COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 29, 2005 Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: Patrick J. Fiedler, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Lundsten, P.J., Vergeront and Deininger, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Arlandis Issac appeals from an order affirming a prison discipline decision. We affirm.
¶2 Issac was charged with conspiracy to incite a
riot and group resistance. The
adjustment committee found him guilty on both charges, but the warden dismissed
the group resistance charge on appeal. Issac
sought judicial review by petition for certiorari. Review on certiorari is
limited to whether: (1) the agency kept
within its jurisdiction; (2) it acted according to law; (3) its action was
arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and represented its will and not its
judgment; and (4) the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order
or determination in question. Coleman
v. Percy, 96 Wis. 2d 578, 588, 292 N.W.2d 615 (1980).
¶3 The
first issue relates to Issac’s request for photographs. In the conduct report, the investigating
officer relied on statements by confidential informants. In the report the officer opined that these
informants were credible, and further noted that “all identification of inmates
referenced in this report was done by photo I.D.” The certiorari record does not show that the officer provided the
photographs used during the investigation to the adjustment committee.
¶4 After
the certiorari record was sent to the circuit court, Issac moved for the filing
of an amended return. The motion
asserted that during the hearing Issac had requested that he be provided with
“all photographic evidence.” He noted that
the photographs used in the investigation were not in the return, and he asked
that they be sent. The court held a
hearing on the motion and ordered that the respondents investigate further
whether there were photographs in existence.
The respondents then filed an affidavit by the investigating officer,
along with the photographs used in the investigation, but asked that they
remain confidential because of the potential risk to confidential
informants. After a further hearing,
the court denied Issac’s motion to amend the return.
¶5 Issac
makes several arguments with respect to this issue. He argues that the investigating officer should not have withheld
these photos from the adjustment committee.
Issac offers no authority for the proposition that the reporting officer
was required to include with the conduct report, or otherwise provide to the
committee, all the results of or materials used in the investigation that might
potentially be relevant.
¶6 Issac
argues that he should have been given the photos for the hearing before the
committee. We note that, contrary to
Issac’s assertions, it does not appear that he asked for these photos during
the administrative proceedings. He
claimed in his motion to amend the certiorari record that during the hearing he
asked for “all photographic evidence,” but that is a deceptive editing of his
own request, which actually sought:
“All photographic evidence, if any, from the months of Nov. and Dec.
2002 of/in the North Side Dining Halls at Waupun Correctional Institution.” The request also sought photos with other
specific descriptions, none of which included the ones used for inmate
identification during the investigation.
Issac thus waived this issue by not raising it at the initial hearing.
¶7 Issac
argues that the circuit court erred by using the officer’s affidavit to decide
the motion to amend the return. Issac
does not explain what informational basis the court should have used instead. As Issac recognized, the photos were not in
the original return. Certiorari review
is limited to the record brought up by the writ. State ex rel. Richards v. Leik, 175 Wis. 2d 446,
455, 499 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1993). If
a party believes the return is not accurate or complete, it is appropriate to
move for amendment of the return.
However, the court needs factual information to decide that motion. In this case, the officer’s affidavit stated
that the photos were not given to the adjustment committee. Issac does not appear to have disputed that
factual assertion, then or now. If the
photos were not before the committee, they should not be included in the
certiorari record sent to the court.
The circuit court properly relied on that affidavit, and properly
decided that the record should not be amended to include these photos. If Issac wanted to raise some issue for
which it was necessary to have the photographs before the court, regardless of
whether they were before the adjustment committee, that issue would have to be
pursued using a legal theory other than certiorari review.
¶8 Issac
next argues that the committee failed to make the evaluation required for the
committee to accept the statements from the confidential informants. The code provides in relevant part: “If the institution finds that testifying
would pose a risk of harm to the witness, the committee may consider a
corroborated, signed statement under oath from that witness without revealing
the witness’s identity or a corroborated signed statement from a staff member
getting the statement from that witness.”
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC
303.81(5) (July 2000). Issac argues
that the committee did not make its own evaluation of the risk of harm to the
confidential informants, but simply deferred to the opinion of the reporting
officer.
¶9 We
do not read the rule to require such a finding by the committee. The rule provides only that “the
institution” must make such a finding, and it says nothing about the committee
doing so. When the reporting officer
makes such a finding in the conduct report, this requirement is satisfied. Furthermore, the conduct report itself does
not have to explicitly make the finding.
The fact that it relies on the informants’ statements supports the
implicit finding being made to that effect.
¶10 Issac
argues that the evidence did not support the finding of guilt on the charge of
conspiracy to incite a riot. On
certiorari review, we apply the substantial evidence test, that is, whether
reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion reached by the
department. State ex rel.
Richards v. Traut, 145 Wis. 2d 677, 680, 429 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App.
1988). The conspiracy rule covers an
inmate who “plans or agrees with individuals to do acts which are
forbidden.” Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.05(2) (Dec. 2000). Issac argues that the committee failed to
find that Issac “conspired,” but stated only that he “directed or coerced
others to participate in a disturbance.”
We agree that one inmate’s plan to coerce other inmates may not support
a charge of conspiracy, but here the committee also found that Issac “directed”
others, which can be read as meaning that Issac was leading or managing willing
participants.
¶11 Issac
also argues that the evidence did not show a “plan” or “agreement.” We disagree. One confidential informant statement said that the informant was
asked to join forces to assist several gang leaders in a riot, and identified
Issac as one of those leaders. Another
statement corroborated this information, again naming Issac by name. These statements support the finding of the
existence of a plan or agreement among the alleged gang leaders to incite a
riot.
¶12 Finally,
Issac makes several brief arguments. He
argues that the conduct report did not give adequate notice of the charge
because the time was too broad and the editing of the confidential informant
statements removed so much specific information that it impeded his ability to
defend. The notice given by the report
was adequate to describe the conduct he was charged with. Issac discusses the performance of his staff
advocate, but concedes he was not prejudiced by that performance. He argues that the authority for the
security director to extend the time for the hearing allows officials to avoid
holding a hearing in a timely manner.
However, the delay in his case was only four days. Finally, Issac argues that he was entitled
to attend the “rehearing” at which the penalty was reimposed after the group
resistance charge was dismissed by the warden on appeal. As far as the record shows, there was no
such hearing.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5 (2003-04).