COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED February 12, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Dillard Earl Kelley, Sr., Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Wedemeyer, Fine and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Dillard Earl Kelley, Sr.
appeals pro se from an order denying
his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2005-06)[1]
motion. He claims that the trial court
erred in denying his motion seeking to vacate his judgment and his motion for
appointment of counsel. Because Kelley’s
claims are procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185
BACKGROUND
¶2 In 1989, Kelley was convicted of seven counts of
second-degree murder, four counts of arson of a building, two counts of arson
of property and one count of arson with intent to defraud, all as party to a
crime. After a trial to the court,
Kelley was found guilty and sentenced to 229 years in prison. Kelley appealed his convictions, challenging
“the admissibility of his drug-related activities at trial and the length of
his sentence.” We summarily affirmed the
convictions, holding that the other acts evidence was properly admitted and the
trial court did not erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.
¶3 In 1993, Kelley filed another postconviction motion, which was denied by the trial court and the denial affirmed by this court. In 1996, Kelley petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied and the appeal related to that was also denied. In 2002, Kelley filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the trial court. In 2004, Kelley filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, which the trial court summarily denied, citing Escalona. The trial court ruled that most of Kelley’s claims were procedurally barred either because they were raised in a previous postconviction motion or because Kelley had failed to provide any sufficient reason for not having raised them previously. We affirmed the trial court’s order and the supreme court denied Kelley’s petition for review.
¶4 In 2007, Kelley filed a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction “pursuant to [Wis. Stat.] § 901.03(4)” and a motion seeking appointment of counsel. The trial court denied both motions, stating “the court does not appoint counsel for purposes of filing a 974.06 motion,” and the claims Kelley raises are procedurally barred by Escalona. Kelley now appeals from the trial court order denying his motions.
DISCUSSION
¶5 Kelley raises numerous issues in an essentially incomprehensible brief to this court. He appears to raise nine issues and asserts that his claims are not procedurally barred. We disagree.
¶6 Defendants are not permitted to pursue an endless succession of postconviction remedies:
We need finality in our litigation. Section 974.06(4) compels a prisoner to raise all grounds regarding postconviction relief in his or her original, supplemental or amended motion. Successive motions and appeals, which all could have been brought at the same time, run counter to the design and purpose of the legislation.
Escalona, 185
¶7 “[D]ue process for a convicted defendant permits him or her a
single appeal of that conviction and a single opportunity to raise claims of
error.” State ex rel. Macemon v. Christie,
216
¶8 Moreover, Kelley does not proffer any sufficient reason for raising his claims in this motion rather than in prior motions. Rather, he argues that the procedural bar does not apply because he is raising a claim under Wis. Stat. § 901.03(4)[2] and he argues the procedural bar does not apply to that statute. We are not convinced. Kelley’s motion is clearly a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, subject to the procedural bar. Further, the single evidentiary claim Kelley raises, which is subject to § 901.03(4), was previously rejected by this court in his direct appeal, and therefore cannot be reconsidered here.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted.
[2]
901.03 Rulings on evidence. (1) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected;
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(4) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the judge.