COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED February
20, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1371
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
EUGENE
HENRY WILLIAMSON and
ELAINE
A. WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
STECO
SALES, INC., a Pennsylvania
corporation,
ABC INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants,
PACCAR, INC., d/b/a PETERBILT MOTORS, INC.,
a Delaware corporation qualified to do
business in Tennessee, XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY,
RONALD L. HAKA, NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents,
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Wood County: DENNIS D. CONWAY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Eich, C.J., Dykman, P.J., and Vergeront, J.
EICH,
C.J. This appeal concerns the
responsibility of various parties and their insurers for personal injuries
suffered by Eugene Williamson in 1991 when a tractor-trailer truck operated by
Ronald Haka backed into him.
Williamson
sued Haka and his insurer, National General Insurance Company, and several
other parties. Also named as a
defendant in the action was Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, the insurer of
the Jerzak Trucking Company, to whom, Williamson alleged, Haka's truck was
leased at the time of the accident.[1] The jury found that Haka's truck was
"under lease" to Jerzak at the time, and the trial court, after
denying Fireman's Fund's postverdict motions, entered judgment declaring that
its policy provided coverage. Fireman's
Fund appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and various jury
instructions given by the court. We
reject the challenges and affirm the judgment.
Other facts will be discussed in succeeding sections of this
opinion.
I. The Jury
Instructions
A.
Introduction: Scope of Appellate Review
In
the first instance, the trial court has "wide discretion" in
instructing the jury on the facts and circumstances of the case, and we will
not reverse on an instructional issue absent an erroneous exercise of that
discretion. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Nemetz, 135 Wis.2d
245, 263-64, 400 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Ct. App. 1986). If the trial court's instructions "`adequately cover the
law'" and "`fairly inform the jury of the law applicable to the
particular case,'" the trial court properly exercises its discretion. Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc.,
193 Wis.2d 6, 24, 531 N.W.2d 597, 604 (1995); State v. McCoy, 143
Wis.2d 274, 289, 421 N.W.2d 107, 112 (1988) (quoted sources omitted).
Whether
there are sufficient facts to warrant giving a particular instruction, however,
is a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Mayhall, 195 Wis.2d 53, 57, 535 N.W.2d
473, 475 (Ct. App. 1995). Finally, even
when an instructional error occurs, we will not order a new trial unless the
error is prejudicial—there is a probability, not just a possibility, "that
the jury was misled thereby."
Betchkal v. Willis, 127 Wis.2d 177, 188, 378 N.W.2d 684, 689
(1985).
B.
Continuation of a Former Lease
Haka had hauled for
Jerzak off and on for several years and purchased his own truck in 1989. In 1990, Jerzak entered into a written
agreement with Haka to lease the truck for a ten-month term ending on February
1, 1991. As indicated, Williamson
claimed that Haka and Jerzak, by their actions, had agreed to extend the lease
beyond its expiration date and that it was in effect on May 8, 1991, when he
was injured.[2] Williamson requested the following
instruction, which was given by the trial court:
Even where an agreement, such as a lease, expires by its
terms, if the parties continue to perform as they had in the past, a
presumption arises that they had mutually assented to a new lease agreement
continuing on the same terms as the old one.
Fireman's
Fund argues that neither the law nor the evidence supports the
instruction.
Considering
the legal challenge first, we begin by noting our agreement with National
General that much of Fireman's Fund's argument is based on a
mischaracterization of the instruction.
According to Fireman's Fund, the instruction tells jurors they must
presume that the Haka/Jerzak lease continued beyond its expiration date.[3] Such a characterization ignores the
instruction's plainly stated major premise: that the presumption of a
continuing agreement arises only "if the parties continue to perform [the
agreement] as they had in the past."
So read, the instruction does not in any way "presume," ipso
facto, that the lease continued—as Fireman's Fund posits. It simply tells the jurors that, if they
find the predicate—that the parties continued to perform the agreement after
its expiration date—it is presumed to continue on the same terms as before. If they do not find the predicate, no
presumption arises.
We
also believe the instruction accurately reflects applicable Wisconsin law. A lease is a contract, much as a contract of
employment. In Borg-Warner Corp.
v. Ostertag, 18 Wis.2d 484, 489, 118 N.W.2d 900, 903 (1963), the supreme
court held that when an employee is "hired by the year and continues in
employment after the end of a particular year, there is a presumption that he
is again employed for the new year on the same terms as before."[4] Fireman's Fund attempts to diminish the
precedential value of Borg-Warner by emphasizing the factual
situation in which the case arose and apparently asserting, without
elaboration, that the court's holding should be strictly limited to the facts
before it. There is nothing in the
language of the Borg-Warner opinion, however, to support such a
limitation. The quoted statement simply
sets forth the general legal proposition against which the court was judging
the facts of the case—much as the trial court did in this case in its
instruction to the jury.
What
Fireman's Fund's argument boils down to is that the evidence did not warrant
the instruction. It states, for
example, that there was no evidence that Haka did any hauling or other work for
Jerzak "between leases."
There
was, however, evidence that, when Haka purchased the truck, Jerzak told him
that he had "a lot of work" for him and could "keep [Haka]
running and ... take a percentage," and that Jerzak prepared a title
application for the truck identifying Jerzak Trucking as the lessee. Jerzak completed all of the paperwork
relating to the truck, including filing the many required government forms and
obtaining insurance. Jerzak listed
Haka's truck as one under lease to Jerzak Trucking in documents filed with the
Motor Vehicles Department and placed its name and certificate of authority
numbers on the truck.
Significantly,
we think, at the time of the accident, Haka's truck was displaying Jerzak
Trucking's name, its "LC," "IC" and "ICC-MC"
numbers, and its 1991 International Fuel License.[5] And when Jerzak applied for fuel tax stamps
in February 1991—after expiration of the written lease—Haka's truck was listed
as one of the trucks operating under Jerzak's authority. Beyond that, after the 1990-91 lease
expired, Haka continued to park his truck in Jerzak's employee lot and
considered that his truck had been under lease to Jerzak "from the time
[he] bought it." He testified that
he believed he was still "under lease" to Jerzak. And Jerzak's wife, who did the company's
paperwork, acknowledged that "basically from the very first day ... Haka
sought title to his truck, [she] understood ... he was under some sort of lease
arrangement with Jerzak Trucking."
Fireman's
Fund stresses that Haka did occasional work for others during the
"interim" period and contends that this is evidence that their
relationship did not continue after expiration of the written contract. But Haka testified that because 1991 was a
"very slow year," Jerzak gave him permission to take on occasional
work for other carriers. Understanding
that even after expiration of the contract, Jerzak had first call on his truck,
Haka "checked in" with Jerzak every morning to see whether Jerzak
needed his truck that day. And he
always sought—and received—specific permission from Jerzak before taking work
from third parties, including the work in which he was engaged at the time of
the accident.
As
in any case, evidence also existed that would support a conclusion that the
parties' prior relationship did not continue on the same terms as before. The evidence, however, is not balanced and
weighed by the trial court in determining whether a particular instruction is
justified—nor by this court in reviewing the trial court's action in that
regard. Our task is to determine whether
there is evidence to support the instruction, not to weigh conflicting evidence
on the point. Finley v. Culligan,
201 Wis.2d 611, 630-31, 548 N.W.2d 854, 862 (Ct. App. 1996). We are satisfied that the evidence warranted
the instruction.
C.
Instruction on Haka's Personal Use of the Truck
The
trial court also instructed the jury: "A truck owner may reserve the right
to use his truck for his own purposes when the motor carrier has no use for the
truck and still be under lease with the motor carrier." Fireman's Fund claims that this instruction,
too, is contrary to law. Again, we
disagree.
The
instruction derives from Kreider Truck Service, Inc. v. Augustine,
394 N.E.2d 1179 (Ill. 1979). While the Kreider
court's discussion of the subject is admittedly dictum, in the course of
its opinion, the court took pains to "point out" and quote at length
from an Interstate Commerce Commission ruling that an operator may use the
leased vehicle for its own purposes on an "intermittent" basis
without terminating the underlying lease arrangement. Id. at 1182.[6]
In
the former appeal of this case, we held that, in the context of a summary
judgment motion, National General had established a prima facie case
that the lease arrangement between Haka and Jerzak (1) continued to exist at
the time of the accident and (2) was not affected by the fact that, on that
date, Haka was doing work for a third party.
Williamson, 191 Wis.2d at 616-618, 530 N.W.2d at
416-17. In so ruling, we expressly
adopted what we described as the "majority rule" that "during
the lease term, the ICC carrier is liable for the lessor's negligence, even if
the lessor is not engaged in a job for the lessee at the time of the
accident." Id. at
616, 617-18, 530 N.W.2d at 416, 417.
Among those cases, we referred to Kreider for the
rationale underlying the rule and also for the proposition that "[t]he
carrier is responsible even if the lessor is performing an intrastate operation
for a third party." Williamson,
191 Wis.2d at 617, 530 N.W.2d at 417.
We
see no legal error in the instruction.
II.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Fireman's
Fund argues that the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find that
the lessor-lessee relationship between Haka and Jerzak continued to exist at
the time of the accident. The argument
is based on a section of the Uniform Commercial Code, § 411.103(1)(j), Stats., which provides, so far as may
be relevant here, that "`[l]ease' means a transfer of the right to
possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration
...." Fireman's Fund says there is
no evidence to establish the three elements of the statute: "(a) a
transfer of the right to possession and use of Haka's truck to Jerzak; (b) for
a term; and (c) in return for consideration."
Williamson
argues first that we should not even consider the argument because
§411.103(1)(j), Stats., was
enacted by the legislature and became effective on July 1, 1992, more than a
year after the accident and several years after Haka and Jerzak began their
relationship. It appears, however, that
the trial court instructed the jury—however briefly—on the statute,[7]
so we consider ourselves bound to consider Fireman's Fund's contentions.
We
pay great deference to jury verdicts.
If there is any credible evidence in the record that, under any
reasonable view, fairly admits of an inference that supports a jury's finding,
that finding may not be overturned. Ferraro
v. Koelsch, 119 Wis.2d 407, 410, 350 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Ct. App. 1984), aff'd,
124 Wis.2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985); § 805.14(1), Stats.
Our task is to search for credible evidence that, under any reasonable
view, supports the verdict, not for evidence that might sustain a verdict the
jury could have reached but did not. Finley,
201 Wis.2d at 631, 548 N.W.2d at 862; Stan's Lumber, Inc. v. Fleming,
196 Wis.2d 554, 565, 538 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Ct. App. 1995). And we give special weight to jury findings
that have been approved by the trial court—as were the jury's findings in this
case. Nieuwendorp v. American
Family Ins. Co., 191 Wis.2d 462, 472, 529 N.W.2d 594, 598 (1995).
As
before, Fireman's Fund argues that, during the interregnum between the written
leases—the time when the accident occurred—Haka did no work for Jerzak, but was
brokering his own work for third parties; it asserts that there is no evidence
that Jerzak had any right to possession or use of Haka's truck after expiration
of the 1990-91 lease agreement.
In
Section I(B) of this opinion, considering Fireman's Fund's challenge to the
evidence supporting the trial court's "continuing lease" instruction,
we set forth at some length the evidence relating to Jerzak's involvement with
Haka and his truck both before and after expiration of the 1990-91 lease. We also noted that, as a matter of law,
Haka's work for third parties during the period does not negate the existence
of a continuing lessor-lessee relationship.
As for the evidence, we emphasized, in addition to the continued display
of Jerzak's name and all state and federal licensing numbers on the truck,
Haka's understanding that he was still under lease to Jerzak during the
contract interregnum. We also noted his
daily "first call" contacts with Jerzak and his routine receipt of
permission from Jerzak to take on occasional work for others—including the work
he was doing at the time of the accident.
Without repeating our earlier discussion, we are satisfied the record
contains adequate evidence that fairly admits of inferences supporting a
finding that Jerzak's right to control the use of Haka's truck continued after
expiration of the 1990-91 lease.
Fireman's
Fund also argues briefly that because Haka acknowledged that he expected to
retain the entire fee for his third-party work on the day of the accident,
there is no evidence of the existence of the statutory requirement of
"consideration." As noted
above, Haka understood that Jerzak continued to have something akin to a
"right of first refusal" with respect to the use of his truck and he
acted on that understanding by checking in with Jerzak every day and seeking
and obtaining his permission before undertaking any work for another principal.[8] All during this time, as we also noted,
Haka's truck continued, with Jerzak's acquiescence, to display Jerzak's
placards, registration and licensing numbers.
We
said in Wagner v. Dissing, 141 Wis.2d 931, 416 N.W.2d 655 (Ct.
App. 1987), that
"it is hornbook law that mutual promises are sufficient
consideration" for a contract. We
note, too that consideration may take the form of a detriment incurred by the
promisee; and that "detriment" has been defined as the performance of
"any act which occasioned [the promisee] the slightest trouble or
inconvenience, and which he was not obliged to perform."
Id. at 944, 416 N.W.2d at 659-60 (citations and quoted sources
omitted). Haka remained "on
call" for Jerzak during the contract interregnum and Jerzak received the
benefit of having a truck readily available on a daily basis during this
period. The jury could fairly infer
from this evidence that consideration existed.
Finally,
Fireman's Fund argues that there was no evidence that the purported oral lease
extension was "for a term," as specified in § 411.103(1)(j), Stats., and that the jury could only
speculate that the lease extension "w[as] subject to any time limitations
whatever." The argument is not
elaborated beyond those statements.
The
expired 1990-91 lease, which ran for ten months, permitted either party to
terminate it on ten days' written notice, and Haka testified that he understood
the lease would continue on a year-to-year basis. We note also that Fireman's Fund has offered no authority for the
proposition that the lease "term" under § 411.103(1)(j), Stats.—in this case the
"ten-day-notice" provisions, or even a general year-to-year
"term"—could not continue in a carry-over oral extension of a written
contract. Indeed, the supreme court
recognized in California Wine Ass'n v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 20
Wis.2d 110, 124-25, 121 N.W.2d 308, 316 (1963), that when a contract is silent
as to its duration it may be terminated by either party upon reasonable
notice. We reject Fireman's Fund's
argument that the jury's verdict must be overturned for a failure of proof of
the "term" of the continued lease.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] On an earlier appeal, we reversed a decision
of the trial court determining that Jerzak had leased Haka's truck, concluding
that disputed issues of material fact existed for trial. See Williamson v. Steco Sales,
Inc., 191 Wis.2d 608, 530 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1995). The case is back before us after trial of
the factual issues to a jury.
[2] Haka and Jerzak executed another written
lease commencing July 15, 1991, and expiring January 31, 1992.
[3] Fireman's Fund captions its argument as
follows: "The Court Erred in Instructing the Jury that a `Presumption'
Existed that the Parties had Mutually Assented to Continuation of the Expired
Lease," and repeats the assertion in the text of its brief.
[4] We note in this regard that the 1990-91
Haka/Jerzak lease designated the driver of the truck—in this case, Haka—as
Jerzak's "employee."
[5] Jerzak testified that he did not allow trucks
not leased to his company to display the company's numbers.
[6] The issue in Kreider Truck Service v.
Augustine, 394 N.E.2d 1179 (Ill. 1979), was whether the carrier-lessee
was liable for injuries caused by the operator-lessor while engaged in work for
a third party. The court held—relying
on Interstate Commerce Commission rules no longer in effect—that because the
lease had not been formally terminated and because the operator's trucks still
carried the carrier's identification and licensing numbers, the carrier was
liable despite the fact that the operator was doing work for another party.
In Kreider,
it was claimed that an oral agreement existed between the parties under which
the operator reserved the right to use the trucks for her own purposes whenever
the carrier had no use for them. The
court, stating that, given its interpretation of the ICC rules, it did not need
to consider the validity and effect of such an "arrangement,"
nonetheless elected to "point out" and quote from an ICC ruling that
a subagreement whereby the operator/lessor could take on occasional work of its
own was "permissible." Kreider,
394 N.E.2d at 1182.
[7] At one point during its lengthy instructions,
the court stated: "You are instructed that the Wisconsin Statutes provides
[sic] that a lease means the transfer of right to possession and use of goods
for a term in return for consideration."
[8] Fireman's Fund asserts that Jerzak testified
that Haka did not talk with him on the morning of the accident, contrary to
Haka's testimony that he did. The
weight and credibility of the evidence are, of course, solely within the
province of the jury. Hauer v.
Union State Bank, 192 Wis.2d 576, 589, 532 N.W.2d 456, 461 (Ct. App.
1995).