COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED December 17, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1470
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
NORTHWOODS CARE VANS,
INC.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF WISCONSIN
DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Respondent-Respondent.
APPEAL from judgment of
the circuit court for Langlade County:
ROBERT A. KENNEDY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Northwoods Care Vans,
Inc., appeals a decision of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services ordering Northwoods to repay $63,618.17 the State overpaid to it and
the circuit court judgment affirming that decision. Northwoods contends that the circuit court erred by concluding
that neither the hearing examiner nor the circuit court had the equitable power
to reduce or eliminate the debt on an equity theory. Because we conclude that Northwoods failed to demonstrate a basis
for relief in equity and Northwoods did not take reasonable steps to protect
its interests, we affirm. We therefore
do not reach the question whether the circuit court or hearing examiner had the
equitable power to reduce or eliminate the recoupment.
Northwoods provides
specialized medical vehicle transportation services to the elderly and
handicapped. The Wisconsin Medical
Assistance Program (WMAP) has certified Northwoods to provide these
services. In order to become certified,
Northwoods had to sign an agreement to comply with all the rules and
regulations of the department. WMAP has
contracted with Electronic Data Systems to provide administrative and
supervisory services as well as regulate the reimbursement for all specialized
medical vehicle providers.
Northwoods clients
include WMAP recipients and non-WMAP recipients. WMAP reimburses Northwoods for services provided to its
recipients, the other clients are on a self-pay basis. Northwoods' business was composed of almost
only WMAP recipients. In January 1992,
Northwoods was seeking to expand its self-pay client base. To that end, one of Northwoods' employees,
Kay Chapman, telephoned the EDS helpline to inquire whether there was a set
rate they could charge self-pay clients.
According to Chapman, the EDS employee stated that Northwoods could set
its own rate but that all self-pay clients had to be charged the same
rate. Northwoods took this to mean it
could charge self-pay clients less than it charged WMAP clients.
Northwoods set its
self-pay rate at slightly less that the rate charged to WMAP clients and
printed brochures to advertise this fact to the general public. Northwoods included one of these brochures
in its 1993 renewal application to EDS.
EDS renewed Northwoods as a specialized medical vehicle transport
provider and did not object to Northwoods' rates.
In response to a letter
complaining that Northwoods was charging WMAP clients more than self-pay
clients, EDS started an audit. The audit found that WMAP had overpaid
Northwoods by $63,618.87 based on the difference between the rates for the
audit period. During the
seventeen-month audit period, Northwoods had 1,919 WMAP clients and 116
self-pay clients. Northwoods appealed
this to a Department of Health and Human Services hearing examiner who affirmed
the recoupment and then to the trial court who affirmed the hearing examiner.
Northwoods argues that
the trial court erred by deciding it did not have the equitable power to alter
or nullify the amount due to WMAP. We
do not reach the question whether the trial court had this equitable power
because we conclude that Northwoods failed to meet the required elements of its
equitable estoppel claim.
The doctrine of
equitable estoppel is not to be as freely applied against government agencies
as it is against private citizens.
Sanfelippo v. DOR, 170 Wis.2d 381, 391, 490 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Ct.
App. 1992). "Estoppel may be
applied against the state when the elements of estoppel are clearly present and
it would be unconscionable to allow the state to revise an earlier
position." Id. at
390-91, 490 N.W.2d at 534. The elements
of equitable estoppel are: "(1)
action or nonaction by the person against whom estoppel is asserted (2) upon
which the person asserting estoppel reasonably relies (3) to that person's
detriment." St. Paul Ramsey
Med. Ctr. v. DHSS, 186 Wis.2d 37, 47, 519 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Ct. App.
1994). The burden is on the party
asserting estoppel to prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
Northwoods asserts that the EDS employee's
statement that Northwoods was free to charge self-pay clients whatever it
desires as long as it charged all self-pay clients the same misled it to
believing it could charge self-pay clients less than it charged WMAP
clients. The threshold issue is whether
this conversation with the EDS employee fulfills the elements of an equitable
estoppel claim. We conclude that it
does not.
Northwoods never
expressly asked EDS if it could charge self-pay clients less than WMAP client
rates. It only asked whether there were
limitations on what it could charge self-pay clients. Northwoods cannot invoke equitable estoppel because it did not receive
the answer to a question it never asked.
Further, we agree with the hearing examiner's conclusion that
"reliance on the telephone conversation was not reasonable, in fact, it
was precisely the opposite." When
making a decision as important as establishing the billing rates, Northwoods
could not have reasonably relied on this conversation to provide support for
two separate billing schedules. A
written confirmation of Northwoods' understanding is the minimum step a prudent
person would undertake in making so important a decision. An equity action will not lie when the party
seeking to invoke equity has failed to take reasonable steps to protect his
interests. Rascar, Inc. v. Bank
of Oregon, 87 Wis.2d 446, 453, 275 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App.
1978).
The agreement Northwoods
entered into with WMAP incorporated the "Specialized Medical Vehicle Terms
of Reimbursement." This document
specifically provides: "Providers are required to bill their usual and
customary charges for services provided.
The usual and customary charge is the amount charged by the provider for
the same service when provided to non-Medical Assistance patients
...." Northwoods had this document
and agreed to follow its terms. Any
question over this section should have been more specifically addressed on the
helpline than with the open ended question Northwoods asked. The ambiguous nature of the question
permitted a reasonable person to respond as though the inquiry concerned a
maximum that could be charged to self-pay clients. It could also be reasonably construed to inquire as to whether
self-pay clients could utilize Northwoods' services without jeopardizing
Northwoods' contract with the State.
Only if Northwoods specifically queried as to the relationship between
the rates for self-pay and medical assistance clients could Northwoods make a
claim for equitable relief.
Because we conclude that
Northwoods failed to meet the elements of an equitable estoppel claim, we
affirm.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.