COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED SEPTEMBER 4, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0920-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
MICHAEL LOTTMAN and
PEGGY LOTTMAN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF RIVER FALLS
and
WAUSAU INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for St. Croix County:
ERIC J. LUNDELL, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Michael and Peggy Lottman appeal a summary judgment
dismissing their action against the City of River Falls in which Michael sought
lost wages and Michael and Peggy both sought damages for mental distress
arising out of Michael's constructive discharge.[1] The trial court concluded that damages for
mental distress or injuries were preempted under the Worker's Compensation Act
and that Michael's economic damages did not arise from constructive discharge,
but rather from his unreasonable decision to quit his job without having
exhausted the remedies set out in the employee handbook. Michael argues that outstanding issues of
material fact preclude summary judgment on the issues of constructive discharge
and whether he followed the employee handbook procedures.[2] We reject these arguments and affirm the
judgment.
We review a summary
judgment without deference to the trial court, applying the same
methodology. St. John's Home of
Milwaukee v. Continental Casualty Co., 147 Wis.2d 764, 782, 434 N.W.2d
112, 119 (Ct. App. 1988). The City is
entitled to summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material
fact. See § 802.08(2), Stats.
All of the alleged
economic damages resulted from Lottman quitting his job. Lottman argues that he was constructively
discharged, resulting in lost wages. To
establish constructive discharge, Lottman must show that his working conditions
were so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign. Chambers v. American Trans. Air, Inc.,
17 F.3d 998, 105 (7th Cir. 1994). An
employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to his working environment and must
seek redress while remaining on his job unless confronted with an aggravating
situation. See Brooms v.
Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir. 1989).
Assuming all of the
facts alleged in the complaint are true and construing all of the facts and
inferences stated in the supporting papers in the light most favorable to
Lottman, the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The specific harassment cited in Lottman's
complaint and detailed in his answers to the City's interrogatory establish as
a matter of law that a reasonable person would not have felt compelled to quit
before following the procedures outlined in the employee's handbook. Lottman alleged harassment over a five-year
period, specifically that his foreman would not allow him to talk on the truck
radio, called him a nickname he did not like, called him a vulgar name, told
another worker that he could teach a monkey to do Lottman's job, stated that he
couldn't stand Lottman, gave Lottman instructions to perform his job in a
different manner than other supervisors had instructed Lottman, and gave
Lottman the "silent treatment."
He also complained that the City had given him an unjustified letter of
reprimand. These specific complaints,
while they indicate an unfriendly workplace and a serious personality conflict
between Lottman and his leadman, do not depict such intolerable working
conditions that a reasonable person would quit his job before exhausting the
redress available under the employee's handbook. Although Lottman orally complained to supervisors about his
leadman or foreman on two occasions during a five-year period, Lottman never
filed a grievance with the City and never took his complaints to the city
administrator or the common council as required by the employee's
handbook. Therefore, as a matter of
law, the economic damages suffered by Lottman were not caused by constructive
discharge and the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[2] The appellants do not raise any issues challenging the dismissal of their claims for mental suffering. The trial court properly concluded that the worker's compensation law provides the exclusive remedy for Michael's alleged mental injuries and the law recognizes no cause of action by a wife against her husband's employer for mental suffering she incurred as a result of his mistreatment at work.