COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED OCTOBER 8, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1459-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROBERT JOHN KOTZ,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for St. Croix County:
SCOTT R. NEEDHAM, Judge. Affirmed
in part; reversed in part and cause remanded.
CANE, P.J. The State appeals the trial court's order
declaring a mistrial after a jury found Robert Kotz guilty of disorderly
conduct, possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. The State contends that the jury's
post-verdict remarks to the trial court at an informal discussion do not
constitute a competent evidentiary basis supporting a grant of mistrial. It also contends that the extraneous
information submitted to the jury related only to the disorderly conduct
offense and could not have prejudiced the jury as to the charges of possession
of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. The order granting a mistrial as to the disorderly conduct charge
is affirmed, but the remaining portion of the order granting a mistrial as to
the possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia is reversed.
The facts are
undisputed. The police responded to a
call from the Village Inn's bartender who had reported that Kotz had become
disorderly and refused to leave the bar.
The police arrested Kotz at the bar and after searching him, found in
his possession a bag of marijuana and a brass "one-hit" pipe. The State charged Kotz with disorderly
conduct based on his disruptions in the bar and also possession of marijuana
and drug paraphernalia based on the items seized after the arrest. The matter was tried to a jury, which found
Kotz guilty of the three charges.
After the jury returned
a verdict finding Kotz guilty of the three offenses, the trial judge met
informally with the jurors to answer any questions they may have had regarding
the jury process. The attorneys for the
State and Kotz were not present at this discussion. When one of the jurors asked the judge why they had not received
evidence or testimony about Kotz's conduct after the arrest, it was discovered
that the arresting officer's handwritten and typed copy of the incident report
had been inadvertently submitted to the jury when it deliberated the
verdict. This extraneous information
referred to Kotz's actions, language and attitude outside the bar after his
arrest. The judge and attorneys had gone
to great lengths to keep this information from the jury as it was not relevant
to Kotz's disorderly conduct offense alleged to have occurred inside the bar
before the police arrived.
Seven days later, the trial court convened a
hearing on its own and advised the parties of its discussion with the jurors
after the trial. After relating its
discussions with the jurors, the trial court inquired whether defense counsel
had any motions. Defense counsel moved
for mistrial as well as for permission to withdraw, reasoning that the
information apparently had been inadvertently submitted to the jury through one
of his exhibits. The trial court
ordered a mistrial as to all of the charges when concluding that it would be
speculative to determine how the jury used the extraneous information in the
formulation of its verdict.
A motion for mistrial is
addressed to trial court discretion and there is a strong policy against
interference with that discretion. See
State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis.2d 147, 149-51, 124 N.W.2d 9, 11
(1963). The State first argues that
there is not a competent evidentiary basis for granting the mistrial. It reasons that the record consists merely
of the trial court's reiteration of portions of its conversations with the
jurors during the post-verdict meeting and that this is not competent
evidence. The State correctly points
out that the proper procedure to determine whether extraneous information was
submitted to the jury and its effect on the jury is outlined in After
Hour Welding v. Laneil Mgmt. Co., 108 Wis.2d 734, 742-44, 324 N.W.2d
686, 691-92 (1982). The State argues
that the trial court should have questioned the jurors on the record to
establish a competent evidentiary basis for specific findings regarding the
prejudicial effect of any such information while exercising great care to
prevent questions concerning the thought processes of the jurors.
Although the trial
court's process of gathering this information is unorthodox, there is no
dispute that the information concerning Kotz's conduct outside the bar with the
police was not to be presented to the jury.
In fact, the trial court went to great lengths to keep this extraneous
information from the jury.
Unfortunately, it is undisputed this information did go to the jury
inadvertently during its deliberation on the verdict. Therefore, this court is satisfied from the record that there was
competent evidence to establish that extraneous information was improperly
submitted to the jury during its deliberations.
The prejudicial effect
of this extraneous information is a question of law, and the trial court's
determination is not accorded deferential review by the appellate courts. After Hour Welding, 108 Wis.2d
at 741, 324 N.W.2d at 690-91. Here, the
State does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that the extraneous
information prejudiced the jury with regard to the disorderly conduct
charge. However, it strenuously argues
that there is no basis to conclude that this information influenced the jury's
verdict as to the possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia charges.
In State v. Eison,
194 Wis.2d 160, 179, 533 N.W.2d 738, 745 (1995), the supreme court stated:
To
determine the possibility of prejudice we consider factors such as the nature
of the extraneous information, the circumstances under which it was brought to
the jury's attention, the nature and character of the state's case and the
defense presented at trial, and the connection between the extraneous
information and a material issue in the case.
At
issue in this case are the following statements contained in an exhibit
submitted to the jury on defense counsel's motion:
Kotz was very loud and verbally abusive
during the transport. The transport was
taped with my Lanier mini cassette recorder and will be available upon request
... Kotz was brought into a receiving cell, from my squad, due to his
uncooperative behavior.
... Kotz became verbally abusive and would
not listen to me.
The State's case consisted
of the bartender's testimony regarding Kotz's conduct in the bar; the arresting
officer's testimony regarding Kotz's arrest and subsequent discovery and
handling of the marijuana and drug paraphernalia; and the crime lab analyst
regarding the testing of the marijuana.
The defense testimony consisted of Kotz's two brothers regarding Kotz's
conduct in the bar prior to the arrest.
Kotz did not testify. Thus, the
evidence regarding Kotz's possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia was
uncontroverted.
This court agrees with
the State that although the jury's awareness of Kotz's post-arrest conduct may
have influenced its verdict on the disorderly conduct charge, there is no
logical or legal connection between the extraneous information and `the possession
charges. In Eison, 194
Wis.2d at 178, 533 N.W.2d at 745, the supreme court held that the standard to
overturn a verdict under these circumstances is whether as a matter of law
there is a reasonable possibility that the extraneous information would
prejudice a hypothetical average jury.
Here, there is no basis in the record to reasonably conclude that the
jury's awareness of Kotz's post-arrest conduct would prejudice a hypothetical
jury in its verdicts on the possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia
charges.
Therefore, the trial
court's order is affirmed as to granting a mistrial on the disorderly conduct
charge. However, the order granting a
mistrial on the possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia is reversed and
the matter remanded to the trial court for sentencing.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.