COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED NOVEMBER 19, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1429
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
IN THE INTEREST OF AMY M. A.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
AMY M. A.,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Eau Claire County:
BENJAMIN D. PROCTOR, Judge. Dismissed.
CANE, P.J. Some of the facts and dates are important
to understand the issue of whether Amy M.A.'s appeal of the trial court’s order
denying her motion to revise a condition of her juvenile supervision is
moot. These facts and dates are
undisputed.
On
July 26, 1995, Amy M.A. was found delinquent for possession of THC and drug
paraphernalia, in violation of §§ 161.41(3r) and 161.573, Stats.
The trial court placed Amy under supervision for one year with
conditions, among others, that she,
within
two weeks of this court date, reveal to her social worker every source she has
ever had in the State of Wisconsin who has provided her with drugs; she shall provide all places she has gotten
these substances, and shall provide any other information she has which will be
helpful to the police in finding out whoever is delivering drugs to her as a
child.
After
Amy unsuccessfully attempted to have the court remove these conditions, the
court on October 3, 1995, stayed them supervision pending appeal.
On March 29, 1996, the
trial court also denied Amy's motion requesting the court to delete the above
conditions when it was shown that Amy had satisfied all of the conditions of
supervision except for naming a gang member who had sold her drugs because she
was concerned for her safety. The trial
court reasoned that if it were not for the legal issue of whether the court has
authority to require a juvenile to provide information to her social worker as
to who sold her drugs, it would grant the motion based on the fact that Amy had
provided the other information and done well on supervision. On April 19, 1996, Amy appealed the court’s
order denying revision of the dispositional order.
On July 9, 1996, Amy's
social worker filed a petition to extend the dispositional order, stating as
grounds for the extension that, "Amy has satisfactorily completed all
conditions except reveal drug sources.
This is currently in the court of appeals. Extension will allow the appeal process to complete." Accepting the State's argument that it was
unnecessary in light of § 48.315, Stats.,
the trial court declined to extend the dispositional order.
Although Amy originally
appealed the trial court’s order denying her request to revise the
dispositional order, she now contends the appeal is moot because her
supervision has expired and the condition of supervision is no longer
enforceable. She contends that pursuant
to the terms of her dispositional order for one year beginning on July 26,
1995, and the operation of § 48.355(4), Stats.,
her supervision expired on July 26, 1996.
Amy reasons that unless her dispositional order is stayed, she is no
longer subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and, therefore, whether Amy
can be required to report her drug sources is moot. This court agrees.
A dispositional order
has no validity once the time period has elapsed. In re B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 641, 469 N.W.2d 845,
847 (1991); see also Huggett v. State, 83 Wis.2d 790, 804,
266 N.W.2d 403, 409 (1978) (where the court held that if an adult probationer’s
sentence is improperly extended, a subsequent revocation and sentence are void
and must be vacated). Here, the trial
court stayed only the requirement that Amy report her drug sources. It declined to stay or extend the
dispositional order and consequently the dispositional order terminated
pursuant to
§
48.355(4), Stats.[1]
Although
the State at the trial level contended that § 48.315(1)(a), Stats., automatically tolled the
termination of Amy’s dispositional order, it has apparently abandoned this
argument on appeal. Amy correctly
points out that § 48.315(1)(a) does not toll termination of dispositional
orders. In In re L.M.C.,
146 Wis.2d 377, 389, 432 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1988), the court held that
§ 48.315(1)(a) did not override the specific language concerning
extensions set forth at §§ 48.355(4) and 48.365(6).
Therefore,
because the court did not stay Amy’s dispositional order or extend the order
past its expiration date of July 26, 1996, Amy is no longer subject to juvenile
court jurisdiction, and the issue of whether Amy must comply with the condition
that she report her drug sources is moot.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
By
the Court.—Appeal
dismissed.
This
opinion will not be published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[1] Section 48.355(4), Stats., provides:
(4) Termination of orders. (a) Except as provided under par. (b) or s. 48.368, all orders under this section shall terminate at the end of one year unless the judge specifies a shorter period of time. Except if s. 48.368 applies, extensions or revisions shall terminate at the end of one year unless the judge specifies a shorter period of time. No extension under s. 48.365 of an original dispositional order may be granted for a child whose legal custody has been transferred to the department of corrections under s. 48.34(4g) or who is under the supervision of the department of health and social services under s. 48.34(4m) or (4n) or under the supervision of a county department under s. 48.34(4n) if the child is 18 years of age or older when the original dispositional order terminates. Any order made before the child reaches the age of majority shall be effective for a time up to one year after its entry unless the judge specifies a shorter period of time.