COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED January 7, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
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No. 96-2232
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
IN THE INTEREST OF
JERRY O.,
a Person Under the Age
of 18:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JERRY C.O.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MICHAEL G. MALMSTADT, Judge. Affirmed.
CURLEY,
J. Jerry C.O., a juvenile, appeals from a dispositional order
adjudging him delinquent for possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver—cocaine. He raises one issue
for review—whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
crack cocaine found on his body during a stop by police. Because the trial court properly determined
that the police acted reasonably in patting down Jerry C.O. during an
investigatory stop and, further, because the police had probable cause under
the “plain touch” doctrine to seize the crack cocaine hidden in
Jerry C.O.'s underwear, the dispositional order is affirmed.[1]
I.
Background.
City of Milwaukee police
officers were dispatched to investigate a possible burglary on the city's near
north side. As they were investigating,
the officers noticed Jerry C.O. and another male in an alley. According to the officers, the alley was a
known problem area for drug-dealing and prostitution. The officers heard Jerry C.O. ask the other male, “Are you
looking?” One officer testified later
that he knew that this question was street slang for, “Are you looking for
drugs?” The police then stopped
Jerry C.O. and asked if they could search him. According to the officers, he stated, “I don't care.”
Officer Gary Cole
testified at trial that while conducting the patdown for weapons, he felt
“something folded up like letters” in Jerry C.O.'s groin area. He also felt something like “little rocks”
or “stones.” Officer Cole testified
that he “couldn't determine what the folded object was,” but that he “knew
almost exactly what the little rocks or stones” were. He testified that he “could have swore [sic] they were crack
cocaine individually packaged up.” Officer
Cole removed folded currency and 29 baggies containing crack cocaine from
Jerry C.O.'s underwear. The
officers arrested him and the State filed delinquency petitions against him.
Jerry C.O. then moved
the juvenile court to suppress the cocaine, arguing that police uncovered it as
a result of a constitutionally improper search and seizure. The juvenile court denied the motion,
concluding that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct
was occurring and therefore could properly conduct an investigatory stop. Further, the court concluded that given the
connection between drug crimes and guns, the officers could properly conduct a
patdown search of Jerry C.O. to locate any weapons that might endanger their
safety. The court also concluded the
patdown was nonconsensual. Finally, the
juvenile court concluded that the police had probable cause to seize the crack
cocaine hidden in Jerry C.O.’s underwear.
A jury found Jerry C.O.
delinquent after a trial. This appeal
follows.
II.
Analysis.
Jerry C.O. does not
contest the juvenile court’s conclusion that the investigatory stop was
proper. Nor does he contest the
conclusion that the police had the “right to search his outer clothing for
weapons.” He argues only that the
actual search which uncovered the secreted cocaine was illegal because it went
beyond the patdown for weapons. He is
incorrect.
The essence of this case
is whether the police had probable cause to seize the cocaine hidden in Jerry
C.O.’s underwear. When the dispositive
historical facts are undisputed, whether police had probable cause is a
question that this court reviews de novo. See Ornelas v. U.S., 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1651
(1996). Further, an appellate court may
inspect the entire record when reviewing a Fourth Amendment challenge; thus,
this court is not limited to the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing. State v. Gaines,
197 Wis.2d 102, 106 n.1, 539 N.W.2d 723, 725 n.1 (Ct. App. 1995).
Under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “a police officer may, under the appropriate
circumstances, detain a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” State v. Waldner, No. 95-1291,
slip op. at 3 (Wis. S.Ct. Dec. 13,
1996). Further, police officers “may
seize contraband detected during the lawful execution of a Terry search.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 374 (1993). A lawful Terry
search is limited to a protective patdown search of a suspect “`to
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon.’” Id. At 373 (citation
omitted). “If the protective search
goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no
longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.” Id.
In Minnesota v.
Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court extended the “plain view”
doctrine to “tactile discoveries of contraband” uncovered during a Terry search:
If a police officer lawfully pats down a
suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its
identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s
privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if
the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same
practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context.
Id. at
375-76; accord State v. Guy, 172 Wis.2d 86, 101-02, 492 N.W.2d
311, 317-18 (1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 914 (1993); State v.
Buchanan, 178 Wis.2d 441, 449 & n.3, 504 N.W.2d 400, 404 & n.3
(Ct. App. 1993) (stating Guy is in “complete harmony” with Dickerson).
The juvenile court, in
denying the suppression motion, ruled that:
“[W]hen you’re carrying stuff in your
underwear ¼ no
matter what the mass of it is, if you’re a police officer who’s just observed
something that anybody would suspect is a drug transaction and then you find a
package in the person who you suspect to be the dealer’s underwear, it doesn’t
matter how big the package is. I think
at that point you’ve gone beyond suspicion and have reached the level of
probable cause.
The
juvenile court’s ruling extends beyond the boundaries of “plain touch” doctrine
as set down by the Supreme Court in Dickerson. Just uncovering an object hidden in a
suspect’s undergarments is not enough, the object’s identity must be
“immediately apparent,” before the police have probable cause to seize the
contraband. Id. Nonetheless, if the juvenile court reached
the correct result, even if its reasoning was incorrect, this court must
affirm. See State v. Holt,
128 Wis.2d 110, 124, 382 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1985). Accordingly, we must review the entire
undisputed record to determine whether the police officer’s action in this case
met the Dickerson standard.
Officer Cole testified
at trial that when conducting the patdown of Jerry C.O. he felt “something
folded up like letters” and something like “little rocks” or “stones.” Officer Cole testified that he “couldn't
determine what the folded object was,” but that he “knew almost exactly what
the little rocks or stones” were. He
testified that he “could have swore [sic] they were crack cocaine individually
packaged up.” It is clear from this
testimony that the identity of the crack cocaine hidden in Jerry C.O.’s
underwear was immediately apparent to Officer Cole when he “frisked” the
outside clothing.[2] He also testified that he had conducted many
drug arrests in the past and that frequently suspects hid contraband in their
underwear. This bolsters his testimony
that the identity of the cocaine was immediately apparent to him, because he
had conducted such searches before and this experience “would help an officer
know how drugs are stored and recognize the feel of a baggie containing
cocaine.” Guy, 172 Wis.2d
at 102, 492 N.W.2d at 317. Further,
there is no evidence that he manipulated the contraband to identify it,
conducted a further search in order to uncover its identity, or in any other
manner went beyond the limited scope of Dickerson. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378-79
(stating that if contraband’s identity is not immediately apparent, police
cannot manipulate object or search further to uncover its identity).
In his reply brief,
Jerry C.O. makes much of the fact that the contraband was hidden in his groin
area and then states that: “A
legitimate search for weapons would be in the chest area, the back area, the
side, and the legs. One does not search
the groin area for weapons just as one does not search the shoes or body
cavities for weapons.” This argument is
unpersuasive. Clearly, suspects could
hide weapons dangerous to police underneath their clothes, including their
groin area, and police could be justified in a limited search to uncover such
weapons. To suggest that police should
be prohibited from conducting a patdown in a suspect’s groin area flies in the
face of the entire purpose of the protective patdown.
In sum, the record
clearly supports the juvenile court’s decision to deny Jerry C.O.’s suppression
motion. The undisputed evidence shows
that the police uncovered the contraband in a proper patdown executed during a
lawful investigatory stop. Further, it
is clear that the identity of the contraband was immediately apparent to the
officer conducting the patdown, and therefore, the officers had probable cause
to seize the hidden cocaine and subsequently arrest Jerry C.O.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[2] On appeal, Jerry C.O. does not contest the seizure of the currency. Accordingly, this court need not reach any conclusion on whether the seizure of the currency met the standards of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). See Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis.2d 442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16, 19, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 894 (1992).