COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED August 28, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1397
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
CITY OF WAUKESHA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL L. BISHOP,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Waukesha County:
ROGER P. MURPHY, Judge. Affirmed.
BROWN, J. Daniel
L. Bishop is the registered agent and the secretary/treasurer for City News
& Novelty, Inc. This corporation
operates an adult bookstore in the City of Waukesha. The municipal court found Bishop guilty of three violations of a
city ordinance after the city housing inspector reported that the viewing
booths in the store did not meet local codes requiring that at least one side
be left open to public space.
In this appeal, Bishop
contends that the municipal court made an evidentiary error when it ruled that
the corporation's application to operate an “adult oriented establishment” was
a public record and that it was properly authenticated. Bishop also contends that the municipal
court made a legal error when it implicitly found that he was an “operator” of
the store as that term is defined in the city code. We conclude that the municipal court did not misuse its
discretion when it admitted the application and that the court correctly found
that Bishop was an “operator” of the store.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court which likewise
found no error in the municipal court's rulings.
During the week
beginning November 27, 1994, the City of Waukesha police issued Bishop three citations
for violating the provision of the city code which requires that private
viewing booths in adult stores:
Have at least one side totally open to a
public lighted aisle so that there is an unobstructed view at all times of
anyone occupying the same.
City of Waukesha, Wis., Ordinance § 8.195(9)(2)(b)2. These citations were issued after a city
housing inspector found during his annual inspection that several of the
viewing booths in the store had been altered; the opening to each booth was narrowed
with a partition. Although the
inspector gave a written warning to the on-site manager asking that the store
correct the violations, the police later issued citations when a follow-up
inspection revealed that the store had not corrected the problem.
In August 1995, the
municipal court held a trial on these violations and found Bishop guilty. Bishop subsequently appealed to the circuit
court for Waukesha county which, after consolidating the three violations,
affirmed the municipal court.
We start with Bishop's
claim that the municipal court erred when it admitted the corporation's permit
application. This evidence specifically
consisted of the application form that the corporation filled out and a “sign
off” sheet that the housing inspector completed after he determined that the
store met local standards. The standard
we apply to this ruling is whether the court misused its discretionary
authority. See State v.
Rogers, 196 Wis.2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Ct. App. 1995). We measure if the trial court applied the
correct legal standard and if its decision was grounded on a logical
interpretation of the facts. See id.
The application form
that the City offered into evidence was submitted by Bishop's corporation for
the year beginning January 25, 1995.
This form lists “City News & Novelty, Inc.” as the applicant and
Bishop as the “Registered Agent.” Where
the form requires the applicant to list all of the officers, directors and
large shareholders (more than five percent), Bishop is named as the secretary/treasurer,
along with one other individual who is listed as the president.
As foundation for these
two documents, the city inspector explained that the “sign off” sheet that was
being introduced was actually a copy of the original that he signed in January
1995 and that the original was on file with the city clerk's office. The inspector also testified that the copy
of the application which the City was now offering had been made from the
original. The inspector further noted
that the original document was on file with the city clerk.
Bishop makes two
objections to the municipal court's decision to accept this evidence. He first argues that the court misapplied
the legal standards that govern public records. He points to the statute which defines admissible public records
as:
Records, reports, statements or data
compilations ... setting forth (a) the activities of the office or agency, or
(b) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law, or (c) in civil cases and
against the state in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law ....
Section
908.03(8), Stats. Bishop argues that the City never showed how
the city inspector's “sign off” sheet and his corporation's permit application
fit any of the categories listed as (a), (b) and (c) in the above statute.
With regard to the
inspector's report, we conclude that the municipal court properly found that it
was a public record. The form was
filled out by a city official pursuant to his duty to inspect the store prior
to the issuance of a license. See
§ 908.03(8), Stats.
We also conclude that
the corporation's permit application also fit the terms of the public records
statute and that the municipal court properly admitted it. Although the applicant, not a city official,
fills out the necessary information, the applicable ordinance explains that:
(a) Any person desiring to secure a
license shall make application to the City Clerk. The application shall be filed in triplicate and dated by the
City Clerk. A copy of the application
shall be distributed promptly by the City Clerk to the City Police Department
and to the applicant.
(b) The application for a license shall
be upon a form provided by the City Clerk.
An applicant for a license shall furnish the following information under
oath ....
City of Waukesha, Wis., Ordinance
§ 8.195(3). Thus, the application,
once it is filled out, becomes an integral part of the city's records. The completed application is dated by the
city clerk and the application (not the license) is distributed to the
police. The requirement that an
applicant perform the ministerial task of filling out the blanks, instead of
perhaps having a public employee do it after being told what to fill in by the
applicant, does not change the “public” character of this record. We therefore conclude that the municipal
court did not err when it admitted the corporation's permit application as a
public record.
Nonetheless, Bishop
raises an alternative argument that the City did not properly authenticate
these documents. Although the inspector
explained to the court that he made the copies from the originals, Bishop
raises the technical point that the inspector “was not asked, and therefore did
not testify, whether or not Exhibits 7 and 8 were identical to the originals of
the documents which he had seen in the clerk's office.”
The applicable
evidentiary standard provides that a public record is authenticated when it is
“testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the
original.” Section 910.05, Stats.
Here, the municipal court personally observed the inspector as he
explained what these documents were and where the official copies are
kept. The court also learned how the
inspector made the copies which were now being offered as evidence. The court then concluded that “Testimony is
that it is a correct copy of the license on file with the City Clerk.” The court's oral ruling indicates that it
found the inspector's testimony credible.
Contrary to Bishop's claim, even though the inspector was not
specifically prompted, the court was free to infer that the inspector was
verifying that these were exact copies.
Bishop's second
appellate claim is that the municipal court made a legal error when it
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that he was an “operator”
of the store and thus legally responsible for the problems at the store. The ordinance defines “operator” as:
Any person, partnership or corporation
operating, conducting, maintaining or owning any adult oriented establishment.
City of Waukesha, Wis., Ordinance § 8.195(1). Bishop contends that the only evidence
showing how he fit this definition was the corporation's permit application
which states that he was the corporation's registered agent and that he was the
secretary/treasurer. He cites to the
dictionary definitions of the words “operating” and “conducting” and suggests
that the common understanding of these words would lead a person to believe
that the ordinance only applies to persons physically involved with running the
store. Bishop argues that under no
reading of the ordinance could he be liable because he is only a corporate
officer.
Bishop's argument,
however, ignores the strong inferences that the municipal court was free to
draw from the evidence before it. The
permit application informed the court that Bishop was one of only two officers
in the corporation. From this, it could
conclude that Bishop was involved in its actual operations. Moreover, Bishop submitted an application
thereby asking the City to grant his corporation permission to open an adult
bookstore. Bishop's willingness to
participate in the application process further strengthens the conclusion that he
was involved in the store's management activities and was not just a passive
officer hidden away at headquarters.
We conclude that the municipal court had sufficient evidence to find
that Bishop was an operator of the store and therefore liable under the
ordinance.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.