COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

 

 

NOTICE

 

DECEMBER 23, 1997

    This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.

 

Marilyn L. Graves

Clerk, Court of Appeals

of Wisconsin

    A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats.

 

 

 

No.    97-1721

 

 

 

STATE OF WISCONSIN

 

IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

 

 

 

State of Wisconsin,

 

                             Plaintiff-Respondent,

 

              v.

 

William N. Ledford,

 

                             Defendant-Appellant.

 

 

 

 

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Buffalo County:  Dane F. Morey, Judge.  Affirmed. 

Before Cane, P.J., Myse and Hoover, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.   William Ledford appeals a postjudgment order that denied his motion to modify his sentence due to “new factors.”  In 1993, the trial court sentenced Ledford to an eight-year prison term and a concurrent eight-year probation term on two forgery convictions, Ledford having pleaded guilty to the charges.  On appeal, Ledford relies on two matters he deems new factors:  (1) his health had worsened since sentencing; and (2) the executive branch had hardened its policy on the Intensive Sanctions Program (DIS).  Ledford believes that these matters now make his 1993 sentence excessive.  The trial court made a discretionary decision that we will not overturn absent an improper exercise of discretion.  See State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis.2d 544, 546, 335 N.W.2d 399, 401 (1983).  We reject Ledford’s arguments and therefore affirm the trial court’s postjudgment order. 

First, Ledford’s health deterioration is not a new factor for purposes of judicial sentence modification.  See State v. Michels, 150 Wis.2d 94, 99-100, 441 N.W.2d 278, 280-81 (Ct. App. 1989).  Rather, it is a matter for sentence administration by the executive branch, relevant to Ledford’s parole eligibility or possibly executive clemency.  Second, we conclude that DIS policy changes by the executive branch do not qualify as new factors unless the trial court had expressly relied on the old executive branch policies at sentencing.  The supreme court reached this conclusion regarding parole policy changes by the executive branch, see State v. Franklin, 148 Wis.2d 1, 14-15, 434 N.W.2d 609, 613-14 (1989), and we see no reason to apply a different rule to executive branch changes in the DIS program.  Here, the record contains no indication that the trial court relied on existing executive branch DIS policies at sentencing, and therefore, any new DIS policies gave Ledford no basis for sentence modification. 

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published.  See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.