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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
December 4, 2007
David R. Schanker
Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT I
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Sandra Murray,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Barbara Damman,
Defendant-Respondent.
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: michael
b. brennan, Judge. Affirmed.
¶1 CURLEY, P.J. Sandra
Murray, pro se, appeals from the
judgment in a small claims action dismissing her complaint claiming she was
wrongfully discharged from her employment at the Milwaukee Center
for Independence (MCFI). Murray
argues that the trial court erred in its conclusion that she was not wrongfully
discharged. Because Murray
was an at-will employee and the trial court found that MCFI accurately assessed
the altercation Murray
was involved in, her termination was proper.
Thus, this court affirms the trial court’s decision.
I. Background.
¶2 Murray
filed a complaint in small claims court against Barbara Damman, MCFI site
supervisor, for wrongful discharge, seeking lost wages in the amount of $500. According to evidence submitted at trial, an
incident at the Milwaukee Academy of Science cafeteria occurred between Murray,
an MCFI employee at the time, and Diane Fowlkes, an MCFI client, while the two
were working. Murray entered the kitchen area of the
cafeteria and encountered Fowlkes. An
altercation ensued. Murray
claims that Fowlkes threatened to knock her teeth out; however, neither Fowlkes
nor any of the witnesses to the confrontation substantiated Murray’s claim. Fowlkes and a witness indicated that Murray struck Fowlkes’s
face with a cloth potholder. Fowlkes became
angry and told another worker to get a supervisor. Fowlkes and Murray were separated. Damman arrived at the cafeteria shortly
thereafter. After speaking with Fowlkes
and Murray, Damman sent each home, took statements from the witnesses, and
wrote an incident report. According to
the report, Murray
initially admitted hitting Fowlkes with a potholder. Murray
was subsequently terminated, at which point she filed a complaint against
Damman demanding lost wages due to her alleged wrongful discharge.
¶3 During the trial, Murray
testified that Fowlkes pushed her earlier in the day and that Fowlkes later said
she was going to knock Murray’s
teeth out for no reason. Murray also
disclaimed her previous admission that she struck Fowlkes across the face with
a potholder; instead, Murray
indicated that she had only fanned the potholder in front of Fowlkes’s
face. Murray did not offer any evidence of
discrimination on the part of MCFI; however, her testimony suggests that she
believed she was discriminated against.
¶4 Damman testified that she did not personally terminate Murray; rather, a representative from MCFI’s human
resource department testified that he and Damman’s supervisor made the decision
to terminate Murray. The human resources representative explained
that MCFI distinguishes between clients and employees who work at its
facilities. At-will employees can be
discharged for any reason that is not discriminatory, while clients are
dependent on MCFI for assistance. The
trial court concluded that Murray was an at-will
employee and that MCFI acted rationally and within its right in discharging Murray over the incident
with Fowlkes.
¶5 The trial court indicated that the question before it was
whether there was some type of breach of contract or breach of employment
relationship. The court found that no
such breach occurred and concluded that MCFI acted within its authority in
terminating Murray. The court explained that it found no
discriminatory reason for Murray’s
discharge. Moreover, the court echoed
testimony about the distinction between clients and at-will employees that was
inherent in MCFI’s purpose. The court
found that MCFI did not act in an arbitrary manner in making its decision to
terminate Murray. Rather, the initial admission by Murray that she hit Fowlkes with the potholder and the
witness accounts suggested that MCFI had good reason to terminate Murray and that a good faith effort was made to determine
the facts which prompted the decision to terminate Murray.
II. Analysis.
¶6 “The employment-at-will doctrine is an established general
tenet of workplace relations in [Wisconsin].” Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 663,
571 N.W.2d 393 (1997). “Where
applicable, the doctrine generally allows an employer to discharge an employee
‘for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being
thereby guilty of legal wrong.’” Id.
(citation omitted). “Courts will not
second guess employment or business decisions, even when those decisions appear
ill-advised or unfortunate.” Strozinsky
v. School Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶33, 237 Wis. 2d 19,
614 N.W.2d 443. Murray challenges the trial court’s
conclusion that she was not wrongfully terminated. Because Murray
has not raised an argument pertaining to Wisconsin’s
public policy exception, the issue in this case is whether a breach of an
employment contract occurred. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,
113 Wis. 2d
561, 572‑73, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (there is a narrow public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine that can be claimed by an employee
if the employee demonstrates that the employer’s termination of the at-will
employee violated established public policy as evidenced by a statutory or
constitutional provision).
¶7 Murray
challenges the trial court’s conclusion that she struck Fowlkes in the face
with a potholder. Following a bench
trial, “[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.” Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) (2005-06). A trial court’s findings of fact “will not be
upset on appeal unless contrary ‘to the great weight and clear preponderance of
the evidence.’” Amoco Oil Co. v. Capitol Indem.
Corp., 95 Wis.
2d 530, 542, 291 N.W.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1980) (citation omitted). When more than one reasonable inference can
be drawn from conflicting testimony, the reviewing court must give deference to
the finder of fact as “the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the
witnesses.” Bank of Sun Prairie v. Opstein,
86 Wis. 2d
669, 676, 273 N.W.2d 279 (1979).
¶8 This court is satisfied that the trial court’s findings are
not clearly erroneous. Based on the
evidence presented, the trial court found that MCFI did not act in an arbitrary
or discriminatory manner when it terminated Murray.
Rather, the trial court found that the prior admission by Murray that she hit Fowlkes with the potholder and the
witness accounts of the incident suggested that MCFI had reason to terminate Murray. Furthermore, the court found that the
documented procedure that was followed by MCFI demonstrated that a good faith
effort was made to determine the facts which led to the decision to terminate Murray. Consequently, the trial court’s finding that
MCFI acted within its discretion in terminating Murray is not clearly erroneous and is
representative of the evidence presented at trial.
¶9 There is no support in the record for Murray’s argument that Damman “took the word
of new clients” or for her allegations that she was “written up,” her hours were
cut, she failed to receive a raise, and she was “forced out.” Much of what she claims in her briefs was
never mentioned at trial. Although Murray claimed that she was threatened, the trial court’s
decision implicitly suggests that Murray’s
version of the events was not believed.
Rather, the record reflects that MCFI terminated Murray
due to the altercation with Fowlkes, which resulted in Murray striking Fowlkes in the face with a
potholder. Consequently, there was just
cause to terminate her. Discharging an
at-will employee due to a physical alteration with another employee, or a
client, is within the discretion of an employer. See
Lopez
v. LIRC, 2002 WI App 63, ¶19, 252 Wis. 2d 476, 642 N.W.2d 561 (employee
discharge for physical altercation is at the discretion of the employer and
verbal provocation is not sufficient to excuse an act of violence). Moreover, Murray presented no evidence of a contractual
employment relationship, and thus, was an at-will employee. See
Ferraro
v. Koelsch, 124 Wis.
2d 154, 163-65, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985) (a contractual employment relationship is
demonstrated by a written agreement or evidence that an employee relied on a company’s
written policy for discharging employees).
As a result, MCFI was not required to demonstrate a cause for its
decision to discharge Murray. See
Hausman,
214 Wis. 2d
at 663. Therefore, the trial court
appropriately found that MCFI acted within its discretion in discharging Murray. Accordingly, this court affirms.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.