COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED October
24, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1806-FT
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
In the
Interest of:
PAUL
P., a person under the age of 18:
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner,
v.
PAUL
P.,
Respondent.
APPEAL
from orders of the circuit court for La Crosse County: MICHAEL J. MULROY, Judge. Affirmed.
EICH,
C.J.[1] Paul P. appeals from a dispositional order
adjudicating him delinquent by reason of his commission of a battery, and from
an order denying his motions for postadjudication relief.[2] He claims that: (1) the juvenile court lost
competency to proceed with the case because the trial did not take place within
twenty days of the plea hearing; and (2) he is entitled to a new trial because
his trial counsel failed to request that the jurors be individually polled
after their verdict.
We
reject both arguments and affirm the orders.
I.
Competency to Proceed
On
June 13, 1995, Paul P. was taken into detention for a battery offense and other
charges not pertinent to this discussion.
The next day he appeared with his attorney for a detention hearing,
after which he was placed in secure detention.
He appeared in court again the following day, June 15, at which time the
juvenile petition was filed and the court, continuing his detention, set the
plea hearing for June 21, 1995. On that
date, Paul P. and his attorney appeared and requested a jury trial. He was continued in secure detention.
Under
the applicable statute, § 48.30(7), Stats.,
a fact-finding hearing is to be held within twenty days of the plea
hearing. In this instance, the
twenty-day period would expire on July 11, 1995. On June 28, the court held a "status conference," at
which time Paul P.'s attorney informed the court that he was "willing to
waive the time limits to ensure that [counsel] can complete [his]
investigat[ion] if that's necessary."
In response, the court continued the "status" hearing to July
5, informing counsel that if the investigation was completed earlier, the hearing
"can be scheduled at an earlier time."
At
the continued status hearing on July 5, Paul P., through counsel, acknowledged
that he had "waived the time limits last week," and the court set the
jury trial for August 8.
On
July 27, the district attorney requested a brief postponement due to the
absence of its primary investigator, and the trial was continued to August
21. On August 7, all parties stipulated
to Paul P.'s transfer to nonsecure detention pending the trial. The jury was selected on August 21, and the
case went to trial on August 23.
On
appeal, Paul P. argues that he never validly waived the twenty-day time limit
of § 48.30(7), Stats. He maintains that he was never personally
questioned by the court as to the waiver and he contends that this is
inadequate because, under In Interest of R.H., 147 Wis.2d 22,
38-39, 433 N.W.2d 16, 23 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 150 Wis.2d 432, 441
N.W.2d 233 (1989), a juvenile's "silence" is not a consent to a
continuance when a hearing is set beyond the statutory time limit. We do not believe R.H. compels
the result Paul P. seeks.
The
State argued in R.H. that the juvenile consented to a continuance
of a dispositional hearing in a CHIPS case, which was required by § 48.30(6), Stats., to be held within thirty days
from the plea hearing, by remaining silent when the hearing was set beyond that
time. Id. at 38, 433
N.W.2d at 23. We said that because,
under § 48.315, continuances in juvenile court may be "granted only `on
the record' for good cause," the State's argument must fail because it had
made "no such showing in this case."
Id. at 39, 433 N.W.2d at 23.
R.H. is inapposite, for this is not a
"consent-by-silence" case.
Paul P. was anything but silent.
Through his counsel, he affirmatively—and on the record—waived the applicable
time limit. The trial court specifically
found that Paul P. validly waived his right to a hearing within twenty days of
the plea, and he has not persuaded us that that finding was in error.[3]
II. Jury Polling
Paul P. next argues that
he is entitled to a new trial "by reason of trial counsel's failure to
request individual polling of the jury."
And while he does not discuss the standards governing a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel—indeed he has not even seen fit to number the
pages of his brief—we assume that is the essence of his argument.
When
the jury returned its verdict finding Paul P. guilty of the charged offense,
the court inquired of the panel: "Ladies and gentlemen, ... if these are
the verdicts of each of you, would you please raise your right hands? Okay, you can lower them. The record should show that all 12 jurors
did raise their right hand[s]." The court then asked the prosecutor and Paul P.'s counsel whether
there was "[a]ny reason to poll the jury," to which each responded
"No, your honor." Then, as
the court prepared to dismiss the jurors, the prosecutor stated that he had
just "read a case ... that the defendant personally has to waive the right
to poll the jury" and "would just elicit that from the jury at this
point." The court responded that
it did not believe that was an accurate statement of the law and dismissed the
jury.
Citing
State v. Jackson, 188 Wis.2d 537, 542, 525 N.W.2d 165, 167 (Ct.
App. 1994), Paul P. argues that because he did not understand that he had a
right to poll the jury, his counsel's waiver of the poll should be disregarded
and the jury's verdict reversed. We
disagree.
In
Jackson, we held that when a defendant is represented by counsel
at the time the verdict is entered, the trial court need not ascertain that he
or she waived the right to poll the jury.
Jackson, 188 Wis.2d at 541-42, 525 N.W.2d at 167. Paul P. points to language immediately
preceding that holding where we noted that the defendant in Jackson
failed to allege "that he did not understand his right to poll the jury or
that he disagreed with counsel's waiver"; he asserts that language should
apply here because he had "given statements ... as to his lack of
understanding and the failure of his counsel to explain to him the significance
of the polling issue." He does not
refer us to any place in the record where such a statement appears, however,
and, as we have noted above, factual assertions by attorneys which are not
reflected by the record cannot be considered by the court. Dane County v. McManus, 55
Wis.2d 413, 425-26, 198 N.W.2d 667, 674 (1972).[4]
Even
so, there is nothing in Jackson to indicate that the dictum to
which Paul P. refers was intended as a holding that a waiver by counsel will be
held null and void anytime the defendant says he did not understand his right
to poll the jury. Indeed, we concluded
our discussion of the issue by stating: "Jackson was represented by
counsel when the verdict was entered, and the decision to assert or waive
certain rights, including whether to poll the jury, was delegated to that
counsel. Thus no constitutional right
was implicated and reversal is not warranted." Id. at 542-43, 525 N.W.2d at 168 (citations
omitted).
In
a later case, State v. Yang, 201 Wis.2d 721, 740-41, 549 N.W.2d
769, 776-77 (Ct. App. 1996), we referred to that language for our conclusion
that Jackson "hold[s] that the decision whether to request
an individual polling is one delegated to counsel," and that counsel's
failure to request a poll is not, ipso facto, deficient performance. We held that when the jury was instructed
its verdict had to be unanimous and all the jurors raised their hands in
affirmance of the verdict in response to the court's questions, there was no
indication that the jury's verdict was not unanimous, and the trial court could
properly deny the defendant's request for a hearing in support of his
postconviction motion claiming that counsel was ineffective for failing to
request an individual poll. Id.
at 741-42, 549 N.W.2d at 777. We see no
merit in Paul P.'s argument that his counsel's failure to request an individual
poll entitles him to a new trial.
By
the Court.—Orders affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[3] Paul P. argues, alternatively, that the
court's finding is not entitled to any weight on appeal because "[t]he
trial judge was not an impartial trier of fact," but rather made the
finding solely to cover up its own "failure[s]" and
"mischaracteriz[ation]" of the testimony. He offers no citation to the record—or to any applicable legal
authority—that would permit us to evaluate such claims. See Lechner v. Scharrer,
145 Wis.2d 667, 676, 429 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1988) (court of appeals need
not consider arguments unsupported by citations to authority or references to
the record).
His
argument that the juvenile court erred by not, sua sponte,
"tak[ing] some steps to ascertain [his own] knowing and voluntary
assent" to the continuance suffers the same fate, for he has offered no
authority in support of such a proposition.
See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 646, 492
N.W.2d 633, 642 (Ct. App. 1992).
[4] In the "factual" portion of his
brief, Paul P. asserts that, at the postadjudication motion hearing, he
"took the stand and reiterated and adopted the allegations of his
Affidavit, incorporated in the Motion itself ... wherein he stated that he did
not understand and was never informed by his counsel that he ... never had his
right to poll the jury explained to him, and did not understand what was going
on when the jury came back with its verdict ...." While he does provide a record citation for
the affidavit, he offers none for the testimony upon which he relies.