COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED March 11, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-2579
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
KENNETH GABLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHERIFF JAMES
KANIKULA, MARINETTE
COUNTY, WISCONSIN,
MARINETTE
COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT AND
MARINETTE COUNTY CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Marinette County:
LARRY JESKE, Judge. Reversed
and cause remanded with directions.
Before LaRocque, Myse
and Madden, JJ.
MYSE, J. Kenneth Gable appeals a
judgment dismissing his complaint alleging a right to contest his termination
before the Marinette County Civil Service Commission. Gable contends that under the rules of the civil service commission
and the employment contract governing the terms of his employment with
Marinette County, he was entitled to a hearing before the commission on his
allegation that his termination was without just cause and politically
motivated by the sheriff. Because we
conclude that the civil service ordinance and Gable's employment contract
provide that a supervisory employe may not be dismissed from office except for
reasons enumerated in the civil service ordinance and that the commission is
vested with the authority to determine whether terminations are in accordance
with the civil service ordinance, we reverse the judgment and remand with
directions to order a hearing on Gable's complaint before the commission.
Kenneth Gable was a
lieutenant with the Marinette County Sheriff's Department and was assigned to
supervise the Marinette County Jail. In
considering the sheriff's department budget, Marinette County decided to
eliminate the county jail supervisor position.
The sheriff then notified Gable that because his position had been
eliminated he would be terminated as an employe of the sheriff's
department. Gable was subsequently
rehired as a deputy but not reinstated to his supervisory status.
Gable alleges that his
termination was pretextual based upon his political activities and that the
sheriff terminated his employment without just cause and in violation of the
employment contract between the County and supervisory employes and the
provisions of the civil service ordinance.
Gable petitioned for a hearing before the civil service commission but
the hearing was denied based upon the commission's determination that it had no
jurisdiction to entertain Gable's complaint that he was terminated without just
cause and in violation of the civil service ordinance.
Gable filed a complaint
asking the circuit court to order the commission to grant a hearing in regard
to his allegations. The circuit court
denied the writ and dismissed his complaint.
Gable's allegation that
the contract and civil service ordinance provided a hearing before the commission
in regard to whether his termination was without just cause presents a question
of both statutory interpretation and the interpretation of contractual
language. Each of these questions
raises a question of law which this court determines without deference to the
trial court's determination. Wagner
Mobile, Inc. v. Madison, 190 Wis.2d 585, 591, 527 N.W.2d 301, 303
(1995); Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis.2d 437, 454-55, 485
N.W.2d 426, 432 (Ct. App. 1992).
Marinette, Wis., Civil
Service Ordinance § 5.08(6) (July 1, 1989), provides that all permanent
employes "shall not be dismissed from such office or suspended except as
provided in § 5.09." Section 5.09
enumerates a variety of grounds upon which discipline or dismissal may be had
against civil service employes. The
parties agree that Gable was a permanent employe as that term is used in the
ordinance.
The collective
bargaining agreement applicable to Gable provides: "If the grievance shall be under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission, the grievance shall there be governed by the
Wisconsin State Statutes." The
civil service ordinance provides specific grounds upon which an employe may be
disciplined or terminated and the contract grants jurisdiction to the civil
service commission regarding matters of discipline or termination of
supervisory employes. The contract also
expressly provides that grievances under the jurisdiction of the civil service
commission are governed by the Wisconsin statutes. Therefore, we conclude that the unambiguous provisions of the
civil service ordinance and employment contract mandate application of the
Wisconsin state statutes to this dispute and the statutes require a hearing
before the commission in regard to Gable's complaint.
Marinette County
contends that it elected to be governed only in a limited way by the statutes
of the State of Wisconsin and that because it did not specifically adopt all of
the provisions of §§ 59.07 and 59.21 and ch. 63, Stats., the statutes are inapplicable to Gable's grievance. Whatever intention Marinette County may have
had when adopting the civil service ordinance, it is clear that the ordinance
specified the grounds upon which supervisory employes could be disciplined or
terminated. While Marinette County may
not have fully understood that by adopting such provisions it was subjecting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the statutes, their subjective intent cannot
change the clear and unambiguous provisions of the civil service
ordinance. We therefore conclude that
cases decided by our court construing a county's obligation under ch. 63 are
applicable to Marinette County and may be used as guidance in resolution of
this dispute.
In Watkins v.
Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 88 Wis.2d 411, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979), the employe contended
that his resignation was coerced and amounted to an improper termination. The commission refused to grant a hearing on
the claim of constructive discharge.
Our supreme court determined that the filing of charges against an
employe was not a prerequisite to a commission hearing and that once the
commission was granted jurisdiction in regard to questions of discipline and
termination it must exercise that jurisdiction. Id. at 422, 276 N.W.2d at 780. That is exactly the circumstance in this
case.
The sheriff and the
County contend that Gable was not terminated but was removed from his position
by virtue of budgetary constraints determined by the county board. There are two reasons why such an assertion
does not support the County's position that the commission had no
jurisdiction. First, we note that Gable
contends that the reasons advanced, budgetary considerations, were pretextual
and that the true reason for his termination was based upon his political
beliefs. Whether such assertion is
valid is not the issue before us.
Because Gable contends that the proffered reasons of budgetary
constraints were pretextual in nature, he is entitled to a hearing before the
civil service commission to present evidence in support of his assertion.
Even more importantly,
the elimination of a lieutenant as the supervisor of the county jail may
justify Gable's reassignment to another position. The County does not explain why termination rather than
reassignment was the appropriate response to the county board's budgetary
action. Moreover, if budget restraints
required the elimination of a lieutenant's position from the sheriff's
department, the record is silent as to why Gable and not any other employe
would be subject to removal. This
silence presents a question of fact for the civil service commission to
resolve.
Gable also asserts as an
additional basis for relief that he was denied procedural due process based
upon the County's refusal to hold a hearing before the civil service
commission. Because we have concluded
that he was entitled to a hearing before the commission under the terms of the
county ordinance and the employment contract, we need not address this further
basis for relief. Gable's further
contention that he is entitled to immediate reinstatement and back pay is a
matter to be resolved at the trial level and before the commission and,
accordingly, will not be addressed by this court as part of this appeal.
By the Court.—Judgment
reversed and cause remanded with directions.
Not recommended for
publication in the official reports.