COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
November 21, 2007
David R. Schanker
Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT IV
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In re the marriage of:
Nancy J. Wertti,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
John S. Wertti,
Respondent-Respondent.
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APPEAL
from the judgment of the circuit court for Adams County: Charles
A. Pollex, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Dykman, Vergeront and Lundsten, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Nancy Wertti appeals the
judgment divorcing her from John Wertti.
The trial court reduced her share of the marital property division by
the value it assigned to a veterinary degree Nancy earned during the marriage. The issue on appeal is whether the trial
court properly treated the degree as a marital asset. We affirm.
¶2 The parties married in 1988.
Nancy
entered veterinary school in 1991 and obtained her degree in 1995. At the time of the property division trial in
2006 she practiced veterinary care three days per week, earning $3150 per
month. John earned $3231 per month from
his full time job.
¶3 The trial court concluded that Nancy’s degree was an asset of the marriage
worth $81,511. The court calculated that
sum by adding Nancy’s
tuition and other educational costs to her reduced employment income while she
attended veterinary school. The means by
which the court valued the asset is not at issue; Nancy acknowledges that the cost and lost
income is an approved means of determining the value of an educational asset,
and does not challenge the court’s calculation of those sums. Instead, Nancy contends that the court erred by
placing any value at all on the degree, because there was no evidence that the
degree will increase her postdivorce earnings or earning capacity. In effect, Nancy argues that she is no better off for
having her degree, and therefore should not have to compensate John for having
earned it during the marriage.
¶4 A supporting spouse is entitled to fair compensation for the
contribution to the other spouse’s education.
Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.
2d 200, 211, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). In
determining the appropriate compensation the guiding principles are fairness
and justice. Id. at 214. A reviewing court will uphold the resulting
award if it is the result of an articulated reasoning process, based on facts
of record and the appropriate legal standards, and not excessive or inadequate
under the circumstances. Id. at 215.
¶5 The trial court appropriately determined that Nancy’s degree was a
marital asset. The record does not support
Nancy’s
contention that the degree has no postdivorce effect on her earnings or earning
capacity, and therefore provides her with no financial benefit. In her last full year of work before she
entered school she earned $20,485. At
the time of the divorce she earned $3150 per month, as a veterinarian, working
only three days a week. From that fact
alone, the inference is available, if not unavoidable, that the degree has
enhanced Nancy’s
ability to support herself. In other
words, the record demonstrates that the degree remains a valuable asset
obtained during the marriage, and therefore subject to the marital property
division.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
(2005-06).