COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED January 29, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT III |
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State of
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Leo Manuel Diaz,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before
¶1 PER CURIAM. Leo Diaz appeals a judgment of conviction for two counts of solicitation of first-degree intentional homicide. He contends the trial court erred by prohibiting him from impeaching one of the State’s witnesses with evidence of prior convictions. We conclude the court properly excluded the evidence and affirm.
Background
¶2 Blaine Denny, an employee at a storage facility and a former police officer, rented a unit to two Hispanic males on May 24, 2004. Denny found their behavior suspicious and contacted police. He later identified Diaz as one of the renters.
¶3 Based on Denny’s information, police obtained a search warrant for the storage unit and discovered over one hundred pounds of marijuana. Sergeant Todd Delain from the Brown County Sheriff’s Department investigated Diaz’s involvement in trafficking those drugs. Diaz implicated himself and was charged with conspiracy to deliver THC, a felony with a possible prison term of up to fifteen years.
¶4 In July 2005, while Diaz was an inmate at the
¶5 After a jury was selected, Diaz moved to admit, for impeachment purposes, evidence of Withers’ prior convictions. Diaz argued there were thirteen; the State had counted ten. However, the court denied the motion as untimely. The trial proceeded and Withers testified, but Diaz did not. The jury convicted Diaz on both counts.
Discussion
¶6 Evidence of a witness’s prior convictions is admissible for
the purpose of attacking that witness’s credibility. Wis.
Stat. § 906.09(1).[1]
¶7 Whether to allow evidence of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes is within the trial court’s discretion.
¶8 Here, Diaz[2] brought his motion to admit evidence of Withers’ prior convictions the day of trial, after the jury had been selected. The court denied the motion as untimely, stating, “I believe the requirement is it is made at pretrial, and it hasn’t been made at pretrial…. I’ll deny the motions for not being timely made….” Diaz contends the court’s decision on timeliness “is not the law.”
¶9 There is no statutory requirement that a motion to admit
evidence of a witness’s prior convictions be brought before trial and, to the
extent the trial court may have thought there was such a statutory rule, it was
in error. However, the circuit courts
have authority to adopt and apply local rules.
See Community Newspapers, Inc. v.
City of
¶10 Diaz has declined to file a reply brief in this matter and, as
such, we deem the matter conceded. See Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC
Secs. Corp., 90
¶11 Diaz is correct to note that, in determining whether to admit
or exclude the prior conviction evidence, the court is to engage in a balancing
test to evaluate whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by
possible prejudice. See Wis. Stat. § 906.09(2);
see also State v. Smith, 203
¶12 Moreover, the evidence of Withers’ prior convictions goes only to his credibility, not directly to any disputed elements of the crimes themselves. Viewing the trial as a whole, there was no reasonable possibility the lack of impeachment evidence contributed to the conviction. Because this incident took place in jail, the jury would likely have inferred Withers had some sort of prior record, even if they could not fully infer the extent. Withers’ testimony was consistent with his contemporaneous notes and with statements he gave to investigators. The audio recording of a conversation between Diaz and Withers further corroborated Withers’ trial testimony. Withers had no motive to fabricate facts—there is nothing to indicate he received any consideration for his cooperation. Finally, Withers testified to multiple facts that he could only have learned from Diaz, such as the names of the key witnesses in the drug case, Denny’s informant identification number and address, Delain’s badge number, and the existence of the drug cartel and the extent of Diaz’s involvement in it.
¶13 Thus, even if the trial court erred and should have allowed
Diaz to impeach Withers, we conclude any such error was harmless. There was no “reasonable possibility that the
error contributed to the conviction.” State
v. Dyess, 124
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.