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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED August 20, 2015 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
2014AP2266 |
Cir. Ct. No. 2011CV627 |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT IV |
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Greg Griswold, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Town of Cross Plains, Town of Cross Plains 2010 Board of Review, Greg Hyer, Anne Herger, Jeff Baylis, Vera Riley, Greg Haack, Terry Kurth, Brad Cupp, James Danielson and Lee DeGroot, Respondents-Respondents. |
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APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the
circuit court for Dane County: Frank d. remington, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Lundsten, Higginbotham and
Sherman, JJ.
¶1 PER
CURIAM. Greg Griswold appeals a judgment and orders entered by
the circuit court after we remanded the case following a previous appeal. Griswold argues that all adverse rulings
entered against him while the circuit court case was pending before Judge John
Albert should be vacated, that the circuit court erred in entering an order requiring
him to post a bond as a condition of appeal, and that the circuit court’s award
of attorney fees incurred by the Town of Cross Plains was excessive and
unreasonable. For the reasons discussed
below, we affirm the judgment and orders of the circuit court.
Background
¶2 Griswold
has pursued several circuit court actions against the Town of Cross Plains
challenging property tax assessments. On
November 14, 2013, we issued a per curiam decision affirming a circuit court
order that denied reconsideration of an order for sanctions against Griswold,
as well as Judge Albert’s decision not to recuse himself from the case. Griswold v. Town of Cross Plains,
Nos. 2012AP26 and 2012AP1380, unpublished slip op. (WI App Nov. 14, 2013). We concluded that the appeal was frivolous,
and remanded the case to the circuit court to determine the proper amount of
costs and reasonable attorney fees to be awarded to the Town pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.25(3) (2013-14).[1] Id., ¶¶9-11.
¶3 After
this case was remanded, Griswold filed a motion that, once again requested the
recusal of Judge Albert. Judge Albert
then transferred the case to another judge.
With Judge Frank Remington presiding, the circuit court awarded $9,500
in attorney fees to the Town and entered a judgment against Griswold in that
amount. Griswold filed a notice of
appeal. The Town filed a motion for
relief pending appeal in the circuit court, seeking relief in the form of an order
requiring Griswold to post a bond as a condition of appealing the award of
attorney’s fees. The circuit court entered
an order granting the motion, and also issued an injunction against Griswold
and in favor of the Town and other named defendants, prohibiting Griswold from
filing further actions against them until Griswold has satisfied all judgments
against him in cases involving those defendants. Griswold then filed an additional notice of
appeal.
Discussion
¶4 Griswold first argues on appeal that all
adverse rulings entered against him prior to Judge Albert’s transfer of the
case to Judge Remington should be vacated.
Griswold cites a string of non-binding cases from other jurisdictions and
asserts that he believes his position on the issue to be a matter of first
impression in Wisconsin. We, however,
believe his argument to be one that defies common sense. Moreover, Griswold provides no binding legal
precedent or factual support for his position that vacating prior adverse
rulings is warranted under the circumstances.
Therefore, we reject the argument because it is meritless.
¶5 Next,
Griswold argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion
when it issued an order requiring him to post a bond as a condition of pursuing
an appeal. We addressed this issue in
our order dated January 27, 2015, in which we denied the respondents’ motion
to dismiss the appeal. At the time we
issued the order, Griswold had not yet posted any bond, and nothing in his
appellate briefs or the record indicates that he has posted a bond since
then. Nevertheless, we are now deciding
the appeal, consistent with our conclusion in our January 27 order that “should
Griswold fail to comply with the order to post bond, nothing in the order
divests this court of jurisdiction over this appeal.” Since he has not paid any bond, and since his
appeal has nonetheless been permitted to proceed, we fail to see how Griswold
has suffered any harm as a result of the circuit court order directing him to
post a bond as a condition of appeal.
Thus, we dismiss Griswold’s arguments on the issue as moot. State ex rel. Olson v. Litscher,
2000 WI App 61, ¶3, 233 Wis. 2d 685, 608 N.W.2d 425 (“[a]n issue is moot when
its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy”
and, generally, moot issues will not be considered on appeal).
¶6 Finally,
we turn to Griswold’s argument that the circuit court’s award of attorney fees was
excessive and unreasonable. We review an
award of attorney fees for erroneous exercise of discretion, giving deference
to the circuit court’s decision because the circuit court is familiar with
local billing norms and will likely have witnessed first-hand the quality of
the service rendered by counsel. Kolupar
v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶22, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 15,
683 N.W.2d 58. Griswold fails to identify
anything in the record that would demonstrate an erroneous exercise of
discretion on the part of the circuit court.
Instead, he relies on conclusory assertions and personal attacks on the
Town’s attorney, Mark Hazelbaker. Griswold
argues that, by awarding attorney fees for legal services performed by
Hazelbaker on behalf of the Town, when Hazelbaker himself was a named
defendant, the circuit court essentially allowed Hazelbaker to be paid for “pro
se” work. Griswold argues that
Hazelbaker should not be awarded any attorney fees.
¶7 We
note, however, that the circuit court did not award any attorney fees directly to
Hazelbaker. Rather, the court granted
judgment in favor of the Town and against Griswold. That is, Griswold is required to pay the Town
amounts the Town owes Hazelbaker. The
issue before the circuit court on remand, and the issue now before us for
review, is whether the fees incurred by
the Town for legal services related to the frivolous appeal were
reasonable. Despite Griswold’s assertion
that the fees generated by Hazelbaker were “exaggerated,” he fails to rebut the
information contained in Hazelbaker’s fee affidavit or to offer any factual or
legal support as to why he believes any specific entry or invoice to be
unreasonable. Accordingly, we are not persuaded
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in entering the fee
award in this case.
By the Court.—Judgment and orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.