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COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED February
13, 1997 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1826-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FRANKIE
L. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Rock County: EDWIN C. DAHLBERG, Judge.
Affirmed.
EICH,
C.J.[1] Frankie L. Taylor appeals from a judgment
convicting him of three misdemeanors: battery, disorderly conduct and resisting
an officer. He argues that (1) the
trial court lost competency to proceed with the case as a result of undue delay
in filing the complaint; (2) his due process rights were violated by the
State's failure to provide him with a copy of the complaint; (3) he did not
have a preliminary hearing on the charges; and (4) he was prevented from
appearing personally in court. We
reject his claims and affirm the judgment.
Taylor
was charged with the offenses as the result of a domestic disturbance. He pled to the charges in exchange for the
State's agreement not to seek repeater enhancement of the possible
sentences. A joint recommendation was
made to the court that he receive the maximum periods of incarceration for the
offenses, to run consecutively to one another and consecutively to a sentence
imposed after parole revocation on other charges. The court accepted the plea, found him guilty and imposed the
recommended sentences.
I. Charging Delay
Citing
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991), which
held that a probable-cause determination must be made for a person in custody
within forty-eight hours after arrest, Taylor first asks us to rule that the
trial court lost jurisdiction to proceed with his case. Nowhere in his brief, however, does he
inform us of either the date of his arrest or the date he first appeared in
court or otherwise refer us to places in the record where such information
appears. We do not review issues that
are inadequately briefed, State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 646,
492 N.W.2d 633, 642 (Ct. App. 1992), or unaccompanied by citations to the
record. In Interest of D.P.,
170 Wis.2d 313, 334-35, 488 N.W.2d 133, 142 (Ct. App. 1992).[2]
II. The Criminal
Complaint
Taylor
next argues that because he was never served with a copy of the complaint he
must be held to have lacked "adequate knowledge" of the elements of
the offense. We are unsure of the
relief he requests, however. We presume
he attempts to challenge the validity of his plea in some respect. He complains that the complaint was given to
his attorney and retained by her. And
while he states at one point in his brief that "[t]here is no real
evidence that anyone correctly informed [him] of the penalties to the offenses
in counts two and three," he acknowledges a few sentences later that, at
his plea hearing, the trial court "described the elements of the offenses
and the penalties that could be imposed upon the conviction.... in each
charge." Taylor's argument, in its
entirety, is as follows:
The record ... indicates that Mr. Taylor attempted to
interpret statutes pertaining to sentencing issues and preliminary examination
issues. It is clear that Mr. Taylor was
unable to understand the material, statutory language, [sic] that he
received. There isn't any indication
that Mr. Taylor's ability to comprehend was considered.
As
we noted above, we do not consider arguments unsupported by citations to
authority, State v. Shaffer, 96 Wis.2d 531, 545-46, 292 N.W.2d
370, 378 (Ct. App. 1980), or references to the record. Keplin v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co.,
24 Wis.2d 319, 324, 129 N.W.2d 321, 323 (1964); Lechner v. Scharrer,
145 Wis.2d 667, 676, 429 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1988).[3]
III.
Preliminary Hearing
Taylor's
counsel states that Taylor "insists that he was entitled to a preliminary
hearing on the charges filed against him." He goes on to acknowledge, however, "It is clear" no
such hearing is required or provided in misdemeanor cases. See § 971.02(1), Stats.[4] Counsel's assertions under this heading
(they cannot be called an "argument") are frivolous and an
unprofessional waste of the State's and the court's time.
IV.
Inability to Appear
Finally,
Taylor claims that, although he was in custody throughout, he was
"absen[t] ... for scheduled court appearances." He correctly points out that under
§ 971.04(1), Stats., a defendant
must be present at arraignment, trial, jury selection, evidentiary hearings,
jury views, and at the return of the verdict and sentencing. Again, however, he has not referred us to
anything in the record reflecting his absence from such court hearing or
proceeding in the case. All he says is
that "[d]ue to [his] absence for scheduled court appearances, [he] ha[d]
no ability to proved [sic] input into [sic] decision made as to procedure or
timing of activity in the case," and that "[t]his is clearly
demonstrated ... by [his] filing motions on his own behalf, apparently without
imput [sic] or knowledge by his attorneys."
Again,
we do not consider arguments that are undeveloped or lacking in citation to the
record or applicable legal authority.[5]
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[2] We see no reason to depart from the rule in
this case, for even if Taylor had adequately briefed the issue, we have held
that "a Riverside violation ... is not a jurisdictional
defect causing a trial court to lose competency over the case." State v. Golden, 185 Wis.2d
763, 768-69, 519 N.W.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1994). It is only where delay results from deliberate acts on the part
of the State—and where the defendant's ability to prepare a defense is
prejudiced thereby—that relief will be afforded. Id. at 769, 519 N.W.2d at 661. Taylor advances no such claims here.
Beyond
that, Taylor himself acknowledges that he was being held in custody on a
probation/parole hold at the time, and we said in State v. Harris,
174 Wis.2d 367, 375, 497 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Ct. App. 1993), that absent either
prejudice or unforeseen circumstances—and, as we said, neither claim is made by
Taylor in this case—"the interval between an `arrest' and an initial
appearance is never unreasonable where the ... suspect is already in the lawful
physical custody of the State."
Taylor's argument borders on frivolous.
[3] The State points out that the record is
replete with explanations of the offenses and penalties to Taylor—both at his
initial appearance and at the plea hearing.
The State also points out that, at the initial appearance, the court
commissioner's statement of the penalties was imprecise in that the
commissioner did not state that Taylor could be either jailed or fined, or
both, on the charges. Because, however,
the statutes require advising a defendant of possible penalties only in felony
cases, § 970.02(1)(a), Stats.,
such a minor inaccuracy was harmless.
[4] Section 971.02(1), Stats., basic to Wisconsin criminal law, states that a
preliminary hearing is prerequisite to an information or indictment only
"[i]f the defendant is charged with a felony."
[5] Citing to the record, the State informs us
that the only "court appearances" at which Taylor was not present
were occasions at which continuances were either requested or granted.
Finally,
we note that Taylor's attempt to assert a constitutional right-of-confrontation
claim in this respect is equally flawed.
The right to be present "throughout the trial" is indeed
essential to due process; it is a right to be present at "all critical
states of [the] proceeding," State v. Divanovic, 200 Wis.2d
210, 220, 546 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Ct. App. 1996), but Taylor simply has not
shown—indeed, or even alleged—that he was absent at any "critical"
stage of this proceeding.