COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED |
NOTICE |
October 22, 1998 |
This opinion is subject to further
editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume
of the Official Reports. |
Marilyn L. Graves Clerk, Court of Appeals of Wisconsin |
A party may file with the Supreme Court
a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV |
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State
of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Melvin
L. Alicea,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Sauk County: patrick J. taggart, Judge. Affirmed.
EICH,
J.[1] Melvin Alicea appeals from a judgment convicting him of
operating a motor vehicle after suspension/revocation (OAS/OAR). Because it was his seventh such conviction
in the past five years, it was processed as a criminal charge, with an enhanced
penalty pursuant to the habitual traffic offender (HTO) laws, ch. 351, Stats.[2]
Alicea
moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that he was not subject to criminal
penalties because all his prior suspensions or revocations resulted from either
his failure to pay fines or forfeitures or his HTO status. He claimed that because his license had not
been suspended or revoked for any other reason, he could be subject only to
civil, not criminal, penalties under § 343.44(2)(e), Stats., which provides as follows:
1. Except as provided in subd. 2., for a 5th or
subsequent conviction under this section or a local ordinance in conformity
with this section within a 5-year period, a person may be fined not more than
$2,500 and may be imprisoned for not more than one year in the county jail.
2. If the revocation or suspension that is the basis of
a violation was imposed solely due to a failure to pay a fine or a forfeiture,
or was imposed solely due to a failure to pay a fine or forfeiture and one or
more subsequent convictions for violating sub. (1), the person may be required
to forfeit not more than $2,500. This subdivision applies regardless of the
person’s failure to reinstate his or her operating privilege.
The
trial court denied Alicea’s motion, concluding that because his license had
also been suspended for speeding violations, the suspensions for failure to pay
did not constitute the “sole” reason for the revocation, and that criminal
penalties were therefore appropriate.
Alicea then pled no contest to the charge, reserving his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to dismiss.
The
relevant facts are as follows. Alicea
was cited for OAR, seventh offense, on May 3, 1997. At that time, he was under an HTO revocation, which had been
imposed on October 17, 1994, and also under numerous suspensions for failure to
pay fines or forfeitures. The HTO
revocation stemmed from four OAS convictions dated July 11, July 25, August 29,
and September 12, 1994. The underlying
suspension, imposed on April 21, 1994, was for an accumulation of demerit
points, based on speeding tickets and an OAS violation (for failure to pay).[3] At the time of the
four 1994 OAS offenses, Alicea was also under failure-to-pay suspension,
imposed on May 6, 1994.
The
issue before us, then, is whether the HTO revocation—which forms the basis of
the current charge—and which stems in part from a failure-to-pay suspension and
in part from a demerit point suspension—was “imposed solely due to a failure to
pay a fine or forfeiture, or was imposed solely due to a failure to pay a fine
or forfeiture and one or more subsequent convictions for [OAR/OAS],” thus
invoking the civil penalties of § 343.44(2)(e)2, Stats. To ask the
question is to answer it. Because
Alicea’s demerit point suspension was based on speeding violations in addition
to an OAS violation, it was not based solely on Alicea’s failure to
pay. Accordingly, we agree with the
trial court that the criminal penalty provision is appropriate.
Arguing
otherwise, Alicea places principal reliance on our decision in State v.
Muniz, 181 Wis.2d 928, 512 N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1994). Muniz was convicted of OAR, first offense,
in 1989. In 1991, while he was under a
two-month demerit point suspension, his operating privileges were again
suspended for five years for failure to pay a fine. He did not reinstate his license after expiration of the demerit
point suspension, and later that year, he was convicted of criminal OAR (second
offense). We reversed his conviction,
holding that while he could properly be punished for operating after revocation
or suspension if he had failed to reinstate following expiration of the
sanction, his failure to reinstate after expiration of the non-failure-to-pay
revocation or suspension did not render the subsequent OAR offense criminal. Id. at 932-33, 512 N.W.2d at
253-54. Alicea thus argues that our
inquiry in this case must be whether any non-failure-to-pay suspensions or
revocations were “in effect at the time of the current violation.” Id. at 933, 512 N.W.2d at 254
(emphasis added). He claims that
because his suspension for excess demerit points expired in 1995, there were no
non-failure-to-pay suspensions or revocations in effect at the time of the
current violation, and the fact that he never reinstated cannot, under
Muniz, render his current OAR criminal.
We
are not persuaded. While it is true
that Alicea’s excess demerit point suspension, in and of itself, was no longer
in effect at the time of his current violation, his HTO revocation was—and that
revocation stemmed from four OAS convictions, which were based in part on the
demerit point suspension (while it was in effect). Stated another way, although his demerit point suspension had
expired, it “lived on” through the subsequent suspensions that resulted from
it.
We explained in State v. Biljan, 177 Wis.2d 14, 501 N.W.2d 820
(Ct. App. 1993), that
if a revocation or suspension in effect at the time the defendant is cited for OAR or OAS was imposed for other than, or in conjunction with, the defendant’s failure to pay a fine or forfeiture, the defendant’s failure to pay a fine or forfeiture is not the sole basis for the revocation or suspension; therefore, [the civil penalty provision] does not apply.
Id. at 19-20, 501 N.W.2d at 823 (emphasis added). Here, the revocation in effect at the time
the instant charge was filed was imposed due to OAS convictions resulting, in
part at least, from a demerit point suspension. And that suspension was not based solely on his failure to pay;
rather, it was based on his speeding violations “in conjunction with” the
failure to pay. In other words, the
revocation in effect at the time of Alicea’s current OAR violation was not
based solely on his failure to pay fines or forfeitures or subsequent
OAS/OAR convictions. It follows that
the trial court properly imposed criminal penalties under § 343.44(2)(e)1,
Stats.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[1] This appeal is decided by a single judge pursuant to § 752.31(2)(c), Stats.
[2] Section 351.02(1)(a)(4), Stats., defines a habitual traffic offender as one who is convicted four or more times within a five-year period of operating after suspension or revocation, regardless of the basis for the suspension or revocation. See State v. Taylor, 170 Wis.2d 524, 529, 489 N.W.2d 664, 666-67 (Ct. App. 1992).
[3] Under § 343.32, Stats., various traffic violations carry “points” based on the seriousness of the condition, and accumulation of more than twelve points in any twelve-month period results in license suspension. At the time the point-suspension was issued, Alicea had accumulated twelve points in the preceding twelve-month period. He was eligible for reinstatement due to that point suspension on April 21, 1995, but apparently, never reinstated.