COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED December 23, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1630
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL M. MEININGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
KITTY K. BRENNAN, Judge. Affirmed.
FINE,
J. Michael M. Meininger appeals from the trial court's order
determining that his refusal to submit to a chemical test of his blood-alcohol
content was unreasonable. See §
343.305(9), Stats. The sole issue on appeal is whether the
trial court correctly determined that the police officer who arrested Meininger
acted lawfully in stopping him. We
affirm.
A police officer may
lawfully stop a person to investigate whether that person has committed or is
committing a crime if the officer “possesses specific and articulable facts
which would warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity was afoot.” State v. Waldner, No.
95-1291-CR, slip op. at 3, (Wis. Dec. 13, 1996). The question of whether an investigatory stop was legally
justified presents a question of law that we decide de novo. State v. Krier, 165 Wis.2d
673, 676, 478 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1991).
The trial court's findings of historical fact will not be reversed,
however, unless they are “clearly erroneous.”
See Rule 805.17(2),
Stats., made applicable to
criminal proceedings by § 972.11(1), Stats.;
see also State v. Angiolo, 186 Wis.2d 488, 494–495, 520
N.W.2d 923, 927 (Ct. App. 1994). We must, of course, give substantial deference
to the trial court's assessment of the evidence when that assessment is based
on the trial court's perception of the witnesses' credibility. Id., 186 Wis.2d at 495, 520
N.W.2d at 927. The lawfulness of an investigatory
stop is analyzed in a “common sense” way under the “totality of the
facts.” Waldner, slip op.
at 4–5.
The police officer who
arrested Meininger testified that Meininger was driving at approximately sixty
miles per hour in a thirty-five miles-per-hour zone, and that he was weaving in
his lane. If believed, that testimony
was sufficient to support the officer's stop of Meininger. Meininger, however, contends that the
officer was not telling the truth, and points to several instances of what he
asserts was the officer's inconsistent testimony:
1. The
officer first testified on direct-examination that when he initially saw
Meininger, Meininger was “drifting in and out of [his] traffic lane.” Moments later, the officer testified that as
he continued to follow Meininger he saw that Meininger was “drifting within
[his] lane, nearly striking the curb -- drifting in the gutter area.” On cross-examination, the officer testified
that he saw Meininger drifting within his traffic lane and did not “believe”
that Meininger “completely exited the lane.”
2. The
officer first testified that the speed limit on the route where he saw
Meininger driving at sixty miles per hour was thirty-five. When confronted with photographs and other
documents, however, the officer admitted that the speed limit was forty miles
per hour.
3. The
officer did not give Meininger a speeding ticket despite the officer's
testimony that Meininger was speeding.
4. Meininger
claims that the officer's testimony that the officer followed him for almost
two and one-half miles before finally stopping him was “almost inconceivable”
given the officer's testimony that Meininger was speeding and driving
erratically.
Finally, Meininger
points to his own testimony, which contradicted the officer's on all essential
points.
The trial court found
that although there “was some successful impeachment of the officer,” that the
spine of the officer's testimony established the lawful justification for the
stop: that Meininger was speeding and was
drifting, “up to the gutter” at one point.[1] The trial court also determined that the
officer's delay in stopping Meininger was “perfectly reasonable and rational.” The trial court's finding that Meininger was
speeding has support in the evidence and is not, therefore, “clearly
erroneous.” Given that finding, the
officer's stop of Meininger was lawful.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.