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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 19, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1609-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
KATHERINE SARAZIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TOM HUDSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for La Crosse County:
JOHN J. PERLICH, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman, P.J., and Roggensack, J.
PER
CURIAM. Tom Hudson appeals from an order, issued under
§ 813.125, Stats., enjoining
him from calling Katherine Sarazin at home or visiting her there. The issue is whether Sarazin presented
sufficient evidence to satisfy the statutory requirements for an
injunction. We conclude that she did
and therefore affirm.[1]
Sarazin petitioned for
an order requiring Hudson to stop harassing her at work or at home by calling
or talking to her about personal matters.
She also requested an order requiring him to stop retaliating against her
at work for refusing his sexual advances.
At the hearing on her petition, Sarazin testified that Hudson had met
her two years before and had recruited her to work at W&G Transport, a
delivery company. She agreed and
accepted a position with W&G, with Hudson as her work supervisor.
In early 1995, the
parties began a brief relationship that included sexual contact. After she broke it off, Hudson persistently
called her, twice sent her roses and twice visited her home, to persuade her to
resume their relationship. She
testified that the contacts created an uneasy working environment for her and
occasionally made her nervous and sick to her stomach. At one point she threatened to call the
police if he did not desist. Another
time Hudson called her boyfriend. She
testified that her children became upset over the contacts.
Sometime around the end
of January 1996, Hudson called her home many times over a weekend. On Monday morning he showed up at her home
and engaged her in a conversation about their relationship, her boyfriend, and
whether she was sleeping with her boyfriend.
Hudson indicated, according to Sarazin, that he had spied on her the
night before. In March 1996, Sarazin filed
a complaint with the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations concerning
Hudson's conduct. After the complaint
was filed, Hudson's only contact with her was one phone call, informing her by
recorded message that he had her paycheck at the office and that she could come
and get it from him if she wished. At
some point shortly before or after Sarazin filed the complaint, another
employee replaced Hudson as Sarazin's supervisor.
In his testimony, Hudson
described the January visit to Sarazin's home as solely for the purpose of
informing her that he had a new girlfriend and was no longer interested in
her. On the basis of the evidence
described above, the trial court granted an injunction ordering Hudson not to
call or visit Sarazin at her residence for two years.
The court may issue a
harassment injunction under § 813.125(4), Stats., if the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that
respondent has violated § 947.013, Stats. In relevant part, that statute prohibits one
from engaging in a course of conduct which harasses or intimidates another
person and which serves no legitimate purpose.
Section 947.013(1m). A course of
conduct means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period
of time showing a continuity of purpose.
Section 947.013(1)(a).
The evidence provided
reasonable grounds to find that Hudson violated § 947.013, Stats.
Sarazin testified that he called and visited her home over a period of
time in a manner that harassed her and served no legitimate purpose. The trial court evidently believed that
testimony, which in large part Hudson did not dispute.
Hudson contends,
however, that because the incidents were remote in time, an injunction was no
longer necessary. We disagree. The most recent incident, two months
earlier, was the most invasive act in the series of harassing phone calls and
visits. More recently, even after
Sarazin commenced her administrative action against Hudson, he called her at
home. Additionally, Sarazin remained
subordinate to Hudson at work, although he no longer directly supervised
her. Under these circumstances, the
trial court could reasonably conclude that a limited injunction was
appropriate.
Hudson also contends
that the evidence was insufficient because Sarazin failed to address the
allegations in her petition about work-related conduct. Section 813.125(5)(a), Stats., requires that the petition
alleged facts sufficient to show that the respondent has violated
§ 947.013, Stats. Sarazin's petition alleged, in part, that
Hudson harassed her by calling or talking to her at home about personal
matters. That is what her evidence
showed. Hudson therefore received
sufficient notice in the petition despite the fact that other allegations in it
were not addressed in the hearing.
Finally, Hudson contends
that the trial court erred because it gave no reasons for its decision. However, we may still affirm the decision if
the record supports it. Schmid v.
Olsen, 111 Wis.2d 228, 237, 330 N.W.2d 547, 552 (1983). As indicated above, the record contains
evidence in the form of Sarazin's testimony that Hudson persistently called and
visited her for no legitimate purpose and in a manner that harassed her. The record therefore supports the court's
decision and we affirm it despite the absence of a reasoned explanation.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.