COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED DECEMBER 27, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0620
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
A-C COMPRESSOR
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FRANCIS ZENO, D/B/A
EQUIPMENT
SERVICE-SALES
SPECIALISTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Outagamie County: HAROLD V. FROEHLICH, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
LaROCQUE, J. Francis Zeno appeals a judgment and an
order for restitution to A-C Compressor Corporation (ACC) after a jury found
that Zeno breached a confidentiality agreement. Following the verdict, the trial court ordered the jury's
compensatory damage award of $56,000 for breach of contract set aside and
substituted a restitution order for $18,400, representing a percentage of the
profits the court found Zeno realized from misappropriation of trade secrets.[1] Zeno asserts that the trial court
erroneously applied the wrong measure of damages in an action at law for breach
of contract. Alternatively, Zeno
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the court's award. Because the trial court implicitly found
that ACC established a claim in equity recognized by § 134.90, Stats., and because the trial evidence
supports the amount awarded, we reject Zeno's contentions and affirm.
Zeno does not challenge
the jury finding that he breached his confidentiality agreement with ACC, and
thus a detailed recitation of the evidence presented to the jury is
unnecessary. It is sufficient to state
that there was conflicting evidence whether ACC took reasonable steps to maintain
the secrecy of the information the confidentiality contract aimed to
protect. Such steps are a condition for
a claim pursuant to § 134.90, Stats.[2] Wisconsin adopted many of the provisions of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in § 134.90, Stats., effective April 4, 1986. 1985 Wis. Act 236; see § 194.30, cmts. (Wis. Stats. Ann. 1989). The court may award restitution to prevent
unjust enrichment. See
§ 134.90, Stats.
Zeno concedes that
disgorgement of profits is a proper remedy for a violation of this
statute. He contends, however, that
this statutory provision for misappropriation of a trade secret is premised
"on the actual loss caused by the violation." We disagree. More accurately, § 134.90, Stats.,
unequivocally says that damages "may include both the actual loss caused
by the violation and unjust enrichment caused by the violation that is not
taken into account in computing actual loss." Section 134.90(4)(a), Stats.
Nevertheless, Zeno also
contends that because misappropriation of a trade secret is grounded in tort
while ACC presented a breach of contract claim to the jury, there was no
grounds for the court to impose upon him the remedy available in a tort action.[3]
We also reject this
contention. Neither the Wisconsin
Constitution nor the statutes contemplate the right to trial by jury in
equitable matters.[4] Trial courts may use as advisory findings by
a jury, although the findings are not binding on the trial court, which may
make its own findings and render a judgment thereon. In re Acme Brass & Metal Works, 225 Wis. 74,
78, 272 N.W. 356, 357 (1937). The
decision whether to grant equitable relief is within the trial court's
discretion. Zinda v. Krause,
191 Wis.2d 154, 175, 528 N.W.2d 55, 62 (Ct. App. 1995). The fact that there is a remedy at law, in
contrast to an equitable one, does not deprive the trial court of equity
jurisdiction unless the legal remedy is adequate. Ferguson v. City of Kenosha, 5 Wis.2d 556, 561, 93
N.W.2d 460, 463 (1958). Thus, for
example, even though a breach of contract for support can be measured in money
damages, this does not require the trial court to deny an equitable remedy of
rescission. Bergman v. Bernsdorf,
271 Wis. 401, 407, 73 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1955).
While the trial court
did not make explicit findings to support a judgment for misappropriation of
trade secrets, those findings are implicit in its decision. Appellate courts may assume that a missing
finding on an issue "was determined in favor of or in support of the
judgment." Sohns v. Jensen,
11 Wis.2d 449, 453, 105 N.W.2d 818, 820 (1960). Appellate courts may
affirm a result the evidence would sustain had the trial court made a specific
finding supporting that result. Here, the
evidence supports the trial court's implicit finding that the information at
issue was a trade secret as defined in § 134.90(1)(c), Stats., and that Zeno engaged in
misappropriation as described in subsec. (2) of the statute. We therefore hold that any failure to
adequately prove contract damages is no bar to application of an equitable
remedy.
Finally, Zeno contends
that even if disgorgement of Zeno's profits is a correct measure of damages,
there was no factual basis to support restitution because Zeno did not have any
profits and was not unjustly enriched.
Apparently, this contention is based on the fact that Zeno's business
operation was a corporation that he formed in 1994, and, according to the
corporate tax return, the corporation suffered a $5,000 loss for 1994.
In addressing the issue
of ACC's damages, the trial court ruled as follows:
The
testimony clearly showed that the defendant's salary from his corporation was
$28,000.00 for the period in question; that the corporation itself after paying
Zeno's salary showed a $5,000.00 loss; that the defendant's corporation started
out with 90% of sales related to A-C Compressor parts and ended the period with
30% of the business sales non A-C parts.
Therefor, considering the net corporate assets and personal salary
benefit to defendant ($28,000 - $5,000 = $23,000) and
considering an average corporate profits of 20% from non A-C Compressor parts,
the proper measure of damages based upon this trial record is set at $18,400
($23,000 x 80% = $18,400).
We conclude that the
evidence supports the trial court's decision on damages, and the fact that Zeno
funneled the profits through a corporation is not an impediment to equitable
relief. The restitution order was a proper
exercise of the court's discretion based upon the facts of record. See § 805.17(2), Stats.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
Not recommended for
publication in the official reports.
[1] ACC does not cross-appeal the trial court's decision to set aside the jury's compensatory damage award.
[2]
Section 134.90, Stats.,
provides:
(1) Definitions. In this section:
(a) "Improper means"
includes espionage, theft, bribery, misrepresentation and breach or inducement
of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy.
(b) "Readily
ascertainable" information does not include information accessible through
a license agreement or by an employe under a confidentiality agreement with his
or her employer.
(c) "Trade secret"
means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique or process to which all of the following apply:
1. The information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use.
2. The information is the subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy
that are reasonable under the circumstances.
(2) Misappropriation. No person,
including the state, may misappropriate or threaten to misappropriate a trade
secret by doing any of the following:
(a) Acquiring the trade secret of
another by means which the person knows or has reason to know constitute
improper means.
(b) Disclosing or using without
express or implied consent a trade secret of another if the person did any of
the following:
1. Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret.
2. At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
he or she obtained knowledge of the trade secret through any of the following
means:
a. Deriving it from or through a person who utilized improper means
to acquire it.
b. Acquiring it under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use.
c. Deriving it from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.
d. Acquiring it by accident or mistake.
(3) Injunctive relief. (a)
1. A court may grant an injunction
against a person who violates sub. (2). Chapter 813 governs any temporary or
interlocutory injunction or ex parte restraining order in an action under this
section, except that no court may issue such an injunction or restraining order
unless the complainant makes an application which includes a description of
each alleged trade secret in sufficient detail to inform the party to be
enjoined or restrained of the nature of the complaint against that party or, if
the court so orders, includes written disclosure of the trade secret. The complainant shall serve this application
upon the party to be enjoined or restrained at the time the motion for the
injunction is made or the restraining order is served, whichever is earlier.
2. Except as provided in subd. 3., upon application to the court,
the court shall terminate an injunction when a trade secret ceases to exist.
3. The court may continue an injunction for a reasonable period of
time to eliminate commercial advantage which the person who violated sub. (2)
otherwise would derive from the violation.
(b) In exceptional circumstances,
an injunction granted under par. (a) may condition future use of a trade secret
by the person who violated sub. (2) upon payment of a reasonable royalty by
that person to the owner of the trade secret for no longer than the period of
time for which the court may enjoin or restrain the use of the trade secret
under par. (a). Exceptional circumstances include a material and prejudicial
change of position, prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of a
violation of sub. (2), that renders an injunction inequitable.
(c) In appropriate circumstances,
the court may order affirmative acts to protect a trade secret.
(4) Damages. (a) Except to the
extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring
knowledge or reason to know of a violation of sub. (2) renders a monetary
recovery inequitable, a court may award damages to the complainant for a
violation of sub. (2). A court may
award damages in addition to, or in lieu of, injunctive relief under sub. (3). Damages may include both the actual loss
caused by the violation and unjust enrichment caused by the violation that is
not taken into account in computing actual loss. Damages may be measured exclusively by the imposition of
liability for a reasonable royalty for a violation of sub. (2) if the
complainant cannot by any other method of measurement prove an amount of
damages which exceeds the reasonable royalty.
(b) If a violation of sub. (2) is
wilful and malicious, the court may award punitive damages in an amount not
exceeding twice any award under par. (a).
(c) If a claim that sub. (2) has
been violated is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate an injunction is made
or resisted in bad faith, or a violation of sub. (2) is wilful and deliberate,
the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
(5) Preservation of secrecy. In
an action under this section, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged
trade secret by reasonable means, which may include granting a protective order
in a discovery proceeding, holding an in‑camera hearing, sealing the record
of the action and ordering any person involved in the action not to disclose an
alleged trade secret without prior court approval.
(6) Effect on other laws. (a)
Except as provided in par. (b), this section displaces conflicting tort law,
restitutionary law and any other law of this state providing a civil remedy for
misappropriation of a trade secret.
(b) This section does not affect
any of the following:
1. Any contractual remedy, whether or not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret.
2. Any civil remedy not based upon misappropriation of a trade
secret.
3. Any criminal remedy, whether or not based upon misappropriation
of a trade secret.
(7) Uniformity of application and construction. This section shall be applied and construed to make uniform the law relating to misappropriation of trade secrets among states enacting substantially identical laws.
[3] Zeno's contract analysis is based upon the premise that the proper measure of damages for the breach is lost net profits before taxes. Zeno then notes that net profits are computed as follows: gross sales less the cost of goods equals gross profits; gross profits minus the operating expenses equals net profits. Zeno reasons that because ACC failed to present evidence by which net profits could be determined, ACC failed to prove contract damages.
[4]
Article I, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution entitled "Trial
by jury; verdict in civil cases" provides:
[As amended Nov. 1922] The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the
amount in controversy .... (Emphasis
added.)
Section 805.02, Stats., provides:
Advisory jury and trial by consent. (1) In all actions not triable of right by a jury, the court upon motion or on its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury.