COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED July 30, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
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No. 96-0548-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
William W. Gandt,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
DANIEL L. KONKOL, Judge. Affirmed.
WEDEMEYER, P.J.[1] William W. Gandt appeals from a judgment
entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant, contrary to §§ 346.63(1)(a),
and 346.65(2), Stats. Gandt claims that: (1) the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the intoxilyzer test;
(2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) admission
of certain testimony and giving a certain jury instruction constituted plain
error pursuant to § 901.03(4), Stats. Because the trial court did not err in
denying Gandt's motion to suppress; because the issue of ineffective assistance
is not properly before this court; and because there was not plain error, this
court affirms.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 4, 1993, at
approximately 2:10 a.m., Gandt was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of an intoxicant.
He agreed to submit to a chemical test of his breath. The intoxilyzer test resulted in a reading
of .13%. According to the record card,
the breath test was administered after observing Gandt for a period of
seventeen minutes.
The Wisconsin
Administrative Code requires an observation of twenty minutes prior to
administering the test. See Trans, § 311.06. On this basis, Gandt moved to suppress the
results of the test. The trial court
denied the motion to suppress, but ordered that as a result of the violation,
the State would not have the benefit of the presumption regarding automatic
admissibility of the test.
The trial court
submitted revised instructions to the jury, which eliminated the automatic
admissibility language. The jury
returned a guilty verdict. Gandt now
appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion
to Suppress.
Gandt argues that the
remedy for violating the twenty minute observation time should be suppression
of the test results. Instead of
ordering suppression, the trial court ruled that the State would not have the
benefit of the presumption that the test results are automatically admissible.
A motion to suppress
evidence raises a constitutional question, which presents a mixed question of
fact and law. To the extent the trial
court's decision involves findings of evidentiary or historical facts, those
findings will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Krier, 165 Wis.2d
673, 676, 478 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1991).
The application of constitutional and statutory principles to the facts
found by the trial court, however, presents a matter for independent appellate
review. Id.
This court concludes
that the trial court did not err in denying Gandt's motion to suppress. Gandt failed to present any authority to the
trial court to support his contention that a violation of the twenty minute
observation period requires suppression of the test results. Moreover, applicable case law holds that
such a violation is a question addressed to the test result's credibility
rather than its admissibility. City
of New Berlin v. Wertz, 105 Wis.2d 670, 674, 314 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Ct.
App. 1981).[2] Accordingly, this court rejects Gandt's
claim that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress.
B. Ineffective
Assistance.
Next, Gandt claims that
his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. This issue, however, was not raised at the
trial court level. Accordingly, it is
not properly before this court and this court cannot address it. See State v. Machner,
92 Wis.2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (1979).
C. Plain
Error.
Finally, Gandt claims
that certain objectionable evidence was admitted, and that a certain jury
instruction should not have been given, and these constituted plain error. Specifically, Gandt claims that the
intoxilyzer test results should not have been admitted because of a lack of
proper foundation and that the language of a certain jury instruction contained
a presumption, which the trial court had previously ruled was not available to
the State.
In order for an error to
be “plain” within the meaning of the rule under § 901.03(4), Stats., it
must be “so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be granted
....” Virgil v. State, 84
Wis.2d 166, 191, 267 N.W.2d 852, 864-65 (1978). A “plain error” is one that is “both obvious and substantial” or
“grave,” id., 84 Wis.2d
at 191, 267 N.W.2d at 865, and the rule is “reserved for cases where there is a
likelihood that the [error] ... has denied a defendant a basic constitutional
right.” State v. Sonnenberg,
117 Wis.2d 159, 178, 344 N.W.2d 95, 104 (1984).
The basis for Gandt's
contention is that the trial court ordered the State to prove the admissibility
of the test instead of benefitting from the presumption normally associated
with the test results. He claims that
the State's introduction of the test results lacked a proper foundation and if
trial counsel would have objected, the trial court could have excluded this
evidence. He also claims that the jury
instruction language which automatically extrapolates the test results back to
the time of driving should not have been submitted to the jury.
After reviewing the
record, this court concludes that Gandt has not presented a situation of plain
error. Regarding the admissibility of
the test results, the record demonstrates that a proper foundation to admit the
test results was laid through the testimony of an expert witness. Regarding the jury instruction language that
Gandt complains about, this particular language was not the subject of the
trial court's ruling regarding presumptions.
The presumptions taken away from the State related only to the
underlying scientific reliability of the intoxilyzer test—not to the
presumption regarding extrapolating back to the time of driving. The record demonstrates that the trial court
modified the jury instructions so that the automatic admissibility language was
removed. This modification was the
remedy for the violation of the observation period. Accordingly, the instant case does not present one of plain
error, and this court rejects Gandt's claim.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[2] Gandt argues for the first time on appeal that “public policy concerns regarding the accuracy and fairness of administering breath tests” calls for suppression of the test results. Although Gandt's argument is a novel and interesting one, he does not cite any authority that directly supports his proposition. He cites instead a case that discusses public policy concerns based on the administrative code regarding employment issues. See Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hosp., 168 Wis.2d 12, 483 N.W.2d 211 (1992). Winkelman, however, has nothing to do with whether intoxilyzer test results must be suppressed if the 20 minute observation period is violated.