COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED December 27, 2007 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
Appeal No. |
|
|||
STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
|||
|
DISTRICT I |
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Antonio T. Maddox, Defendant-Appellant. |
||||
|
|
|||
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Wedemeyer and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Antonio T. Maddox appeals from an order summarily denying his motion for postconviction plea withdrawal. The issue is whether postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to previously seek plea withdrawal for the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We conclude that Maddox has not shown that his trial counsel was ineffective, negating any correlative claim of ineffectiveness by postconviction counsel for failing to move for postconviction plea withdrawal. Therefore, we affirm.
¶2 Maddox shot and killed two men in a
¶3 Maddox moved for plea withdrawal, contending that he was not fully aware of the elements and nature of the offenses, and that his trial and postconviction counsel were ineffective: the former for failing to explain imperfect self-defense and for urging him to plead guilty, the latter for refusing to pursue plea withdrawal in favor of or in addition to sentence modification. The trial court summarily denied his postconviction motion, ruling that the record belied Maddox’s claims that his pleas were entered without his understanding of the elements and nature of the offenses and their potential defenses, which thereby negated his ineffective assistance claims.
¶4 Maddox appeals, contending that: (1) he did not “fully” understand the elements and nature of the offenses; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for urging him to “[t]ake the deal” and not explaining to him about imperfect self-defense, for had he known, he would not have pled guilty. He also claims that he raised these complaints with postconviction counsel whom he alleged was also ineffective for refusing to pursue them in proceedings pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30(2) (1999-2000).[1] Maddox contends that his claims warrant an evidentiary hearing.
¶5 To demonstrate entitlement to a postconviction evidentiary hearing, the defendant must meet the following criteria:
Whether a defendant’s postconviction motion alleges
sufficient facts to entitle the defendant to a hearing for the relief requested
is a mixed standard of review. First, we
determine whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient material facts
that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief. This is a question of law that we review de
novo. [State v.] Bentley,
201
State v. Allen,
2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274
¶6 To enter
a valid guilty plea, the trial court must
comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.08.
Whenever the sec. 971.08
procedure is not undertaken or whenever the court-mandated duties are not
fulfilled at the plea hearing, the defendant may move to withdraw his plea. The initial burden rests with the defendant
to make a prima facie showing that
his plea was accepted without the trial court’s conformance with sec. 971.08
or other mandatory procedures as stated herein.
Where the defendant has shown a prima
facie violation of sec. 971.08(1)(a) or other mandatory duties, and alleges
that he in fact did not know or understand the information which should have
been provided at the plea hearing, the burden will then shift to the state to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s plea was knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entered, despite the inadequacy of the record at
the time of the plea’s acceptance.
¶7 Maddox claims that he did not “fully” understand the elements or nature of the offenses, namely the legal meaning or significance of “intent to kill.” See Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01; 940.05. He claims that the trial court did not explain these concepts to him, nor did it ask Maddox’s trial counsel if he provided this explanation.
¶8 During the guilty plea colloquy, the trial court asked Maddox
whether his trial counsel had reviewed the elements of the offenses with him,
and whether Maddox understood the elements and how they related to the facts
alleged in the complaint. Maddox
responded affirmatively to those inquiries.
Moreover, Maddox had signed a guilty plea questionnaire and waiver of
rights form in which he also acknowledged that he “underst[oo]d what [he was]
charged with, what the penalties are and why [he] ha[d] been charged. [He] also underst[oo]d the elements of the
offense and their relationship to the facts in this case and how the evidence
establishe[d his] guilt.” See State
v. Moederndorfer, 141
¶9 Maddox also contends that his trial and postconviction
counsel were ineffective. To maintain an
ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must show that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that this deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. Strickland v.
¶10 Maddox’s principal ineffective assistance claims are against trial counsel for failing to explain imperfect self-defense to him, which Maddox claims would have prompted him to forego pleading guilty and to instead proceed to trial. Maddox also contends that his trial lawyer urged him to “[t]ake the deal” because he allegedly told Maddox there was “simply no evidence to support [Maddox’s] version of the events. And [trial counsel] would not be able to provide [Maddox] with a defense.”
¶11 To claim imperfect self-defense, Maddox would be required to show that he had “a reasonable belief that [he] was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person,” and that
(1) he had an actual, but unreasonable, belief that force was necessary because the unlawful interference resulted in an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; or (2) he possessed a reasonable belief that force was necessary because the unlawful interference resulted in an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm but his belief regarding the amount of force necessary was unreasonable.
State v. Camacho, 176
¶12 In his postconviction motion, Maddox alleged that:
Trial counsel specifically informed the defendant that “it does not matter whether you felt you were going to be shot by the victims during the incident at the bar. The fact that you shot them, and no gun was found does not entitle you to use ‘self-defense’. The fact that the victims may have been armed or that you believed them to be armed or that you saw them reaching for what appeared to be a gun, does not entitle you [to] ‘legal grounds’ to draw a weapon and ‘open fire’.”
“The fact that no[ ]one saw them with a gun, and no [one] witnessed them at anytime prior to the shooting with a gun, would lead a jury to believe that you were lying about the victims being armed, and that this belief comp[el]led you to shoot them. There is just simply no evidence to support your version of the events. And I would not be able to provide you with a defense. Take the deal.”
Most of the witnesses interviewed by police also reported that Maddox repeatedly shot at the victims, also negating a self-defense claim. Consequently, Maddox has not shown that imperfect self-defense was a viable claim. When considered in this context, Maddox has not shown that trial counsel’s alleged advice was deficient.
¶13 Maddox seeks to rewrite history. The record, most particularly the transcript
of the plea colloquy, his signed guilty plea questionnaire, the facts alleged
in the complaint, which Maddox agreed were “substantially true and accurate,” and
the multiple witness-statements that differ consequentially from Maddox’s
postconviction version of the incident conclusively belie his new
postconviction version; he therefore is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. See Allen, 274
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5. (2005-06).
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] The
Camacho
standard applied when Maddox was allegedly misadvised by trial counsel, and
when the case would have been tried, had he not pled guilty.