COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED |
NOTICE |
DECEMBER 23, 1997 |
This opinion is subject to further
editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume
of the Official Reports. |
Marilyn L. Graves Clerk, Court of Appeals of Wisconsin |
A party may file with the Supreme Court
a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT III |
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State
of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mariontai
Stacy,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Brown County: John D. mckay, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J., Myse and Hoover, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Mariontai Stacy, an inmate in the Wisconsin prison system, appeals his conviction for battery to a prisoner as a party to the crime, having entered an Alford no contest plea to the charge. At the prison, Stacy received disciplinary sanctions for the same conduct consisting of eight days adjustment segregation and 360 days program segregation; prison officials also later transferred him to a different institution. Stacy claims that the criminal charge, on top of the prison sanctions, constitutes unconstitutional double jeopardy. While conceding that his double jeopardy argument contradicts current case law, see, e.g., State v. Killebrew, 115 Wis.2d 243, 340 N.W.2d 470 (1983), he claims that his prison transfer distinguishes his case and inherently converted his prison sanctions from remedial matters into punishment. He reasons that prison officials no longer had grounds to base the sanctions on the need to maintain order once they transferred him to a different institution, away from the scene of the incident. We reject this argument and affirm his conviction.
Stacy’s argument misunderstands the purpose of prison sanctions
and misreads them from a prison-centered perspective rather than a
prisoner-centered one. Prison sanctions
are primarily remedial, not punitive. See
id. at 254, 340 N.W.2d at 476.
They serve to control the prisoner’s comportment through behavior and
attitude adjustment. They concern the
prisoner, not the prison itself. They
retain those characteristics despite the prisoner’s change of institution. We have no reason to believe that Stacy’s
transfer lessened his need for attitude and behavior control. Further, prisoners are sentenced to the
Wisconsin State prison system, not a particular institution. See §§ 973.013 and 973.02,
Stats. The executive branch has the power to control the placement of
prisoners and to move them from one prison to another for purposes of sound
prison administration, such as controlling problematic inmates. This suggests that Stacy’s transfer from one
institution to another has no legal significance in terms of punishment. No matter where enforced, Stacy’s prison
sanctions remain primarily remedial, and we see nothing in the transfer
sufficient to invoke double jeopardy protections.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.