COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED February
12, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0690-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID
L. SHAW,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Walworth County: JAMES L. CARLSON, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded.
Before
Brown, Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. David L. Shaw appeals from a judgment of conviction of
three counts of sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen. He argues that he was denied his due process
right to present a defense by the trial court's denial of his motion for continuance
and the exclusion of opinion testimony about the victim's truthfulness. He also claims that he was prejudiced by
improper comments in the prosecutor's closing argument. We conclude that errors occurred and that as
a result the real controversy was not fully tried. We reverse the judgment and grant a new trial in the interests of
justice.
The
criminal complaint alleges that Shaw had sexual contact with ten-year-old Carly
C. The contact allegedly occurred while
Carly was on a camping trip and staying in a trailer with Shaw in June
1993. Carly testified that the contact
occurred. Shaw testified that it did
not. Carly testified that Shaw wrote
messages related to her in a wood shelter.
Shaw testified that he did not.
Carly
did not report the assault until the end of August 1993. She first revealed the assault to the aunt
she was then living with. At trial a
social worker testified that a child victim of sexual assault does not often
report the assault right away and may not confide in a parent if that parent
has a close relationship with the perpetrator.
She explained that children often wait to disclose such incidents when
they feel they are in a safe environment.
Eleven days before trial, Shaw asked for a continuance in order to
permit Dr. Robert Shapiro to appear and give testimony to rebut the social
worker's testimony. The request was
denied.
Shaw
argues that denial of the continuance to obtain the attendance of Shapiro
deprived him of his due process right to present a defense. A motion for continuance is committed to the
discretion of the trial court. See
State v. Fink, 195 Wis.2d 330, 338, 536 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Ct. App.
1995). Where a continuance is sought to
obtain attendance of a witness, the trial court is charged to consider
"whether the testimony of the absent witness is material, whether the
moving party has been guilty of any neglect in endeavoring to procure the
attendance of the witness, and whether there is a reasonable expectation that
the witness can be located. Where a
satisfactory showing is made with respect to these elements, the moving party
is ordinarily entitled to a continuance ...." Elam v. State, 50 Wis.2d 383, 390, 184 N.W.2d 176,
180 (1971) (citation omitted). Where a
defendant's right to due process of law is implicated, we must balance the
defendant's right against the public interest in the prompt and efficient
administration of justice. See Fink,
195 Wis.2d at 338, 536 N.W.2d at 404.
At
a hearing on April 4, 1995, it was explained that the prosecution would have a
social worker testify as an expert on how child abuse victims act. Shaw attempted to have the testimony
excluded. The trial court ruled that
the testimony would be admitted upon a proper foundation. On June 1, 1995, Shaw requested a
continuance of the trial scheduled to commence June 12. The request indicated that on May 20, 1995,
a commitment had been obtained from Shapiro to testify in rebuttal to the
social worker's testimony but that Shapiro would be unavailable during the week
of June 12 due to a planned vacation.
Shapiro's affidavit confirmed that he would be unavailable until after
June 26, 1995, and that he was prepared to testify that the child accommodation
theory is, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, inapplicable to
the facts of this case. At the motion
hearing on June 7, Shaw's counsel explained that it had taken forty-five days
to find a qualified rebuttal expert who was willing to testify upon very short
notice.
The
trial court found that Shaw's request was not a "good faith effort to
preserve the testimony of a rebuttal witness but a dilatory request for
continuance." The trial court
noted that Shapiro had not been subpoenaed, that it had not been demonstrated
that any local person could not offer a similar opinion, and that the defense
had not offered to take Shapiro's videotape deposition.
We
conclude that the request for a continuance satisfied the elements set forth in
Elam. Shapiro's testimony
was material to rebut the social worker's explanation of Carly's behavior. This case involved a credibility battle
between Carly and Shaw. The unrebutted
expert evidence served to bolster Carly's credibility. The request was not
merely a dilatory tactic. The defense
explained the difficulty it had in procuring an expert who was willing to
testify in rebuttal. Shapiro's
testimony was evidence that could not be provided by another available
witness. The witness had been located
and was willing to testify. The defense
could not be expected to subpoena Shapiro as it would alienate a witness who
agreed to provide defense evidence.
Also,
it is questionable whether a videotaped deposition of Shapiro would have been
admissible. In State v. Temby,
108 Wis.2d 521, 525, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Ct. App. 1982), the court held that
to satisfy requirements of the confrontation clause, a witness must be in fact
unavailable in order to permit the use of a deposition. Temporary unavailability is not sufficient. See id. at 526, 322
N.W.2d at 525. In any event, there
exists a constitutional preference for live testimony at a criminal trial. See State v. Thomas,
144 Wis.2d 876, 888, 425 N.W.2d 641, 645 (1988).
The
requested continuance was short.
Counsel sought an additional two weeks at the motion hearing. When the trial commenced, Shaw's counsel
indicated that Shapiro was willing to cut his vacation short and appear on
Friday of that week. Only a two-day
continuance was needed. The case was
not that old as to outweigh Shaw's interest in presenting a defense. The criminal complaint had not been filed
until April 1994. Previous delay in the
case in February 1995 was occasioned by lead defense counsel's illness. In light of the short amount of time needed
to procure the expert's testimony and the materiality of that testimony, denial
of a continuance was an erroneous exercise of discretion.[1]
We
turn to the ruling on opinion evidence as to Carly's truthfulness. The defense wanted to present the testimony
of Thomas and Ronald Waters who had frequent contact with Carly and her family
between January and May 1993. When
Thomas was asked about his opinion of Carly's truthfulness, the trial court
sustained the prosecutor's objection based on remoteness in time. The trial court ruled that only Carly's
character for truthfulness at the time of trial was at issue.
Evidentiary
rulings, particularly relevancy determinations, are left to the discretion of
the trial court and will not be upset on appeal unless the court misused its
discretion. See Shawn B.N.
v. State, 173 Wis.2d 343, 366-67, 497 N.W.2d 141, 149 (Ct. App.
1992). We will affirm the trial court's
discretionary ruling if it is supported by a logical rationale, is based on
facts of record and involves no error of law.
See id. at 367, 497 N.W.2d at 149.
We
conclude that an error of law occurred.
Section 906.08(1), Stats.[2]
is not limited to truthfulness at the time of trial. It is not necessary that the witness giving the opinion testimony
have a long acquaintance with the person or have recent information. See State v. Cuyler,
110 Wis.2d 133, 139, 327 N.W.2d 662, 665-66 (1983); see also State
v. Hilleshiem, 172 Wis.2d 1, 20, 492 N.W.2d 381, 389 (Ct. App. 1992)
(witness should have been allowed to give opinion of undercover agent's
character for truthfulness during the period the witness worked with the
agent). Remoteness in time bore only on
the weight to be given the evidence.
That function is exclusively for the jury. See State v. Wachsmuth, 166 Wis.2d 1014, 1023, 480
N.W.2d 842, 846 (Ct. App. 1992).
Finally, the witnesses' knowledge and contact with Carly was within
months of the time she reported the alleged sexual assault. Their familiarity with Carly was not so
remote to the events as to negate probative value.
The
State argues that the evidence was cumulative to the testimony of two other
witnesses that Carly tended to lie about things.[3] However, those two witnesses, a mother and
her daughter, were equivocal about Carly's truthfulness. The mother indicated that Carly had lied
about things but did not know if Carly would lie about "something this
big." The young daughter testified
that Carly would lie to get someone into trouble but that she would sometimes tell
the truth. Credibility was the crucial
issue. Testimony from Thomas and Ronald
Waters would have attacked Carly's credibility. It may have been enough to change the outcome of the case.
Shaw's
final claim arises from closing argument.
The prosecutor concluded his closing argument with the following:
I submit in closing that this little girl was victimized
by this man when he molested her in that trailer. She had a traumatic experience, which she testified, which is his
right to have her do because we have the burden of proof, but she was still
traumatized, victimized again. I'm
asking you not to victimize her again.
When Shaw's objection was sustained, the prosecutor
further stated: "To return a
verdict now saying the defendant is not guilty is to return a verdict
victimizing that child a third time, telling her you don't believe her. Please don't do that."
Generally,
counsel is allowed considerable latitude in closing argument and it is within
the trial court's discretion to determine the propriety of counsel's statements
and arguments to the jury. See State
v. Wolff, 171 Wis.2d 161, 167, 491 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Ct. App.
1992). The line between permissible and
impermissible argument is drawn where the prosecutor goes beyond reasoning from
the evidence and suggests that the jury arrive at a verdict by considering
factors other than the evidence. See
State v. Neuser, 191 Wis.2d 131, 136, 528 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Ct. App.
1995). Without a doubt the prosecutor's
argument was improper.[4] It appealed to the jury's emotions and
sought a verdict based not on the evidence, but on a desire not to further
victimize the child. It was also
offensive for the prosecutor to suggest that the child had been victimized by
having to testify at trial and Shaw was at fault for that form of
victimization.
Upon
concluding that a prosecutor's argument was improper, we examine the remarks in
the context of the entire trial to determine if the remarks "so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process." See id.
(quoted source omitted). We need not
engage in that exercise here. We
determine that the cumulative effects of the errors in Shaw's trial require a
new trial in the interests of justice.[5]
See § 752.35, Stats. Here the jury was not given an opportunity
to hear important testimony bearing on Carly's credibility, and improper
remarks during the prosecutor's closing argument obscured the issues. It is a case where the real controversy has
not been fully tried and we may reverse without a finding that there is a
substantial probability of a different result on retrial. See State v. Smith, 153
Wis.2d 739, 742, 451 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 1989).
By
the Court.—Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Shaw also argues
that he should have been granted a continuance in order to procure a
handwriting expert to examine wood boards containing messages Shaw allegedly wrote
about Carly. Shaw was not informed that
the boards had been obtained by the sheriff until a few weeks before
trial. At the hearing on the request
for a continuance, Shaw relied on trial counsel's experience as an offer of
proof that handwriting analysis could be performed on the boards. This was insufficient as an offer of
proof. However, because we reverse and
remand for a new trial, we need not address this issue.
[2] Section
906.08(1), Stats., provides:
Except as provided in s. 972.11(2), the credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or
opinion, but subject to these limitations: a) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and b), except with respect to an
accused who testifies in his or her own behalf, evidence of truthful character
is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
This section was renumbered § 906.08(1) (intro.) and amended by
1995 Wis. Act 225, § 519. The
changes do not affect our analysis.
[3] The State
suggests that Shaw failed to make an offer of proof regarding what Thomas and
Ronald Waters' opinion of Carly's truthfulness would have been. The claim of error is preserved because the
substance of their opinion is apparent from the context in which the questions
were asked. See
§ 901.03(1)(b), Stats.
[4] Upon Shaw's
objection, the trial court failed to exercise its discretion at all. It merely responded by noting that the
comments were argument only.
[5] For this reason,
we do not address the State's claim that Shaw waived the objection to the
prosecutor's improper closing argument by failing to move for a mistrial. Our discretionary power of reversal pursuant
to § 752.35, Stats., extends to
situations of waiver where the exercise of our discretionary power is necessary
to achieve justice in the individual case.
See Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis.2d 1, 19, 456 N.W.2d
797, 805 (1990).