COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED OCTOBER
2, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1535
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
CITY
OF DELAVAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEFFREY
ALAN LANG,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Walworth County: ROBERT J. KENNEDY, Judge. Affirmed.
ANDERSON,
P.J. Jeffrey
Alan Lang appeals from the trial court’s judgment affirming the municipal
court’s denial of Lang’s motion to suppress—unlawful stop.[1] Lang argues that the officer was not in
possession of any particularized suspicion of criminal conduct and therefore
the investigative stop of his vehicle was unreasonable. Because we conclude that the facts available
to the officer were sufficient to provide him with a reasonable suspicion of
illegal activity, the judgment is affirmed.
The
evidence is not disputed. An anonymous
informant contacted the Walworth County Sheriff’s Department, reporting “some
unwanted subjects” at the Vegas Gentlemen’s Club. The subjects were allegedly intoxicated and causing some type of
disturbance or refusing to leave. The
informant also reported that the suspect vehicle was a gray Chevy S-10 Blazer
with Illinois license plate number JRT-198, traveling on Highway 11 towards
Delavan.
This
information was relayed to City of Delavan Police Officer James Bilskey. Bilskey then observed a gray Chevy S-10
Blazer with license plate number JXN-198 traveling on Highway 11. After following the vehicle for several
blocks, Bilskey stopped the vehicle.
This
information was also relayed to Sergeant Thomas Hausner of the Walworth County
Sheriff’s Department. As he traveled
westbound on Highway 11 in the City of Delavan, he observed Bilskey with the
suspect vehicle. Hausner pulled over to
assist. Hausner performed field
sobriety tests and eventually arrested Lang for operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated (OWI).
Lang
brought a motion to suppress the evidence amassed as a result of his arrest
before the City of Delavan municipal court.
He contended that Bilskey did not have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion for stopping his vehicle under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968), because the anonymous informant’s information was not sufficiently
reliable. The municipal court denied
Lang’s motion. The parties then entered
into a stipulated trial and the municipal court found Lang guilty of OWI. He appealed the denial of the suppression
motion to the circuit court, which was also denied.
On
this appeal, Lang renews his argument that Bilskey did not have a reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle. In
reviewing an order regarding suppression of evidence, we will sustain the trial
court’s findings unless they are against the great weight and clear
preponderance of the evidence. State
v. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d 128, 137, 456 N.W.2d 830, 833 (1990). However, whether a stop meets statutory and
constitutional standards is a question of law that we review without deference
to the trial court. State v.
Krier, 165 Wis.2d 673, 676, 478 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1991).
Lang
contests the reliability of the anonymous information. An anonymous tip, without more, seldom
justifies an investigative stop. Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990).
However, when the details of the anonymous informant’s predictions can
be verified, there is reason to believe that the caller is honest and well
informed about the illegal activity. Id.
at 331-32. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has held that when significant aspects of an anonymous tip are independently
corroborated by the police, the inference arises that the informant is telling
the truth and an investigatory stop is justified. Krier, 165 Wis.2d at 676, 478 N.W.2d at 65; see
also Richardson, 156 Wis.2d at 142, 456 N.W.2d at 836.
Here,
the anonymous informant reported the type of vehicle involved, the roadway on
which the vehicle was traveling, the direction of travel and a portion of the
license plate number. The facts
provided by the caller were personally corroborated by Bilskey. This established that the anonymous informant’s
information was likely based on recent and reliable perceptions or
information. This provided Bilskey with
a reasonable and articulable suspicion for stopping the vehicle. See Terry, 392 U.S. at
27.
Moreover,
Bilskey had an articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Bilskey independently
observed Lang’s vehicle weave from approximately the center of the lane to the
curb and back. When a person’s activity
could constitute a crime, a police officer may validly perform an investigative
stop pursuant to § 968.24, Stats. Unlawful behavior may be present, or it may
not. Even so, officers have the right
to temporarily freeze the situation so as to investigate further. Krier, 165 Wis.2d at 678, 478
N.W.2d at 69. Upon viewing Lang’s erratic
driving, Bilskey could validly perform an investigatory stop, irrespective of
the anonymous tip.
Nevertheless,
Lang maintains that “the fact that the car only went near the center line to
the curb once in the entire time officer Bilskey observed the vehicle shows not
intoxication, but prudent driving.”
This certainly is not the only inference. Bilskey observed Lang’s vehicle at approximately two o'clock in
the morning and he only followed him through an intersection and about one
block further. In that short distance,
Lang weaved and then “pulled up to a stop sign.” Bilskey followed for one more block and then turned on his siren,
at which point Lang pulled over, hitting the curb in the process. This hardly qualifies as “prudent” driving.
Lang
further contends that “[i]t is the obligation of the police officer to learn of
specific facts constituting a reasonable suspicion of an offense before he may
act.” In Krier, we made
the opposite determination. We stated,
Section
968.24, Stats., explicitly allows
an investigative stop based on a reasonable suspicion. That statute is operative in this case
because the police had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that he was
engaged in an activity that could be criminal. That verb is all that is required here.
Krier, 165 Wis.2d at 678, 478 N.W.2d at 66 (emphasis added). Because we conclude that, under the totality
of the circumstances, Bilskey had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to
perform the investigatory stop of Lang’s car, the statute is effective here as
well.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.