COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED February 25, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0707-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Oscar Howard,
Defendant-Appellant,
Patricia Lee Fenske,
Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: ELSA C. LAMELAS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Schudson and Curley, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Oscar Howard appeals from the judgment of
conviction, following a jury trial, for physical abuse of a child—recklessly
causing great bodily harm, party to a crime, and from the trial court orders
denying his postconviction motions. We
affirm.
On November 12, 1994,
Oscar Howard and Patricia Fenske brought their[1]
one-and-one-half-year-old daughter, Janeena, to Milwaukee Children's Hospital
where she was diagnosed as having suffered a broken left femur as a result of
physical contact. The evidence
consisted primarily of police accounts of the parents' statements on the
morning after the incident, and testimony of the doctors who examined
Janeena. The evidence established that
the parents, during the course of an argument, struggled over Janeena and,
while Howard held the child, Fenske pulled her at an angle causing the broken
leg. Dr. Stephen Lazoritz, a
pediatrician and the Medical Director of the Child Protection Center of
Children's Hospital, used a doll to demonstrate the child's position and
explain his opinion that the combined actions of both parents were necessary to
cause the injury.
Jury deliberations
lasted two days. According to the
statements of four jurors filed in support of Howard's postconviction motions,
on the second day a juror brought a Cabbage Patch doll with which various
jurors performed demonstrations of Fenske's and Howard's conduct. Howard contends that he is entitled to a new
trial because of this jury conduct.
Denying Howard's motion
for a new trial, the trial court's very detailed and well-reasoned written
decision explained, “Although there is a possibility that some jurors may have
not reenacted Dr. Lazoritz's demonstration precisely, ... in light of
the totality of what has been presented ... any distinction is not
critical.” Accordingly, despite
concluding that the evidence of jury misconduct was competent under
§ 906.06(2), Stats.,[2]
and that the jury's experiments with the doll involved extraneous information
that was potentially prejudicial under State v. Eison, 194 Wis.2d
160, 533 N.W.2d 738 (1995), the trial court concluded:
...
that the evidence against Howard was so strong that there is not a reasonable
possibility a hypothetical average jury could have been prejudiced by the use
of the Cabbage Patch doll in the jury room, particularly where the jurors had
heard detailed testimony relating to the physical positions of both parents,
their actions, and the general movement in which they were engaged while
pushing and pulling on the baby; and particularly where an actual demonstration
was performed by the doctor with another doll as to how the baby was held and
what movements had occurred.
Howard argues that the
jury's experimentation with the doll was prejudicial. The State counters by arguing not only that the jury conduct was
non-prejudicial, but also that the evidence of the jury conduct was incompetent
and inadmissible. We need not address
the State's intriguing theories regarding the competency of the evidence of
juror misconduct because we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, assuming
the Cabbage Patch doll demonstrations were extraneous and potentially
prejudicial, there still is “no reasonable possibility” that a hypothetical
average jury could have been prejudiced.
Under § 906.06(2), Stats., when a trial court concludes
that evidence of juror misconduct is competent and admissible and that the
extraneous information is potentially prejudicial, the trial court “must then
determine, as a matter of law, whether the extraneous information constituted
prejudicial error requiring reversal of the verdict.” Eison, 194 Wis.2d at 177, 533 N.W.2d at 744. In making that determination, the trial
court “must assess, as a matter of law, whether the conviction must be reversed
because there is a reasonable possibility that the [jury misconduct] would have
had a prejudicial effect upon a hypothetical average jury.” Id. at 177, 533 N.W.2d at
745. In measuring whether such a
reasonable possibility exists, we adhere to “the constitutional error test for
criminal cases ... namely, that the state ‘must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Id.
at 178, 533 N.W.2d at 745 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
We independently review
the trial court's determination of prejudice.
See id. As
our supreme court has explained, we consider the “totality” of factors
including:
the
nature of the extraneous information, the circumstances under which it was
brought to the jury's attention, the nature and character of the state's case
and the defense presented at trial, and the connection between the extraneous
information and a material issue in the case.
Id. at
179, 533 N.W.2d at 745. We conclude
that the totality of factors establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury demonstrations with the doll did not contribute to the verdict.
As Howard explains,
“[t]he central issue in the trial focused on whether [his] actions or lack
thereof was causal with respect to the injuries that Janeena received during
the incident.... It was [his]
contention that there was no affirmative conduct on [his] part ... and that he
was a victim of circumstances beyond his control.” The jury demonstrations with the Cabbage Patch doll, however,
would have had little if any bearing on that issue; they were merely cumulative
to the trial testimony and doll demonstrations of Dr. Lazoritz. Moreover, Howard's exculpatory versions of
the cause of Janeena's injury were inconsistent with the medical evidence. Finally, in his trial testimony, Howard
acknowledged that during his argument with Fenske he held Janeena while Fenske
pulled her legs. Thus Howard's admitted
conduct, though not the sole cause of injury, was sufficient to constitute a
substantial causal factor for one convicted as a party to the crime.[3]
On a related issue,
Howard argues that the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on
his motion regarding juror misconduct.
Howard sought a hearing to require testimony from the eight jurors who
had not provided statements prior to his postconviction motion. As the State responds, however:
The
circuit court accepted the facts asserted in these [four written juror]
statements as verities. And Howard has
never alleged that any of these jurors could testify to any facts in addition
to those recounted in their statements.
Thus, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing to prove any of the
facts within their knowledge.
Nor had Howard ever suggested what additional
facts, if any, any of the other jurors could have recited at any evidentiary
hearing.
The
State is correct. The supreme court has
explained:
[I]f
the defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his motion to raise a
question of fact, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the
trial court may in the exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion without
a hearing.
Nelson
v. State, 54 Wis.2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629, 633
(1972). Further, specifically in the
context of a motion for an evidentiary hearing to establish alleged jury
misconduct, we explained that a defendant's “preliminary showing must assert
facts that, if true, would require a new trial.” State v. Marhal, 172 Wis.2d 491, 497, 493 N.W.2d
758, 761-62 (Ct. App. 1992). Here, the
trial court accepted Howard's factual premise of jury misconduct. Therefore, even assuming that evidence from
additional jurors would have further substantiated Howard's factual
allegations, additional evidence would not have advanced his unsuccessful legal
theory.
Howard also argues that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the
police. After interviewing Fenske at
the hospital, the police went to Howard's home and interviewed him there. Viewing this simply as an investigative
interview, the officers did not read Howard his Miranda warnings.[4] Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied Howard's motion concluding that “[t]here is simply nothing here
that leads me to believe that a reasonable person would have believed that he
was in custody” and, therefore, that Miranda warnings were not
required. Howard argues that the trial
court erred in concluding that he was not in custody.
For Miranda
warnings to be required, a person must be in “custody” and under
“interrogation” by the police. State
v. Mitchell, 167 Wis.2d 672, 686, 482 N.W.2d 364, 369 (1992). This court's review of a trial court’s
conclusions about whether certain undisputed facts establish “custody” and
“interrogation” is de novo. See
State v. Clappes, 136 Wis.2d 222, 235, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987)
(application of evidentiary or historical facts to constitutional principles
presents questions of law independently reviewed on appeal).
A person need not be
under formal arrest to be in a custodial status requiring Miranda
warnings. See State v.
Pounds, 176 Wis.2d 315, 322, 500 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Ct. App. 1993). To evaluate whether a person is in custody
for Fifth Amendment Miranda purposes, courts must consider the
totality of the circumstances and determine whether a “reasonable person in the
defendant's position would have considered himself or herself to be ‘in
custody,’ given the degree of restraint.”
State v. Swanson, 164 Wis.2d 437, 446-47, 475 N.W.2d 148,
152 (1991).
We must adopt the trial
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Coerper, 192 Wis.2d
566, 571, 531 N.W.2d 614, 617 (Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 199 Wis.2d 216,
544 N.W.2d 423 (1996). Whether a
suspect was in custody, however, presents a question of law which we determine
without deference to the trial court decision.
Pounds, 176 Wis.2d at 320, 500 N.W.2d at 376 (Ct. App.
1993). In determining whether a suspect
is in custody for Miranda purposes, “a court should consider the
totality of the circumstances” including “[t]he defendant's freedom to leave
the scene and the purpose, place and length of the interrogation.” State v. Leprich, 160 Wis.2d
472, 477, 465 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Ct. App. 1991).
When the police arrived
at Howard's apartment, they knew of Janeena's injury but they did not know
whether Howard had caused it. They
entered Howard's apartment with his permission. Howard was “fully cooperative.”
They questioned Howard for between twenty and fifty minutes in his own
residence—a place “‘not indicative of the type of inherently coercive setting
that normally accompanies a custodial interrogation.’” Leprich, 160 Wis.2d at 478,
465 N.W.2d at 846 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting United States v. Helmel,
769 F.2d 1306, 1320 (8th Cir. 1985)).
The police did not arrest, cuff, or confine Howard in any way.[5] They never told Howard he could not
leave. Under the totality of the
circumstances, the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. The trial court correctly concluded that
Howard was not in custody when questioned by the police at his apartment and,
therefore, that Miranda warnings were not required.
Finally, Howard argues
that the complaint lacks probable cause.
The State responds that, under State v. Webb, 160 Wis.2d
622, 467 N.W.2d 108, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 889 (1991), a defendant
cannot challenge the sufficiency of a complaint on appeal given that subsequent
proceedings established guilt. Once
again, however, we need not confront the State's theory because, we conclude,
the complaint establishes probable cause.
A criminal complaint is
sufficient when the alleged facts, together with reasonable inferences drawn
from them, allow a reasonable person to conclude that a crime was probably
committed and the defendant probably is culpable. State v. Adams, 152 Wis.2d 68, 73, 447 N.W. 90, 92
(Ct. App. 1989). Whether a criminal
complaint is sufficient presents a legal issue subject to our independent
review. State v. Barman,
183 Wis.2d 180, 201, 515 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Ct. App. 1994).
Howard argues that the
complaint is insufficient because it “fails to establish that [he] caused
the great bodily harm or that [his] actions were reckless.” We disagree. Clearly the complaint alleged that Howard's actions, in
combination with Fenske's, caused a fracture of the child's femur. According to the complaint, Dr. Lazoritz was
presented with the information police had gathered about the parents'
altercation. That, together with his
medical assessment of the child, led him to conclude that the “height
differential” at which the parents were holding the child
would
create an angle in the child's femur, and if there was traction by the mother
on the child's leg at an angle, then this angle could cause a transverse
fracture of the femur. Merely pulling
on the leg would not cause a transverse fracture, but pulling or pushing at an
angle as in the struggle, would be a sufficient force to cause a fracture of a
femur in an infant this age.
Although not as
explicit, the complaint also establishes probable cause that Howard's conduct
was reckless. Under § 948.03(1), Stats., “‘recklessly’ means conduct
which creates a situation of unreasonable risk of harm to and demonstrates a
conscious disregard for the safety of the child.” The complaint alleges a series of arguments between Fenske and
Howard accompanied by their physical struggles over the child. According to Fenske's statement in the
complaint, she observed Howard:
lifting
the baby up by the back of her clothes.
She states she then attempted to grab for the baby at which time
[Howard] pulled the baby close to his upper body. She then began to pull on the lower part of the baby. She states that the baby then began to cry
while she was pulling the baby and while [Howard] was securing the baby close
to him.
Further,
according to Howard's statement in the complaint:
the
two of them engaged in a tussle with the baby.
He states that he grabbed the baby under the arms, holding her to his
upper body at which time [Fenske] had the baby by the legs and feet. He states that during their scuffle, the
baby began to cry.
We
are satisfied that these allegations establish probable cause that Howard
engaged in conduct presenting an unreasonable risk of harm to and demonstrating
a conscious disregard for the safety of the child.
By the Court.—Judgment
and orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] The complaint alleged that “Fenske states that she is the mother ... and that ... Howard believes he is the child's natural father, but he is not.” Howard testified that he believes he is the father. In this opinion we will refer to Fenske and Howard as the parents.
[2]
Section 906.06(2), Stats.,
provides:
Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may the juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received.
[3] Howard also presents separate constitutional arguments for a new trial because of jury misconduct based on his sixth amendment rights to be present and have representation at all proceedings, and to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. As the supreme court explained in Eison, however, “[a]lthough the error of extraneous information in a criminal trial may implicate the defendant's constitutional rights, reversal is not mandated unless the error is prejudicial.” State v. Eison, 194 Wis.2d 160, 180 n.4, 533 N.W.2d 738, 746 n.4 (1995). Therefore, having concluded that the trial court correctly determined that the jury misconduct was not prejudicial, we need not address Howard's additional theories. See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only dispositive issue need be addressed).
[5] Although Howard claimed that one of the officers prevented him from getting up to put on a shirt, the police denied his allegation, and the trial court believed the police testimony. Howard also testified that the police told him he would be arrested if he refused to answer their questions, but would be ordered into the district attorney's office on Monday if he answered their questions. The trial court found, however, that Howard's testimony in this regard was not credible.