COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
June 8, 2000
Cornelia G. Clark
Clerk, Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10
and Rule 809.62.
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
State
of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Phillip
T. Wonderly,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dodge County: andrew p. bissonnette, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Dykman, P.J., Eich and Deininger, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. The State appeals the trial court’s order suppressing two incriminating letters that Phillip Wonderly wrote to Detective Joanne Swyers in late February 1998. The issue is whether the trial court properly suppressed the letters. We affirm.
¶2 The State charged Wonderly, a prison inmate, with aggravated battery. Pursuant to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), he moved to suppress a statement he made on February 5, 1998, three days after the battery. The trial court suppressed the statement because a prison official had continued interrogating Wonderly after he had invoked his right to counsel. See id. at 484-85 (holding that after an accused invokes the right to counsel, the state may not continue to interrogate unless the accused initiates further communication). The State does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
¶3 Wonderly then moved to suppress two incriminating letters he sent to Detective Joanne Swyers on February 21, 1998. The trial court suppressed the letters, concluding that they were the fruit of a Miranda violation that occurred on February 18, 1998, when Wonderly was interrogated for a second time about the battery but was not read his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
¶4 The State argues that the letters should not have been suppressed because the detective’s failure to read the Miranda warnings on February 18th was simply a “technical” violation of the Miranda rule. Relying on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 312 (1985), the State contends that “if there is merely a technical violation of Miranda and no prior constitutional violation, then the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine [should] not … be applied….”
¶5 Here, however, there was a prior constitutional violation. The trial court ruled that an Edwards violation occurred on February 5th. The State has not challenged that ruling. Further, the State concedes that an additional Edwards violation occurred during the February 18th interrogation because Wonderly had previously invoked his right to counsel on February 5th and had not voluntarily initiated subsequent communication.
¶6 Thus, several significant constitutional violations occurred in this case. The police violated Wonderly’s rights under Edwards on February 5th and 18th. The police did not give Wonderly the Miranda warnings on February 18th before resuming interrogation. Under these circumstances, Wonderly’s “ability to exercise his free will” was significantly compromised. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. We thus conclude that the letters were the result of improper pressures exercised by the police, rather than “the product of a ‘free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice.’” See State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 236, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987) (citation omitted). As such, the letters were properly suppressed under Miranda.[1]
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] We need not reach whether the writing of the letters was sufficiently attenuated from the Edwards violations so as to purge any taint because we have concluded, as did the trial court, that they should have been suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).