COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED May 1, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
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No. 96-1855-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
MELISSA C. LENZEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
JOAN KAISER,
WISCONSIN PHYSICIANS
SERVICE,
and U-CARE, HMO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THOMAS A. BARNDT, and
AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Dane County:
DANIEL R. MOESER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Dykman, P.J.,
Vergeront and Roggensack, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Melissa C. Lenzen appeals from a judgment dismissing
her personal injury complaint. She
raises several issues related to jury instructions. We affirm.
The basic facts are not
in dispute. Defendant Thomas A. Barndt
was driving east on University Avenue in November 1988. At that time University Avenue was marked
for one lane of traffic in each direction.
Ahead of Barndt, also eastbound on University Avenue, two cars were stopped. It appears undisputed that the first car
ultimately turned left. The intentions
of the second car are in dispute.
Barndt moved to the right and began to pass the two stopped vehicles on
their right. Plaintiff Lenzen was
walking north on the west side of Middleton Street, approaching University
Avenue. As he approached the intersection
Barndt attempted to stop, but slid on snow.
His vehicle struck Lenzen near the southwest corner of the intersection,
although the precise location was in dispute.
The jury found both
Barndt and Lenzen negligent, and apportioned the negligence 15% to Barndt and
85% to Lenzen. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the complaint. Lenzen
appeals.
Lenzen argues that the
circuit court erred by not giving the jury instructions based on certain rules
of the road. The first rule is found in
§ 346.10(2), Stats.,
1987-88, which provides in relevant part:
"[T]he operator of a vehicle shall not overtake and pass any other
vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any intersection ...."
We conclude the court
did not err because there is no evidence of record that Barndt's conduct
violated this rule. The statute does
not apply to Barndt's passing of the first vehicle waiting at the intersection
because that vehicle ultimately turned left, and therefore was not "proceeding
in the same direction."
Barndt's passing of the
second vehicle did not violate the statute because the vehicle was not within
the intersection. The prohibition on
passing "at any intersection" is a penal statute which "requires
a strict construction of the word ‘at.'"
Behr v. Larson, 275 Wis. 620, 626, 83 N.W.2d 157, 161
(1957). "[W]ithout evidence that
the collision occurred within the intersection no violation was
shown." Id.
(emphasis added). The term
"intersection" is defined as "the area embraced within the
prolongation or connection of the curb lines ... of 2 or more highways which
join one another at, or approximately at right angles." Section 340.01(25), Stats., 1987-88.
Matthew McGilligan provided the only testimony of record about the
specific locations of the cars Barndt passed.
He testified that the first car was across the crosswalk, which extended
north from the west side of Middleton Street, and the second car was five to
seven feet behind that car. Therefore,
the second car was not in the intersection, and Barndt's passing of it did not
violate the rule.
Lenzen also argues that
the circuit court erred in instructing the jury as follows:
The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass
another vehicle upon the right if such movement can be done in safety and if he
can do so without driving off the pavement or main-traveled portion of the
roadway, when the vehicle overtaken is making or about to make a left turn.
The
instruction which was based on § 346.08(1), Stats., 1987-88, which provided:
The operator of a vehicle may overtake
and pass another vehicle upon the right only under conditions permitting such
movement in safety and only if he can do so without driving off the pavement or
main-traveled portion of the roadway, and then only under the following conditions:
(1) When the vehicle overtaken is making
or about to make a left turn;...
Lenzen argues that the
instruction should not have been given because the statute allowed Barndt to
pass only one "vehicle," rather than the two "vehicles"
which were present on University Avenue.
Lenzen also argues that the instruction did not properly state the
content of the statute because the instruction omits the part of the statute
that says passing on the right can be done only when the passed vehicle
is turning left.
Barndt responds that
Lenzen waived these arguments by failing to object at trial. See § 805.13(3), Stats.
We disagree. Lenzen's objection
to this instruction was sufficiently particular to preserve the arguments made
on appeal. Turning to the merits, we
reject both of Lenzen's arguments. As
to the first, while it is true that the statute provided only that an operator
may pass a "vehicle," in construing statutes the singular includes
the plural and the plural includes the singular, unless such construction would
produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature. Section 990.001(1), Stats., 1987-88. This
result does not appear inconsistent with legislative intent. As to the second argument, that the
instruction did not properly state the content of the statute, we conclude that
the instruction is adequate. An
ordinary reading of the instruction would be that it implies passing on the right is not permitted under other
circumstances.
Lenzen argues the
circuit court erred by not giving the jury an instruction based on Wis J I—Civil 1350, which would have
described a driver's duty to signal when making a lane change. We conclude that any error was
harmless. Failure to give the
instruction would only be prejudicial if the jury found that Barndt failed to
signal. There was little evidence to
support such a finding. Barndt
testified that he did not remember whether he signalled in this instance, but
that he "normally" does so "as an automatic reaction." Testimony from other witnesses was
inconclusive.[1] The total testimony on this point was very
brief. In view of the other facts of
the case, which were more fully explored at trial, it is unlikely that a
conclusion about whether Barndt signalled was a significant factor in the
jury's decision. The requested
instruction would not have caused the jury to change the apportionment of
negligence enough to change the ultimate result.
Lenzen also argues the
court erred by not giving the jury an instruction based on Wis J I—Civil 1354, with unspecified
"appropriate modifications."
That instruction provides generally that a deviation in direction must
be made with reasonable safety and ordinary care to make an efficient lookout.[2] Any error here was also harmless. This instruction adds little substance
beyond what was already given in the instruction about passing vehicles making
left turns, which said the movement should only be done if it can be done in
safety. Again, we do not believe the
giving of this instruction would have caused a different ultimate result.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] The
appellant appears to overstate that testimony.
Her brief states that Paulette Sprecher, driver of the rearmost vehicle
Barndt passed, testified that Barndt veered around to her right "without
signalling." However, Sprecher's
testimony was ambiguous. She was
asked: "Did you notice did the car
signal to turn right?" She
replied, "I don't believe so."
It is not clear whether Sprecher answered that she did not notice, or
that Barndt did not signal.
The appellant's brief states that Matthew McGilligan, who was stopped on Middleton Street waiting to enter University Avenue, "indicated that Mr. Barndt neither used his directional signal nor honked his horn." However, McGilligan's testimony was also ambiguous. He was asked: "Matt, when the car went around the cars in front of him, you didn't see him signal?" He replied, "I did not remember," apparently speaking in the past tense because he was referring to a statement he had given to an investigator.
[2] Wis J I—Civil 1354 provides in relevant
part:
A safety statute provides that no person shall
deviate from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and
until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.
This statute requires the driver of the deviating vehicle to exercise ordinary care to make an efficient lookout. This calls for the driver to exercise ordinary care to determine the presence, location, distance, and speed of any vehicle that might be affected by the driver's movement. After having made these observations, the driver must also exercise reasonable judgment in calculating the time required to safely deviate from the vehicle's position on the roadway without interfering with other vehicles within or approaching the vehicle's course of travel.