesting that he was of diminished intelligence.
¶15 What the record does show is that he had a lengthy criminal
history and familiarity with his rights.
Even one prior arrest and conviction has been shown to be enough to
characterize a person as an “experienced criminal.” McAdoo, 65
¶16 We find that Wells’ personal characteristics and prior contacts with police were sufficient to characterize him as an experienced criminal, and that he therefore evidenced an ability to resist pressure from police.
B. Police Pressures Used to
Induce Admission
¶17 In addition to analyzing the personal characteristics of the
defendant, we must review the police pressures applied to induce an
admission. Agnello, 269
¶18 Wells was interviewed four times from the time of his arrest to
the time of his confession. He was
interviewed for twenty-four of the seventy-seven hours in which he was in
custody during that time. While those
are both significant amounts of time, “the length of interrogation and custody,
while certainly relevant to the discussion of voluntariness, simply is not
dispositive in and of itself.” State
v. Turner, 136
¶19 As stated before, Wells was provided his Miranda rights at the
beginning of each interview session, which he waived each time. These multiple reminders were more than
sufficient to allow someone with Wells’ prior police experience to understand
his rights. See Backstrom, 293
¶20 Wells claims that police put undue psychological pressure on him by speaking of Jesus Christ and the movie The Passion of the Christ, showing him photographs of the persons they claimed identified him, showing him a photograph of the victim, showing him a picture of his pregnant fiancée and telling him he would never see her again, repeatedly telling him they did not believe him, and repeatedly telling him he was guilty. Wells does not claim that detectives made threats or promises to elicit his admission or that he was ever told he could not contact family or friends while in custody.
¶21 Police officers told Wells that they did not believe his denial
of involvement in the shooting. Police
interviewers are not obligated to accept a suspect’s denial of wrongdoing, and
telling an arrestee that he knows more than he is admitting is not unfairly
coercive.
¶22 Wells objects to being shown pictures of sensitive photographs
relating to the shooting. However,
“[t]he confrontation of [a] defendant with information against him[,] ‘whatever
that may be, does not amount to the utilization of overwhelming force or
psychology.’” Barrera v. State, 99
¶23 In addition, Wells contends that police mentioned his pregnant
girlfriend and Jesus Christ to apply undue pressure on him. He fails, however, to present an argument as
to why the mention of either would unduly cause him to falsely confess to the
shooting of Blucher. Even if police told
Wells that his girlfriend would testify against him, that would not constitute
an unfair police practice.
¶24 Finally, Wells claims that the trial court incorrectly found that because he signed portions of his statements from the fourth interview, but not others, he was under no pressure. Wells points to his testimony at the suppression hearing where he said all of the written statements of his fourth interview with police in which he confessed to shooting Blucher were untrue, even though he signed the portions he believed did not incriminate him, and where he clearly stated that he was under pressure during the entire interrogation process.
¶25 However, the court did not find that Wells was under no
pressure, but rather that he was not subjected to undue pressure and that he
showed the ability to resist the pressure that was present. It is not unusual that an individual being
questioned by police in a similar manner to Wells would feel pressure. In order to find undue pressure we must be
persuaded that there was “excessive physical or psychological pressure brought
to bear on the [defendant]” or “inducements, threats, or other methods used to
compel a response.” Agnello, 269
¶26 The trial court found that Wells physically signed those
portions of his statement that were not incriminating to him. The trial court’s finding in this regard is
supported by the record. Therefore,
despite Wells’ self-serving testimony that he was pressured throughout the
process and that the entire statement was untrue, we conclude that his act of
signing some portions of his statement, but not others, showed that Wells was
not “broken down” by undue police pressure and not coerced into giving an
involuntary admission. See Eason, 245
¶27 After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of Wells and balancing his personal characteristics with the pressures applied by police in securing his confession, we conclude that Wells’ statements to police were voluntary. Wells has failed to show that the police were coercive or applied undue pressure to overpower his ability to resist. Because the trial court properly denied Wells’ motion to suppress, we affirm.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.