COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED April 2, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1728
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
KATHY LASKA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF WAUKESHA
ZONING
BOARD OF APPEALS, TOWN
OF WAUKESHA PLAN
COMMISSION
and TOWN OF WAUKESHA
TOWN BOARD,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Waukesha County:
ROGER MURPHY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brown, Nettesheim
and Anderson, JJ.
BROWN, J. The
Town of Waukesha Zoning Board of Appeals granted a “special exception” from
certain ordinances relating to drainage systems. The ruling permitted the developer to set basements closer to the
water table. Kathy Laska, a neighboring
landowner, filed a petition for certiorari review of this ruling. She alleged that the Zoning Board of Appeals
did not provide proper notice of the public hearing on this matter. Laska later filed an amended petition which
added a claim that the town of Waukesha's other planning agencies had improperly
applied other zoning ordinances during their review of this development.
After the circuit court
dismissed her petition and her amended petition, Laska brought this appeal and
now realleges her original claim that the notice was defective. Laska also continues to assert that the
planning agencies have misapplied certain zoning ordinances.
We join in the circuit
court's conclusion that Laska was not harmed by the defective notice and that
the special exception is valid. We
further conclude that Laska's zoning-related challenge is not properly before
us because she abandoned this argument in the proceedings before the circuit
court. Moreover, Laska never raised it
before the planning agencies. We affirm
the order dismissing Laska's petition and her amended petition.
The record reveals the
following undisputed facts. Paul and
Judith Scholovich wish to develop “Trillium Woods,” a residential subdivision
consisting of eleven homesites on a twenty-one acre,[1]
wooded, hilltop site. The Scholoviches
began the approval process by filing an application with the Town of Waukesha
Plan Commission which granted “conceptual approval” on July 27, 1995. The Plan Commission, however, informed the
Scholoviches that they needed a special exception from local drainage
ordinances before they could proceed further in the approval process. Accordingly, the Scholoviches filed an
application with the Zoning Board of Appeals on September 25, 1995.
The drainage ordinances
relevant to the inquiry before the Zoning Board of Appeals mandated that the
lowest (basement) floor of the proposed homes be at least three feet above the
highest “seasonal ground water level.” See
Town of Waukesha, Wis., Zoning
Ordinances §§ 11.08(a) and 11.12(d).
Because site testing showed that the water level sometimes approached
within two feet of the ground surface, the Scholoviches proposed that they
would install a special drainage system which would keep the basements dry and
safely carry away any ground water runoff.
The Zoning Board of
Appeals scheduled a public hearing and published a notice in the Waukesha Freeman, Oct. 9, 1995 and Oct.
16, 1995; the notice provided in pertinent part:
BOARD OF APPEAL
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Town of
Waukesha Board of Appeals will meet on Wednesday, October 25, 1995 ... to
consider the request of Paul J. and Judith Scholovich ....
....
FOR THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL EXCEPTION: If approved, this would allow the lowest
floor elevation above the highest “natural” anticipated seasonal ground water
level by lowering the drain tile system.
Prior
to the hearing, the Zoning Board of Appeals also received written reports and
comments from the town's Building and Zoning Department and from neighboring
landowners.
During the public
hearing, the Zoning Board of Appeals heard testimony regarding the specific
details of the drainage system from the Scholoviches' attorney and from their
engineer. Moreover, several neighbors
from an adjoining subdivision, including Laska, testified in opposition. They all explained how their homes were
located downhill of the proposed development and how they already had drainage
problems. They expressed fear that any
construction on the hilltop land above them would substantially aggravate their
situation.
The Zoning Board of
Appeals nonetheless granted the Scholoviches a special exception. Laska then filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the circuit court on November 22, 1995. In it she explained that she was “aggrieved”
by this drainage ruling because it meant that the development “has now cleared
its final significant approval hurdle.”
Laska's specific complaint was that the notice for the October 25 public
hearing was defective.
In addition, two months
later, Laska filed an amended petition and added claims that the Plan
Commission and the Town of Waukesha Town Board had misapplied the applicable
zoning ordinances when they reviewed this development. Laska explains that her new claims were
based on what was then the just released decision in City of Waukesha v.
Town Bd. of Waukesha, 198 Wis.2d 592, 543 N.W.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1995),[2]
which declared void the town's “Planned Urban Development” ordinance—the same
ordinance which the Scholoviches were seemingly relying on to secure approval
for their development.
The following standards
of review govern our analysis of Laska's appeal. We owe no deference to the circuit court's decision to dismiss
the petition and the amended petition. See
State ex rel. Smith v. Oak Creek, 131 Wis.2d 451, 455, 389 N.W.2d
366, 367 (Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 139 Wis.2d 788, 407 N.W.2d 901
(1987). Nonetheless, our analysis is
confined to the following four issues:
(1) whether the planning agencies stayed within their jurisdiction, (2)
whether they acted according to law, (3) whether their decisions were arbitrary
or oppressive and (4) whether their decisions were reasonably supported by the
evidence. See id. Laska's notice claim relates to the first of
these prongs and her zoning claim relates to the second. We now will address them in that order.
Laska first claims that
the notice was facially defective because it stated that the proposed special
exception was related to the “natural” water level. She argues that this was misleading because the Scholoviches were
really seeking to impose an “artificially lowered” water level by installing a
drainage system. Laska further argues
that the defects in the notice left her without a “meaningful opportunity to
prepare an objection.”
The Town (on behalf of
all of the zoning agencies) responds that we should follow the reasoning of the
circuit court. The court found that
Laska was not in a position to challenge the notice since she appeared at the
hearing and was able to state her objections.
The Town argues that Cities Service Oil Co. v. Board of Appeals,
21 Wis.2d 516, 124 N.W.2d 809 (1963), supports this conclusion.
In Cities Service,
the zoning board withdrew a building permit and the landowner argued that its
decision should be overturned because of flaws in the notice. See id. at 534, 124 N.W.2d at
818. The supreme court observed,
however, that the landowner had participated in the hearings and reasoned that
the “defect” was not “prejudicial” to the landowner. See id. at 535, 124 N.W.2d at 819.
Laska replies, however,
that the analysis within Cities Service is not applicable
here. She notes that the neighboring
landowners in that case successfully persuaded the zoning board to revoke the
landowner's unauthorized building permit, hence the supreme court was simply
making the common sense observation that better notice would have only informed
more opposition to come to the hearing and would have been of no benefit
to the landowner. Cf. id.
(“[the landowner] is not entitled to raise this lack of adequate notice to
others than itself.”).
We disagree that the
analysis within Cities Service does not apply. We acknowledge that the decision provides
some support for Laska as the supreme court emphasized how in variance cases,
similar to special exception cases, “adequate public notice is most essential in
order to give affected property owners a chance to protest against the proposed
variance.” See id.
at 534-35, 124 N.W.2d at 819. However,
the court added to this cautionary language that a party challenging the notice
must also show how he or she was negatively affected; it explained:If the
variance is granted and the published notice is defective, nearby property
owners adversely affected, who have been seriously prejudiced thereby,
ought to be entitled to assert that the board's action in granting the variance
is illegal and void.
Id. at
535, 124 N.W.2d at 819 (emphasis added).
Based on these statements, we reject Laska's argument that Cities
Service is not applicable.
Assuming that the notice
was defective, Laska has not demonstrated how an accurate notice would have
changed her position before the Zoning Board of Appeals. We have reviewed the record and see that
Laska's argument, and that of the other neighbors, was that no development
whatsoever should take place on the Scholoviches' hilltop land.[3] Laska's objection was not based on the
specifics of the drainage system or on what an appropriate “natural” or
“artificial” water level should be. Nor
has she demonstrated to this court that she would have made such an argument if
she had only been properly advised through a better public notice. Thus, we conclude that the notice's
technical defect did not affect her ability to prepare for the hearing. We reject Laska's challenge to the notice.
We next turn to the
claim that Laska raised in her amended petition concerning whether the Plan
Commission and the Town Board misapplied the Town's zoning ordinances. Because Laska abandoned the issue before the
circuit court, we deem it waived on appeal.
This is what occurred
before the circuit court. Soon after
Laska filed her original petition, the court set a briefing schedule which
required Laska to file her brief-in-chief by January 19, 1996. She did so.
Then, afterward and before the reply brief was due, Laska filed her
amended petition. She never sought
permission to file a supplemental brief on the issue raised in her amended
petition.
As a result, once it
came time for the court to make a ruling, it only had before it a complete
analysis of Laska's notice claim and simple allegations relating to her zoning
claim. So the circuit court ruled on
Laska's notice issue and merely noted that Laska had also raised a zoning
issue. Because Laska failed to pursue
this latter issue before the circuit court, she is precluded from asserting it
on appeal. See Reiman Assocs., Inc. v. R/A Advertising, Inc., 102
Wis.2d 305, 306 n.1, 306 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Ct. App. 1981).
There is a further
reason why Laska's zoning claim is not properly before this court. Laska never raised it during the hearings
where the zoning of this development was addressed; she failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies. See Nodell
Inv. Corp. v. City of Glendale, 78 Wis.2d 416, 424, 254 N.W.2d 310, 315
(1977).
Since Laska's original
briefs to this court did not clarify why she needed to raise this claim by
filing an amended petition, instead of pursuing the generally required path of
making this objection during the administrative process, we asked the parties
to prepare supplemental briefs.
In this brief, Laska
concedes that the Plan Commission and the Town Board considered whether they
should grant the Scholoviches a “conditional use permit,” the final step in the
approval process, after the Scholoviches received their special
exception from the Zoning Board of Appeals.
Thus, it is clear that Laska had the opportunity to present her concerns
about whether the Scholoviches could properly develop their property in light
of the City of Waukesha decision.
For some reason, however,
Laska chose not to appear at these hearings and elected to simply “attach” this
issue to the petition for certiorari review that she had already filed to
challenge the ruling made by the Zoning Board of Appeals. That ruling to grant the Scholoviches the
special exception to the drainage ordinances, however, was not at all related
to the matter of how the property should be zoned and whether the Scholoviches
were entitled to a conditional use permit. Although Laska alleged that the
drainage matter was the last “hurdle” that the Scholoviches faced, the
supplemental briefs establish that this was not the case.
Although our decision to
affirm the order dismissing Laska's petition and her amended petition may leave
her without any remedy, she has failed to pursue the administrative remedies
that were available to her. We
therefore hold Laska to the rule that issues not raised before the appropriate
administrative agency will not be considered on appeal. See Goranson v. DILHR, 94
Wis.2d 537, 545, 289 N.W.2d 270, 274 (1980).
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
Not recommended for
publication in the official reports.
[1] We took this number from the circuit court's memorandum decision. We note, however, that other documents identify the parcel to be about thirty acres. This discrepancy is not relevant to the issues before us.
[2] The decision was released on December 6, 1995. Laska filed her amended petition on January 24, 1996.
[3]
Laska summarized her position to the Zoning Board of Appeals as follows:
We are all very sorry that the [Scholoviches] might lose out financially if they do not develop the woods. However, they would be able to develop the entire rest of their property and that will not at all affect the people in the lower areas. If they develop anything west of that woods, all the drainage would go towards Big Bend Road, would not at all affect us on the lower part. I believe what we're developing here is a white elephant.