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COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED March
6, 1997 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-2088
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
CITY
OF MARION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DONALD
J. MINNIECHESKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Waupaca County: JOHN P. HOFFMANN, Judge. Affirmed.
DEININGER,
J.[1] Donald
Minniecheske appeals from a judgment convicting him of speeding in violation of
Marion City Ordinance 10-1-1, adopting § 346.57(5), Stats.
The issue is whether the arresting officer had authority to issue
Minniecheske a citation outside the city limits of Marion. We conclude that the officer was engaged in
fresh pursuit under § 175.40(2), Stats.,
and was therefore authorized to issue a citation to Minniecheske for violating
the city's traffic ordinance.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On
February 5, 1996, City of Marion Police Officer Goerlinger clocked
Minniecheske's vehicle travelling at 51 mph in a 35 mph zone along East
Ramsdell Street (County Highway S) within the City of Marion. Goerlinger immediately pursued Minniecheske,
keeping the vehicle within his sight during the entire course of the
pursuit. Goerlinger stopped
Minniecheske at the intersection of County Highway S and U.S. Highway 45, which
is located approximately one hundred yards outside the city limits of
Marion. The trial court found
Minniecheske guilty of speeding under the Marion City Ordinance.
ANALYSIS
Minniecheske
argues that Goerlinger lacked jurisdiction to issue a citation because the stop
occurred outside the city limits of Marion.
Section
175.40(2), Stats., states: "For purposes of civil and criminal
liability, any peace officer may, when in fresh pursuit, follow anywhere in the
state and arrest any person for the violation of any law or ordinance the
officer is authorized to enforce."[2] The application of a statute to undisputed
facts raises a question of law which we decide without deference to the trial
court's decision. Minuteman, Inc.
v. Alexander, 147 Wis.2d 842, 853, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1989). An officer is in "fresh pursuit"
when: (1) the officer acts without unnecessary delay; (2) the pursuit
is continuous and uninterrupted; and (3) the period of time between the
violation, the pursuit and the stop is reasonable. City of
Brookfield v. Collar, 148 Wis.2d 839, 842-43, 436 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Ct.
App. 1989).
In
Collar, a Brookfield police officer observed a car speeding,
crossing over the centerline and weaving in its lane. The officer waited to find a safe place to pull the car over, and
as a result the stop occurred outside the city limits of Brookfield. Applying the three-factor test for fresh
pursuit, we concluded that the officer acted to pursue Collar without delay,
the pursuit was continuous and the several minute delay between the commission
of the offense and the subsequent stop was reasonable based on the officer's
concerns about finding a safe place to effect the stop. See Collar, 148 Wis.2d
at 842-43, 436 N.W.2d at 913.
Officer
Goerlinger testified that he determined by radar that Minniecheske's vehicle
exceeded the speed limit by sixteen miles per hour within the City of
Marion. The officer acted without delay
in commencing the pursuit; the pursuit was continuous; and the period of time
between the officer's observation of Minniecheske's violation and the time of
the stop was very brief and therefore reasonable. We conclude that Goerlinger was in fresh pursuit of Minniecheske
and was therefore authorized to arrest Minniecheske outside the Marion city
limits for violating the city's traffic ordinance. See § 175.40(2), Stats. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.