COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED November 27, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-2249-CR-NM
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JUSTIN HAWKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Rock County:
EDWIN C. DAHLBERG, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Vergeront and Roggensack, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Justin Hawkins appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered after he pled guilty to one count of first-degree reckless injury and
to one count of robbery, with use of force, both as party to a crime. Hawkins also entered an Alford[1]
plea to one count of burglary. The
court sentenced Hawkins to ten years on each count, to be served consecutively.
Hawkins's appellate
counsel, Attorney Carl W. Chesshir, has filed a no merit report pursuant to Rule 809.32, Stats., and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). Hawkins received a copy of the
report, and he was advised of his right to file a response. He has not done so. Based on our review of the no merit report
and the record, we conclude that there are no arguable appellate issues. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of
conviction.
The no merit report
first addresses whether Hawkins's pleas were entered knowingly and
voluntarily. The court explained the
potential penalties associated with the three crimes. The court explained the elements of each crime to Hawkins, and he
responded that he understood them. The
court reviewed the various constitutional rights waived by the pleas, and
Hawkins indicated he understood that he would be waiving those rights. The court explained the effect of an Alford
plea and found that the record contained a sufficient factual basis for such a
plea. See State v. Garcia,
192 Wis.2d 845, 859-60, 532 N.W.2d 111, 116-17 (1995). Hawkins assured the court that he had not
been promised anything in return for his pleas and had not been
threatened. Hawkins acknowledged that
the statement he gave to the police about the crimes was voluntary. Hawkins told the court that he was satisfied
with his attorney's representation, and the attorney advised the court that he believed
Hawkins understood the proceedings. In
sum, the plea colloquy between Hawkins and the trial court satisfies the
requirements set forth in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246,
267-72, 389 N.W.2d 12, 20-25 (1986), and § 971.08, Stats. A
postconviction challenge to the validity of the Hawkins's pleas would lack
arguable merit.
We also conclude that a
challenge to Hawkins's sentence would lack arguable merit. Sentencing lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court, and a strong policy exists against appellate interference
with that discretion. See State
v. Haskins, 139 Wis.2d 257, 268, 407 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Ct. App.
1987). The trial court is presumed to
have acted reasonably and the defendant has the "burden to show
unreasonableness from the record."
See id.
The primary factors to
be considered by the trial court in sentencing are the gravity of the offense,
the character of the offender, and the need for the protection of the
public. State v. Harris,
119 Wis.2d 612, 623, 350 N.W.2d 633, 639 (1984). The weight to be given the various factors is within the trial
court's discretion. Cunningham v.
State, 76 Wis.2d 277, 282, 251 N.W.2d 65, 67-68 (1977).
The record shows that
the court considered the appropriate factors.
The court spoke at length about the gravity of the offense. These charges stem from the beating death of
Bryan Bradley, a physically and mentally handicapped man. Bradley was robbed and beaten to death in
his home by two juveniles, C.C. and T.A.
Hawkins drove the juveniles to Bradley's house and later picked them
up. Although Bradley was already badly
beaten by the time Hawkins returned to the house, he admitted hitting Bradley,
who was bound, gagged and laying on the floor.
C.C. and T.A. were charged with and convicted of more serious crimes.
The court considered
Hawkins's youth, the absence of a prior record and his limited mental
abilities. The court noted that he
received the "benefit of considerable discretion" in the State's
initial charging decision, which considered Hawkins's noninvolvement in the
initial beating. Nevertheless, the
court said, Hawkins was involved in a "serious[,] ... stupid and senseless
act."
The court considered the
interests of the victim and his family and society's interests in punishment and
deterrence. The fact that Hawkins
received the maximum prison term for each count does not render the sentence
excessive or "`so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock
public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what
is right and proper under the circumstances.'" State v. Dietzen, 164 Wis.2d 205, 213, 474 N.W.2d
753, 756 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis.2d
655, 673, 348 N.W.2d 527, 537 (1984).
Because the court considered the appropriate sentencing factors, it did
not erroneously exercise its discretion.
Upon an independent
review of the record, this court finds no basis for reversing the judgment of
conviction. Any further appellate
proceedings would be without arguable merit within the meaning of Anders
and Rule 809.32, Stats.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed, and appellate
counsel is relieved of any further representation of the defendant on this
appeal.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.