COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JANUARY 22, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1660-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM A. GASPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Eau Claire County:
PAUL J. LENZ, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J., Myse
and Carlson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. William Gasper appeals a judgment convicting him of
sexually assaulting a child. He argues
that the complaint and information were not sufficiently specific as to the
date of the offense to allow him an adequate opportunity to defend himself and
that the trial court erroneously allowed other crimes evidence. We reject these arguments and affirm the
judgment.
Gasper was charged with
having sexual contact with an eight-year-old child. Although the complaint and the testimony at the preliminary
hearing created a wide range of potential dates for this offense, the
information filed eight months before trial alleged that the crime took place
between August 4 and October 1, 1994.
Because the date of the commission of the crime is not a material
element, it need not be precisely alleged and the only questions are whether
the two-month timeframe prevented Gasper from preparing a defense and whether
he might be subjected to double jeopardy because of lack of specificity in the
date. State v. Fawcett,
145 Wis.2d 244, 250, 426 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Ct. App. 1988); Holesome v. State,
40 Wis.2d 95, 102, 161 N.W.2d 283, 287 (1968).
Although Gasper
complains that he was not given sufficient notice to prepare a defense, he has
not identified any defense that would have been available had the timeframe
been further narrowed. Gasper had been
given a key to the victim's house and had ready access to the victim on
numerous occasions. Nothing in the
record suggests that Gasper would have had an alibi if a more specific
timeframe had been alleged.
There is no realistic
double jeopardy issue. The State
concedes that it cannot charge Gasper with another sexual assault of the same
victim during the timeframe alleged in the information. Therefore, the information was sufficiently
specific to satisfy Gasper's due process rights.
The trial court properly
exercised its discretion when it allowed evidence that Gasper had previously
sexually assaulted his granddaughters.
The decision to admit evidence lies within the trial court's discretion. State v. Davis, 171 Wis.2d
711, 722, 492 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Ct. App. 1992).
This court will not reverse a discretionary decision unless the use of
the court's discretion is wholly unreasonable.
State v. Johnson, 118 Wis.2d 472, 481, 348 N.W.2d 196, 201
(Ct. App. 1984).
Other crimes evidence is
admissible if it is relevant to some issue other than propensity unless its
probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. See State v. Speer, 176
Wis.2d 1101, 1113-14, 501 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1993). While the State has the burden of showing that this evidence is
relevant to one or more of the named admissible purposes, greater latitude of
proof is offered in sex crimes cases involving a minor child. State v. Mink, 146 Wis.2d 1,
13-14, 429 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Ct. App. 1988).
Here, evidence that Gasper sexually assaulted his grandchildren is
relevant to prove that his motive for touching the victim was sexual
gratification. See State
v. Plymesser, 172 Wis.2d 583, 592-95, 493 N.W.2d 367, 371-72
(1992). When intent is an element of
the offense charged, evidence of other crimes is relevant even if the defendant
does not directly dispute the State's proof of intent. Id.
The other crimes were
near in time and circumstances to the offense alleged here and, therefore, have
substantial probative value. The sexual
contact with Gasper's granddaughters involved victims of similar ages to the
victim in this case and, although the victim here was not related to Gasper, he
had a close relationship with the victim's mother and the victim called him
"daddy." The previous
offenses were four years and eight years before this sexual assault, and Gasper
spent much of the intervening time in prison.
Periods of confinement are not considered in computing the time between
incidents. State v. Rutchik,
116 Wis.2d 61, 75, 341 N.W.2d 639, 645 (1984).
Any potential unfair prejudice was presumptively eliminated by a
curative instruction that was given immediately prior to the other crimes
testimony and again at the close of the trial.
See State v. Williamson, 84 Wis.2d 370, 391, 267
N.W.2d 337, 347 (1978). Therefore, the
trial court properly exercised its discretion when it admitted the other crimes
evidence.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.