COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED July
31, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0780
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
IN THE
INTEREST OF BENJAMIN M. B.,
A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
BENJAMIN
M. B.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Crawford County: MICHAEL
KIRCHMAN, Judge. Affirmed.
DYKMAN,
J. This is a single-judge appeal
decided pursuant to § 752.31(2)(e), Stats. Benjamin M.B. appeals from an order waiving
him into adult court. Benjamin raises
two issues on appeal: (1) whether
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to waive Benjamin into adult court once
it accepted his not guilty plea; and (2) whether there was sufficient
evidence to support Benjamin's waiver into adult court. We conclude that: (1) the court retained jurisdiction over Benjamin and was
able to hear the motion for waiver into adult court; and (2) there was
sufficient evidence in the record to support the circuit court's finding that
waiver into adult court was proper. We
therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
The
initial appearance for Benjamin M.B., a seventeen year old, was set in the
juvenile court for February 7, 1996.
After informing Benjamin of the contents of the petition, the judge
asked defense counsel if the juvenile was ready to admit or deny. The defense counsel responded that Benjamin
was ready and immediately following Benjamin answered, "Not guilty. Oh, deny."
The
judge then stated, "Okay. Then the
matter will be set for trial. The clerk
will enter the denial." The State
immediately interjected that it intended to bring a motion for waiver into
adult court. The judge acknowledged
that he had failed to give the State the chance to stop him before he accepted
the plea, withdrew his acceptance of the plea and allowed the State to proceed
with its motion for waiver into adult court.
The
waiver hearing was held on March 5, 1996.
The State called as witnesses two juvenile probation officers who
supervised Benjamin M.B. while he was on formal supervision in Rock
County. Both testified that due to
Benjamin's age, background and residence in Illinois, as well as other factors,
the Wisconsin juvenile court system did not have appropriate services available
for him. Based on this testimony, the
judge waived Benjamin into adult court.
Benjamin appeals.
JURISDICTION
Section
48.18(2), Stats., provides that
"[t]he petition for waiver of jurisdiction shall be filed prior to the
plea hearing." Based on 48.18(2),
Benjamin argues that the judge erred in allowing the State to bring its motion
after the plea was entered into the court.
We disagree.
Benjamin
prematurely entered his plea at the initial appearance before the State was
given a chance to make an appearance, much less bring its motion for waiver
into adult court. The State immediately
brought its motion to the attention of the court. The judge, over objection, chose to withdraw the previously
accepted plea and to hear the motion for waiver.
A
trial court has the ability to correct errors that occur in the trial
process. Fritsche v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 171 Wis.2d 280, 295, 491 N.W.2d 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1991).
In Fritsche, we held that a trial judge could reconsider a
nonfinal ruling when he determined that there has been an error. Id. Accepting a plea at the initial appearance before the State was
given the opportunity to bring its motion would have been erroneous. Thus, the judge did not err by withdrawing a
previously entered plea because the State was not given a chance to speak
before the plea was taken.
If
we followed the view urged by Benjamin, a trial court could never correct what
it ultimately concluded was a mistake in the trial process. Such a doctrine would elevate form over
substance. We conclude that the circuit
court judge had the power to withdraw the juvenile's plea in order to hear the
State's motion to waive Benjamin into adult court.
Even
assuming that the judge's decision to hear the motion for waiver into adult
court was error, Benjamin's substantive rights were not adversely
affected. Error that does not affect
the defendant's substantive rights shall be disregarded. Section 805.18(1), Stats.; In re Shawn B.N., 173 Wis.2d 343, 375,
497 N.W.2d 141, 153 (Ct. App. 1992).
Thus, any error that might have occurred must be treated as harmless.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Benjamin argues that the
State failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the facilities,
services and procedures available to him were inadequate to support waiver into
adult court. We disagree.
The
decision of whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction is within the sound
discretion of the juvenile court. In
re J.A.L., 162 Wis.2d 940, 960, 471 N.W.2d 493, 501 (1991). "We will uphold a discretionary
determination if the record reflects that the juvenile court exercised its
discretion and there was a reasonable basis for its decision." In re
B.B., 166 Wis.2d 202, 207, 479 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Ct. App. 1991). In making this determination, the juvenile
court's primary consideration must be the best interests of the child. In re D.H., 76 Wis.2d 286,
305, 251 N.W.2d 196, 206 (1977). We will
reverse a juvenile court's waiver determination "if and only if the record
does not reflect a reasonable basis for the determination or a statement of the
relevant facts or reasons motivating the determination is not carefully
delineated in the record." J.A.L.,
162 Wis.2d at 961, 471 N.W.2d at 501.
Section
48.18(5), Stats., provides the
criteria a court must consider in determining whether a juvenile should be
waived into adult court: (1) the
personality and prior record of the child; (2) the type and seriousness of
the offense; (3) the adequacy and suitability of facilities, services and
procedures available for treatment of the child and protection of the public
within the juvenile justice system; and (4) the desirability of trial and
disposition of the entire offense in one court if the juvenile was allegedly
associated in the offense with persons who will be charged with a crime in
circuit court. The trial court
addressed the criteria set forth in § 48.18(5) and found that those
interests would not be best served by remaining in juvenile court.
The
State introduced evidence from two witnesses who had supervised and treated
Benjamin since 1992. Both testified
that the juvenile justice system was no longer adequate to meet the needs of
Benjamin. The witnesses looked to
Benjamin's age, attitude, peer group and past experience in the juvenile system
in making their determination of what was best for Benjamin. The witnesses also noted that Benjamin
continued to have negative contacts with the law despite his supervision and
felt that further supervision would not be in Benjamin's best interest. Last, the witnesses noted that Benjamin
resided in Illinois, making supervision more difficult. Benjamin offered no evidence.
The
trial court found that Benjamin's best interest would be met in adult
court. The judge based his conclusion
on the testimony of two witnesses who arguably know Benjamin and his particular
needs best. Both witnesses testified
that the juvenile justice system had nothing left to offer Benjamin.
Benjamin
argues that by failing to employ less restrictive alternatives, the court
erroneously exercised its discretion.
However, § 48.18, Stats.,
does not require that the court attempt all possible juvenile placements before
it may waive the juvenile into adult court.
Instead, § 48.18(6) requires only that the best interests of the
child and the public be the primary consideration in analyzing the appropriate
placement of the child.
Here,
the court reasonably found that adult court would best serve the needs of
Benjamin and the public. We conclude
that the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports. See Rule
809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.