COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED May 24, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0843
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
IN THE INTEREST OF
DAVID S.,
HEATHER S. and ERIC
S.,
CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE
OF 18:
MARNAE S.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
CHRISTOPHER R. FOLEY, Judge. Affirmed.
SULLIVAN,
J. Marnae S. appeals from an order for termination of her parental
rights. She presents two issues for
review—whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it
admitted photographs into evidence, and whether it properly instructed the
jury.[1] This court rejects her arguments and
affirms.[2]
I. Background.
Marnae and David S. are
the parents of three children—David, Jr. (born March 21, 1983); Heather (born
April 9, 1984); and Eric (born February 23, 1986). David Jr. and Heather were found to be Children in Need of
Protection or Services in December 1985.
See § 48.13(10), Stats. Eric was found to be a Child in Need of
Protection or Services in April 1987.
On February 7, 1994, a
Petition for Termination of Parental Rights was filed. The parents contested the petition. A jury trial was held on July 24‑27,
1995. The jury returned a verdict
finding continuing Need of Protection or Services as to all three children, as
to each parent. The trial court entered
an order terminating the parental rights of both Marnae and David S. Only Marnae S. appeals this order. The children's guardian ad litem
supports the trial court's order.[3]
II. Analysis.
Marnae S. first
challenges the trial court's admission of photographs during the trial.
In September 1985,
police and a social worker, James Cox, visited Marnae and David's
apartment. Cox testified that the
family had just moved from the apartment.
The police officer took twelve photographs of the apartment showing its
condition. Feces were on the kitchen
floors and walls, as well as dried food on the floor and sinks. David S.'s explanation for the
apartment's condition was that they (the parents) had “trashed” the apartment
due to their landlord's alleged unfair treatment of them.
During the trial, the
trial court admitted the photographs, ruling that they were relevant to show
why the State became involved with the children. There is no evidence in the record that the photographs were
published to the jury. Marnae S.
argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to
properly conduct a Rule
904.03, Stats., balancing test.
Whether to admit
evidence is a matter within the wide discretion of the trial court, and we will
reverse such determinations only upon an erroneous exercise of that
discretion. State v. Evans,
187 Wis.2d 66, 77, 522 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Ct. App. 1994). Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” Rule 904.03, Stats.
(emphasis added). Evidence is unfairly
prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the outcome by improper means or
if it appeals to a jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its
instinct to punish, or otherwise causes the jury to base its decision on
something other than the propositions in the case. See Bittner v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
194 Wis.2d 122, 147‑48, 533 N.W.2d 476, 486 (1995).
While the basis for the
trial court's evidentiary ruling is not extensively discussed by the trial
court, there is nothing in the record from which this court can conclude that
there was an erroneous exercise of discretion.
The trial court reasoned that the photographs would assist the jury in
understanding the reason for State involvement with the family. Further, although the trial court
acknowledged that the evidence was prejudicial, it did not conclude that it was
unfairly prejudicial. See
Rule 904.03, Stats.
The record shows a reasoned discretionary decision; hence, there was no
erroneous exercise of that discretion. See
State v. Jackson, 188 Wis.2d 187, 194, 525 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Ct.
App. 1994) (“A proper exercise of discretion consists of the court applying the
relevant law to the applicable facts in order to reach a reasonable
conclusion.”).
Marnae S. next
challenges the trial court's instructions to the jury. She argues that the trial court did not
instruct the jury that they should individually consider whether each parent's
rights should be determined. She argues
the trial court should have charged the jury with the standard instructions. As both the State and the guardian ad
litem point out, however, Marnae S. never raised this issue at
trial. They argue that she waived this
issue pursuant to § 805.13(3), Stats.[4]
This court agrees; thus,
we will not review the issue. See
State v. Syed Tagi Shah, 134 Wis.2d 246, 251‑52 n.4, 397
N.W.2d 492, 495 n.4 (1986) (failure to object to errors in proposed
instructions constitutes waiver even if the instruction misstates the law).
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[1] In her reply brief to this court, Marnae S. asks this court, under its discretionary power of review, see § 752.35, Stats., to reverse because “the real controversy has not been fully tried.” She argues in her reply brief that there was a miscarriage of justice and that her counsel was ineffective. This court will not review these issues because they were raised for the first time in Marnae S.'s reply brief. See State v. Foley, 142 Wis.2d 331, 345 n.7, 417 N.W.2d 920, 927 n.7 (Ct. App. 1987).
[3] We note that the guardian ad litem argues that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the photographs, nor err in the form of the verdict and instructions.
[4] Section 805.13(3), Stats., states in relevant part:
(3) Instruction and verdict conference. At the close of the evidence and before
arguments to the jury, the court shall conduct a conference with counsel
outside the presence of the jury. At
the conference, or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs,
counsel may file written motions that the court instruct the jury on the law,
and submit verdict questions, as set forth in the motions. The court shall inform counsel on the record
of its proposed action on the motions and of the instructions and verdict it
proposes to submit. Counsel may object
to the proposed instructions or verdict on the grounds of incompleteness or
other error, stating the grounds for objection with particularity on the
record. Failure to object at the
conference constitutes a waiver of any error in the proposed instructions or
verdict.
(Emphasis added.)