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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND RELEASED
January 14, 1997
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NOTICE
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats.
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.
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No. 96-1800
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
LITTLE SISSABAGAMA
LAKE
SHORE OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF EDGEWATER AND
SAWYER COUNTY,
Respondents-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Sawyer County:
NORMAN L. YACKEL, Judge. Reversed
and cause remanded.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
MYSE, J. Little Sissabagama Lake Shore Owners
Association, Inc., appeals a judgment dismissing the association's writ of
certiorari requesting review of the County's denial of tax exempt status for
land owned by the association. The
trial court dismissed the association's writ of certiorari based on the failure
to file a notice of claim and claim (notice of claim) with the County prior to
filing the writ. The association
contends that the trial court erred by holding the association was required to
give notice to the County before filing this action. Because we conclude that a notice of claim is not required when
appealing a county board's determination under § 70.11(20), Stats., we reverse.
The facts of this case
are straightforward. The association is
a tax exempt nonprofit corporation under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). The association completed a property tax
exemption request, which the Sawyer county assessor's office granted. The Sawyer County Board, however, held a
meeting in June reviewing the assessor's decision and denied tax exempt status
for the association's property. In
August, the association sent a request for reconsideration to the County but received
no response. The association appealed
following the writ of certiorari procedure under § 70.47(13), Stats.
This writ was filed within ninety days after the notice of the denial of
tax exempt status.
Sawyer County, joined by
the Town of Edgewater, moved to dismiss the action because the association had
failed to first give notice of claim as required under § 893.80(1), Stats.
The trial court, concluding § 893.80(1) applied and a notice of claim
was required, dismissed the action.
This appeal followed.
This appeal requires us
to interpret the interaction between §§ 70.11(20) and 893.80, Stats.
The construction of a statute presents a question of law we review de
novo. State ex rel. Frederick v.
McCaughtry, 173 Wis.2d 222, 225, 496 N.W.2d 177, 179 (Ct. App.
1992). The goal of statutory
construction is to determine the legislature's intent. Id. The first recourse to determine legislative intent is the
language of the statute itself. Id.
at 226, 496 N.W.2d at 179. Only if the
language of a statute is ambiguous may one resort to legislative history and
other extraneous matters in attempting to determine legislative intent. Id. at 226, 496 N.W.2d at
179. Because the county board was
acting under § 70.11(20), it is appropriate to begin our analysis there.
Section 70.11(20), Stats., provides tax exempt status for
property under the following conditions:
Property Held In
Trust In Public Interest. Property that is owned by, or held in trust for,
a nonprofit organization, if all of the following requirements are fulfilled:
(a) The property is used to
preserve native wild plant or native wild animal life, Indian mounds or other
works of ancient persons or geological or geographical formations of scientific
interest.
(b) The property is open to the
public subject to reasonable restrictions.
(c) No pecuniary profit accrues to
any owner or member of the organization or to any associate of any such owner
or member from the use or holding of the property.
(d)
The county board of the county where the property is located has not determined
that the property is not owned by, or held in trust for, a nonprofit
organization and has not determined that at least one of the requirements under
pars. (a) to (c) has not been fulfilled.
The
county board was acting pursuant to its authority under subsec. (d) when it
denied the requested tax exempt status.
The County argues that DNR
v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis.2d 178, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994), requires a
notice of claim. We disagree. Although Waukesha extended §
893.80, Stats., to all actions,
including those in equity and not just to those actions seeking money damages,
we conclude that a notice of claim is no more required when appealing a county
board's determination under § 70.11(20), Stats.,
than it would be for an inmate filing a habeas corpus action. We reach this conclusion for a variety of
reasons.
Initially, there is no
purpose in requiring a § 893.80, Stats.,
notice of claim when review of a county board's determination under §
70.11(20), Stats., is
sought. The purpose of requiring notice
is to make the municipality aware of the claim and afford it "'an
opportunity to compromise and settle [the] claim without
litigation.'" Waukesha,
184 Wis.2d at 195, 515 N.W.2d at 894 (citation omitted). In each case, the County will be aware of
the dispute. The County does not need
to be put on notice of a claim it has already heard and denied.
Moreover, a notice of
claim is not required because this is a review of a tax determination. Appeals from property tax determinations do
not require a notice of claim. Section
70.47, Stats. Section 70.11 enumerates which property is
tax exempt. The assessor in compiling
the tax rolls must necessarily incorporate the exemptions listed in §
70.11. These decisions are appealable
without a notice of claim. Id. The legislature vested in the county board,
without specifying a separate appeal procedure, its function under
70.11(20). The county board, however,
is not involved in any other determinations under § 70.11. In view of the fact that all other
determinations under § 70.11 are reviewable without a notice of claim,
consistency and logic demand that county board determinations under subsec.
(20) do not require a notice of claim.
Last, requiring a notice
of claim to review county board § 70.11(20), Stats.,
determinations would conflict with our policy of resolving property tax
disputes promptly. Applying § 893.80, Stats., to these claims could make an aggrieved taxpayer wait
as long as 240 days after a
claim has been denied before filing an action for review of this
determination. Because the purpose of §
893.80 is satisfied and its application to these determinations would conflict
with another policy, we conclude that a notice of claim is not required when
reviewing county board § 70.11(20) determinations.
Even if we were to
conclude that § 893.80, Stats.,
applies, we would conclude that it has been complied with in this case and will
be in each case arising under § 70.11(20), Stats. A notice of
claim under § 893.80 does not need to be given if the County had actual notice
of the incident giving rise to the action and the requirements of §
893.80(1)(b) are satisfied. Waukesha,
184 Wis.2d at 197, 515 N.W.2d at 895; § 893.80(1)(a), Stats. Here, the
county board had actual notice. The
board was the instigator in reviewing the assessor's decision and had received
a request for reconsideration of its determination regarding the tax exempt
status of the association's land.
Under Waukesha,
in addition to actual notice, the requirements of § 893.80(1)(b), Stats., need to be met. These requirements are that the County must
have notice of (1) the claimant's address, (2) the itemized relief sought, (3)
this notice must be submitted to the clerk, and (4) the claim must be
disallowed. Section 893.80(1)(b), Stats.
Strict compliance with these requirements is not necessary, rather
substantial compliance is sufficient. Waukesha,
184 Wis.2d at 197-98, 515 N.W.2d at 895.
The identity of the association and its location were well known to the
county board. The relief sought is
clear and not only does the clerk have notice of the claim but indeed the
entire county board will have notice.
The denial of the claim is apparent from the county board's vote. Further, the request for reconsideration
constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of
§ 893.80(1)(b). Therefore, because
the County had actual notice and the requirements of 893.80(1)(b) are
satisfied in this case, we conclude that no notice of claim was necessary.
Not only were the
893.80(1)(b), Stats., elements
satisfied and actual notice present in this case, but they will be in every
case. The County will have actual
notice whenever it is acting under § 70.11(20), Stats., because it is specifically addressing the issue of
whether this taxpayer's property will be tax exempt.
Compliance with the
elements of § 893.80(1)(b), Stats.,
is also automatic when the county board acts under § 70.11(20), Stats.
The County will necessarily be aware of the location of the property in
question and its owner. The relief
sought is apparent and known in every case; the taxpayer is requesting tax
exempt status for a certain parcel of property. The entire county board will be aware of the claim because
county board action is necessary under § 70.11(20)(d). Last, the denial of the claim will be apparent
to the taxpayer from the county board's vote.
Compliance with the elements of § 893.80(1)(b) and the presence of
actual notice is inescapable under § 70.11(20). Therefore, we conclude that no notice of claim need ever be given
of a claim arising from a § 70.11(20) determination of the county board
and reverse.
By the Court.—Judgment
reversed and cause remanded.
