COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED January
9, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1055
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
IN RE
THE MARRIAGE OF:
GARY
B. LARSEN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
KAREN
S. LARSEN, N/K/A KAREN S. BEHLE,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Rock County: JAMES E.
WELKER, Judge. Reversed.
Before
Dykman, P.J., Vergeront and Roggensack, JJ.
DYKMAN,
P.J. Karen S. Larsen appeals from an
order reducing the amount of limited-term maintenance she was receiving from
Gary B. Larsen from $2,100.00 per month to $1,100.00 per month. The circuit court reduced the maintenance
because it concluded that Karen failed to make progress toward her college
degree as required by the parties' stipulation. Because we conclude that the undisputed facts do not support this
conclusion, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Gary
and Karen were granted a divorce on September 14, 1993. The stipulation of divorce provided that
Gary pay Karen maintenance of $2,100.00 per month. The stipulation further stated:
This maintenance
obligation shall continue until March 1, 1998, subject to the provisions
recited herein. Maintenance will
terminate if Karen S. Larsen ... fails to continue progress toward her college
degree and certification, except for emergency reasons or temporary periods,
which the parties understand to be if she became ill or disabled in some way or
manner and could not attend college for a semester. If, during the period of this maintenance obligation, Karen S.
Larsen obtains her degree and certification as currently contemplated, as long
as none of the other conditions recited herein apply, then the maintenance
obligation of Gary B. Larsen shall be reduced to [$1,100.00] per month ....
On
January 9, 1996, Gary brought a motion to reduce or terminate maintenance on
the grounds that Karen had failed to make progress toward her degree.[1] At the motion hearing, Karen testified that
she had been attending the University of Wisconsin-Stout for two years before
quitting in 1968 to marry Gary. She had
accumulated sixty-six credits at that time.
She resumed her education in 1992, enrolling in the dietetics and food
science program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. At the time of her divorce, her anticipated
graduation date was May 1997.
At
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Karen earned the following credits:
Fall
1992: 12
credits earned
Spring
1993: 12
credits earned
Summer
1993: 2 credits earned
Fall
1993: 12 credits earned
Spring
1994:
9 credits earned
Summer
1994: 3 credits earned
Fall
1994: 9 credits earned
Spring
1995:
0 credits earned
Summer
1995: 0 credits earned
Fall
1995: 10 credits earned
Karen dropped Organic Chemistry, a three-credit course,
during both the spring 1994 and fall 1994 semesters and failed this same course
during the spring 1995 and summer 1995 sessions. She also dropped Accounting Principles, another three-credit
course, during the spring 1995 semester.
She passed both courses during the fall 1995 semester.
In
October 1995, Karen received a letter from the University indicating the
courses she needed to complete in order to graduate in the spring or summer of
1997. The letter indicated that Karen
was thirty-six credits short of graduation.
Karen completed ten of these required credits during the fall 1995
semester.
The
circuit court reduced maintenance to $1,100.00 per month because Karen had
failed to make progress toward her degree.
The court reasoned:
In this case, the evidence shows that [Karen] has failed
to make [progress toward her college degree].... She has taken light course loads. Regularly dropped courses and failed other courses. She has an academic average of 2.062 on a
four-point scale. There is no way that
she will complete her degree if her progress in the future is equal to that in
her past.[2]
Karen
appeals. She does not contest the
court's findings that she dropped courses, failed others, and had a grade point
average of 2.062 at one point. Rather,
she argues that these facts do not establish that she failed to make progress
toward her degree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A
stipulation incorporated into a divorce judgment is in the nature of a
contract. Kastelic v. Kastelic,
119 Wis.2d 280, 287, 350 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Ct. App. 1984). The construction of a written contract
presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Ondrasek v. Tenneson, 158
Wis.2d 690, 694, 462 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Ct. App. 1990). Whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law that we
decide independently of the circuit court's decision. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177 Wis.2d 539,
547, 502 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Ct. App. 1993).[3]
DISCUSSION
The
disposition of this appeal turns on the definition of "progress toward her
college degree." When the terms of
a contract are plain and unambiguous, we will construe the contract as it
stands. Borchardt v. Wilk,
156 Wis.2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). Contractual language is ambiguous when it is
"reasonably or fairly susceptible of more than one
construction." Id. We give words in a contract their common and
ordinary meaning. State ex rel.
Siciliano v. Johnson, 21 Wis.2d 482, 487, 124 N.W.2d 624, 627 (1963).
We
may look to a dictionary for the ordinary and plain meaning of a word. Frank v. Wisconsin Mut. Ins. Co.,
198 Wis.2d 689, 695, 543 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Ct. App. 1995). We see no reason why the parties would have
intended to give the word "progress" a meaning other than the
ordinary definition found in a dictionary.
Therefore, we turn to a dictionary to determine the parties' intent in
using the word "progress."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1813 (1993) defines "progress" as "an
advance or movement to an objective or toward a goal." This definition is unambiguous. It does not require a minimum rate of
advancement or movement or a diligent effort toward achieving a goal. It simply requires an advance or
movement toward a goal or objective.
Using
the ordinary and plain meaning of word "progress," we conclude that
Karen continues to make progress toward her college degree. Karen testified that at the time of her
divorce, her anticipated graduation date was May 1997. The October letter from the university
indicates that she is on course to graduate in the spring or summer of
1997. Karen continues to take courses
that are required for her degree and has also attended summer school. Therefore, she continues to advance toward
her goal of attaining a college degree.
We
realize that Karen did not earn any credits during either the spring 1995 or
summer 1995 session. But during both
sessions, she was enrolled in Organic Chemistry, a course required for her
degree. Although she dropped the course
in the spring and fall of 1994 and failed the course in the spring and summer
of 1995, she eventually passed the course in the fall of 1995. She also dropped Accounting Principles,
another required course, in the spring of 1995, but passed this course in the
fall of 1995 as well.
The
stipulation does not require that Karen establish a minimum level of
proficiency in organic chemistry and accounting to continue receiving $2,100.00
per month in maintenance. It requires
only that she continue to make progress toward her degree. Although her difficulties in these courses
slowed her progress, she continued to make progress toward her degree and her
anticipated graduation date has not changed.
The
stipulation also does not require that Karen maintain a minimum grade point
average, and no testimony was offered to establish that Karen must achieve a
minimum grade point average to earn a degree in dietetics. Therefore, the circuit court's observation
that Karen's grade point average was 2.062 is irrelevant.
Gary
argues that many of the courses Karen enrolled in after their divorce were not
aimed at obtaining a degree in dietetics and that this "was not the type
of conduct contemplated by the parties when they entered into the agreement to
divorce in this matter." Gary
argues that the "trial court determined, and properly so, that it was the
contemplation of the parties that [Karen] work diligently toward completion of
her degree." He concludes:
"What the trial court did in reality was to determine that [Karen] should
have graduated with her degree by the time of the motion hearing."
But
when a contract is plain and unambiguous, we will construe it as it stands
without looking to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the
parties. See Eden Stone Co.
v. Oakfield Stone Co., 166 Wis.2d 105, 115, 479 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Ct.
App. 1991). We have already determined
that the word "progress" as used by the parties is plain and
unambiguous. If the parties had
intended that Karen "work diligently toward completion of her degree"
to receive $2,100.00 per month maintenance, they would have said so. Had Gary intended that Karen earn her degree
at a faster pace, he should have negotiated a more specific stipulation.
The
stipulation does not provide that Karen must take a minimum class load. The stipulation does not provide that Karen
must graduate by a certain date.
Instead, the stipulation provides only that Karen must make progress
toward completion of her degree. She
has done so, though not as fast as Gary would prefer. We therefore reverse the circuit court's order.
By
the Court.—Order reversed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] Gary also moved to modify maintenance on the
grounds that Karen was involved in a de facto marriage with another man
and that the financial circumstances of both Gary and Karen had changed since
the divorce. The circuit court refused
to reduce or terminate maintenance on these grounds, and Gary does not appeal
this portion of the circuit court's decision.
[2] Although the stipulation provided that
maintenance would terminate if Karen failed to continue progress toward her
college degree, the court did not terminate maintenance, but instead reduced it
to $1,000.00 per month. The court
reasoned:
The agreement
incorporated in the judgment also provided that, if [Karen] obtains her degree
or certification, the maintenance is to be reduced to $1,100 per month. It is difficult to ascertain the intent of
the parties in agreeing to that provision and further providing for a
termination of maintenance if [Karen] is not making progress toward a
degree. It is impossible to believe
that the parties contemplated that [Karen] would have need for some further
limited term maintenance if she completed her degree but would have no need for
such maintenance if she abandoned that effort or didn't pursue it diligently.
It is necessary for
this court to reconcile those two provisions.
It is the conclusion of the court that her failure diligently to pursue
and make progress toward a degree should not put her in a worse position than
if she completed such a degree. Therefore,
the court will order that maintenance continue at the same rate as would be in
effect if she had completed her degree.
Neither party takes issue with this determination.
[3] In their briefs, the parties argue that the
circuit court's determination that Karen had failed to make progress toward her
degree was a discretionary decision. We
disagree. The parties confuse the
court's modification of maintenance here with a modification of maintenance
ordered pursuant to § 767.32, Stats. Section 767.32 allows the circuit court to
modify maintenance when it concludes that there has been a substantial change
in circumstances. Modification of
maintenance under § 767.32 is within the discretion of the trial
court. Moore v. Moore, 89
Wis.2d 665, 669-70, 278 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1979).
In
reducing Karen's maintenance, the circuit court did not determine that there
was a substantial change in circumstances.
Therefore, we do not review the circuit court's decision under the
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.
Rather, the circuit court interpreted the parties' stipulation of
divorce in determining that Karen had failed to make progress toward her
degree. Because the court's decision
turned on its interpretation of a stipulation, we review its determination de
novo. See Duhame v.
Duhame, 154 Wis.2d 258, 262, 453 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Ct. App. 1989).