PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 96-0006
Complete Title
of Case:
EPF CORPORATION,
Petitioner-Respondent,
VAL AL GREENHOUSES,
INC.,
ENER-CON, INC.,
CHARLES
TIEDE, JR., LUNA TIEDE
and
ASSOCIATED MILK
PRODUCERS, INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
ROGER C. PFOST, a/k/a ROGER C.
PFOST and ROBERT PFOST,
Respondent-Appellant,
COMMONWEALTH LAND
TITLE COMPANY,
GEORGE SIMONELIC and
KAREN
SIMONELIC,
Intervenors-Appellants.
Oral Argument: January 30, 1997
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: April 2, 1997
Opinion Filed: April
2, 1997
Source of APPEAL Appeal from an order
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Racine
(If
"Special", JUDGE: EMILY S. MUELLER
so indicate)
JUDGES: Brown, Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the respondent-appellant and the
intervenors-appellants, there were briefs and oral argument by Robert F.
Johnson, of Cook & Franke, S.C.,, of Milwaukee.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the petitioner-respondent, there was a
brief and oral argument by Scott v. Lowry of Waukesha.
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED April
2, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 96-0006
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
EPF
CORPORATION,
Petitioner-Respondent,
VAL AL GREENHOUSES, INC.,
ENER-CON, INC., CHARLES
TIEDE, JR., LUNA TIEDE and
ASSOCIATED MILK PRODUCERS, INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
ROGER
C. PFOST, a/k/a ROGER C.
PFOST
and ROBERT PFOST,
Respondent-Appellant,
COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE COMPANY,
GEORGE SIMONELIC and KAREN
SIMONELIC,
Intervenors-Appellants.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Racine County: EMILY S. MUELLER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Brown, Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.
NETTESHEIM,
J. Commonwealth
Land Title Company appeals from a circuit court order rejecting its motion to
set aside a sheriff's sale of certain real estate formerly owned by Roger C.
Pfost. EPF Corporation (EPF), which
held assignments of various judgments docketed against Pfost, executed on the
judgment liens and purchased the property at the sheriff's sale. Later, Commonwealth redeemed the property
pursuant to the title insurance policy which it had issued to the present
owners. In this action, Commonwealth
sought to recoup its redemption payment.
Pfost
had previously discharged the debts underlying the judgments in
bankruptcy. In 1990, he sought and
obtained a circuit court order pursuant to § 806.19(4), Stats., satisfying some, but not all,
of the judgments. In this case,
Commonwealth argues that the 1990 order should be broadened to satisfy the
judgments not addressed in that proceeding.
Alternatively,
Commonwealth argues that the sheriff's sale was invalid because the real estate
sold at the sale was Pfost's former homestead.
Commonwealth contends that when Pfost sold the real estate to a third
party after the bankruptcy, the sale (and the later sale to Commonwealth's
insured) was free and clear of the judgment liens.
The
circuit court rejected both arguments.
We agree with both rulings. We
affirm the order.
FACTS AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The
facts and procedural history of this case are lengthy and involved.
The
principal actor in this case is Roger Pfost who originally purchased the real
estate as his homestead during the 1970s.
In August 1989, Pfost filed bankruptcy.
On his bankruptcy schedules, Pfost listed his various debts, including
four judgments in favor of Val Al Greenhouses, Inc., Ener-Con, Inc., Charles
and Luna Tiede, and Associated Milk Producers, Inc., respectively.
Pfost
also listed the real estate as his exempt homestead. He valued the property at $60,000 and listed mortgages against
the property in the total amount of $54,707, producing an exempt homestead
equity of $5293. This equity was within
the allowable homestead exemption in effect at the time of Pfost's bankruptcy.[1] Pfost's homestead exemption claim was not
challenged in the bankruptcy proceedings.
In November 1989, Pfost's debts were discharged in bankruptcy and he
emerged from bankruptcy still owning his homestead property and with his
homestead equity intact.
On
June 1, 1990, Val Al Greenhouses assigned its judgment to EPF. Four days later, Pfost sold his homestead
real estate to Ray Leffler for an amount slightly in excess of $60,000. Commonwealth issued a title insurance policy
to Leffler. Three days later, Ener-Con
assigned its judgment to EPF.
Two
weeks later, in July 1990, Pfost filed a circuit court action pursuant to
§ 806.19(4), Stats. We recite the relevant portions of this
statute in the accompanying footnote.[2] In summary, the statute permits a person who
has received a bankruptcy discharge to seek a circuit court order satisfying a
judgment based on a debt which has been discharged in the bankruptcy. Pfost's application, however, sought satisfaction
of only the Val Al Greenhouses and Ener-Con judgments.[3] It did not address the judgments in favor of
the Tiedes or Associated Milk Producers.
Pfost's action was assigned to the Honorable Stephen Simanek. On July 27, 1990, Judge Simanek granted
Pfost's application. The order directed
the clerk to indicate on the records of each case that the two judgments were
satisfied.
On
April 15, 1992, Leffler sold Pfost's homestead property to George and Karen
Simonelic, the current owners. Again
Commonwealth insured the title, issuing its title insurance policy to the
Simonelics.
Thereafter,
Associated Milk Producers and the Tiedes assigned their respective judgments to
EPF.[4]
That
brings us to the present case. In
February 1994, EPF commenced this action by petitioning the circuit court for
leave to execute the judgment liens it held against the real estate.[5] The court granted EPF's petition and
authorized the sheriff to sell the property.[6] EPF provided proper notice of the sale by
publication. EPF then purchased the
property at the sheriff's sale and received a sheriff's deed on August 5, 1994.
Commonwealth
then redeemed the property pursuant to its title insurance policy issued to the
Simonelics. Thus, the Simonelics'
ownership of the real estate has been preserved.
On
July 21, 1995, nearly a year after the sheriff's sale, Commonwealth moved to
intervene in this action, seeking relief from Judge Simanek's 1990 order
pursuant to § 806.07, Stats.[7] Judge Emily S. Mueller presided over this
phase of the proceedings. Specifically,
Commonwealth sought to reopen and broaden Judge Simanek's 1990 order to include
satisfactions of the judgments in favor of the Tiedes and Associated Milk
Producers.
Judge
Mueller granted Commonwealth's request to intervene. However, at the conclusion of the hearing on Commonwealth's
motion, Judge Mueller denied Commonwealth's request to reopen and amend Judge
Simanek's 1990 order. We will address
the details of this ruling in our later discussion.
On
December 8, 1995, Commonwealth brought a motion for reconsideration. However, this motion actually introduced a
new theory for undoing the sheriff's sale.
Commonwealth argued that since Pfost had emerged from the bankruptcy
with his homestead intact, his subsequent sale of the property to Leffler (as
well as Leffler's subsequent sale to the Simonelics) was free and clear of the
judgment liens against the property.
Judge Mueller also rejected this additional argument.
SECTION 806.19(4), STATS.,
AND THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE JUDGE SIMANEK
As
noted, Judge Simanek's 1990 order directed the clerk to satisfy the judgments
in favor of Val Al Greenhouses and Ener-Con.
The order did not speak to the other two judgments held by the Tiedes
and Associated Milk Producers. Relying
on § 806.07, Stats.,
Commonwealth sought to reopen the 1990 proceedings and to broaden Judge
Simanek's order to include satisfactions of the judgments in favor of the
Tiedes and Associated Milk Producers.
A
circuit court's order denying a motion for relief under § 806.07, Stats., will not be reversed on appeal
unless the court has misused its discretion.
See State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis.2d 536,
541, 363 N.W.2d 419, 422 (1985).
Discretion contemplates a reasoning process dependent on the facts of
record and yielding a conclusion based on logic and founded on proper legal
standards. See id.
at 542, 363 N.W.2d at 422. On this
issue, the facts are not disputed. They
consist of the record before Judge Simanek, minimal as it is, and the
proceeding in this case before Judge Mueller.
Commonwealth
does not dispute that Pfost applied to Judge Simanek pursuant to
§ 806.19(4), Stats., for
satisfactions of only two judgments.[8] Commonwealth argues, however, that Judge
Mueller should nonetheless have amended and broadened Judge Simanek's 1990
order because something “short circuited” in the proceedings before Judge
Simanek. We understand Commonwealth to
argue that, despite the limited request by Pfost, Judge Simanek was obligated
to issue an order which applied to all the debts discharged in Pfost's
bankruptcy.
We
disagree for a variety of reasons.
First, we cannot say from the record of the 1990 proceeding that Judge
Simanek was alerted that Pfost's request did not include all the judgment debts
which had been discharged in bankruptcy.
Second, and more importantly, we can hardly fault Judge Simanek for
granting the very relief which Pfost requested. Pfost invited Judge Simanek's ruling. We do not review invited error.
See In re Shawn B.N., 173 Wis.2d 343, 372, 497
N.W.2d 141, 152 (Ct. App. 1992). If
Pfost was aggrieved by this order, his remedy was to seek reconsideration or to
appeal. He did neither.
Commonwealth
also argues that Judge Simanek's order was improper because Pfost's application
and the ensuing order are not in keeping with the forms set out in
§ 806.19(4)(b), Stats.[9] We reject this argument for two
reasons. First, this subsection states
that the application and order “shall be in substantially the following
form.” Id. (emphasis
added). This language does not require
that an order entered pursuant to this statute must mirror the statute.
Second,
and more importantly, we see nothing in the language of § 806.19(4), Stats., which requires that an order of
satisfaction must travel to all of the judgments premised on debts which have
been discharged in bankruptcy. The very
fact that the statute says the judgment debtor “may” apply for a satisfaction
under the statute, see id. at para. (4)(a), suggests that
the debtor may also choose to limit the application to only certain
judgments. For whatever reason, Pfost
chose to so limit his application. We
will not speculate as to why he chose to do so; we simply observe that he did.[10]
We
hold that Judge Mueller's application of § 806.19(4), Stats., to the facts of record was
correct. Accordingly, Judge Mueller did
not misuse her discretion in denying Commonwealth's motion to reopen the
proceedings before Judge Simanek.
In
addition, Judge Mueller ruled that Commonwealth's application for relief did
not comply with the “reasonable time” requirement of § 806.07(2), Stats.[11] This analysis requires that we balance two
competing factors: the need for
finality of judgments and the ability of a court to do substantial justice when
the circumstances so warrant. See
State ex rel. Cynthia M.S. v. Michael F.C., 181 Wis.2d 618, 626-27,
511 N.W.2d 868, 872 (1994).
Commonwealth
entered this history in June 1990 when it issued its title insurance policy to
Leffler who purchased the real estate from Pfost. We are entitled to presume that Commonwealth, as a sophisticated
and knowledgeable title insurer, conducted a title search and discovered the
unsatisfied judgments docketed against Pfost.
In the face of this knowledge and the potential legal peril it
presented, Commonwealth nonetheless insured Leffler's title.
The
same is true when Commonwealth insured the Simonelics' title in 1992. With only two of the four judgments of
record having been satisfied, Commonwealth elected to yet again insure good
title to the property.
Commonwealth
explained to Judge Mueller that it did not act sooner to obtain relief from
Judge Simanek's order because it was uncertain about the legality of the
judgment liens. But that uncertainty
would argue for an earlier, not later, action by Commonwealth to resolve the
question. Instead, Commonwealth waited more
than five years after Judge Simanek's order and nearly one year after the
sheriff's sale before seeking judicial relief.
We
also properly consider the circumstances of EPF. Ever since June 1990 when it acquired its first assignment, EPF
conducted its legal and business affairs in the belief that this initial
assignment, and those thereafter, were valid and enforceable. EPF then pursued its rights under those
assignments by executing on the judgment liens and ultimately purchasing the
property at a sheriff's sale. All of
these actions were taken without objection by any party and with full judicial
approval. Only after all of the
foregoing, and nearly a year after the sheriff's sale, did Commonwealth
formally enter into this dispute.
We
conclude that Commonwealth slept on its rights. The equities weigh far more heavily in favor of EPF. We affirm Judge Mueller's further ruling
that Commonwealth's application for relief under § 806.07, Stats., was untimely.
HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION
By
reconsideration motion, Commonwealth argued a new theory for upsetting the
sheriff's sale. Commonwealth contended
that since the real estate was Pfost's former homestead which had been
protected by the bankruptcy, Pfost's subsequent sale of the property to Leffler
(and Leffler's subsequent sale to the Simonelics) was free and clear of the
judgment liens.
Judge
Mueller saw this issue as related to the previous issue regarding Judge
Simanek's order and Commonwealth's motion for relief pursuant to § 806.07,
Stats. Harkening back to her previous ruling, Judge Mueller denied
Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration.
In its respondent's brief on appeal, EPF sounds the same theme.
Although
we ultimately reject Commonwealth's homestead argument, we disagree with Judge
Mueller and EPF that this issue is dependent upon the 1990 proceedings before
Judge Simanek and § 806.19(4), Stats. Thus, at oral argument, we asked EPF to
respond to Commonwealth's argument on the merits. EPF did so.
Commonwealth's
issue requires that we analyze the homestead exemption. In so doing, we recognize that the issue
stems from the homestead exemption accorded Pfost under the federal bankruptcy
law. However, the parties have provided
us only Wisconsin law on this point and we therefore answer the question on
that basis.
The
Wisconsin homestead exemption is grounded in our state constitution. Article I, § 17 of the Wisconsin
Constitution provides:
The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary
comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable
amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or
liability hereafter contracted.
A
“homestead” is defined as “the dwelling and so much of the land surrounding it
as is reasonably necessary for use of the dwelling as a home, but not less than
one-fourth acre (if available) and not exceeding 40 acres.” See § 990.01(13)(a), Stats.; see also
§ 900.01(14), Stats. The “homestead exemption” is defined in
terms of its physical characteristics and acreage in § 990.01(14) and in
terms of its financial extent in § 815.20, Stats. The latter
statute renders a homestead “exempt from execution, from the lien of every
judgment and from liability for the debts of the owner to the amount of
$40,000, except mortgages, laborers', mechanics' and purchase money liens and
taxes ....” See
§ 815.20(1). If the homestead is
sold, the proceeds are exempt to “an amount not exceeding $40,000 ....” See id.
In
Moore v. Krueger, 179 Wis.2d 449, 507 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1993),
this court restated the well-established purpose of the homestead exemption.
The
purpose of the homestead exemption is to preserve judgment debtors and their
families their homes and yet leave them at liberty to change homestead by sale,
or to remove for temporary convenience, without forfeiting the exemption.
Id. at 458, 507 N.W.2d at 158-59.
This
court has also recognized that “the public policy of this state strongly favors
the liberal construction of the homestead statutes in favor of the debtor, and
that homestead rights are preferred over the rights of creditors.” See Mogilka v. Jeka,
131 Wis.2d 459, 468, 389 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Ct. App. 1986).
In
this case, Pfost's homestead rights were fully protected in the bankruptcy
proceeding. He emerged from bankruptcy
with full ownership of his homestead property and with his financial equity in
the homestead intact. Pfost then reaped
the full financial benefit of that protection when he sold the property to
Leffler and received the proceeds.
Judge
Mueller's decision to uphold EPF's judgment lien rights against Pfost's former
homestead property does no violence to Pfost's homestead rights. Pfost left this scenario long ago with the
full benefit of his homestead protection.
Thus, the true question in this case is whether Commonwealth (standing
in the shoes of the Simonelics as a subsequent purchaser) may “piggyback” on
Pfost's homestead protection and invoke it as a shield against EPF's creditor
claim.
As
the case law demonstrates, the purpose of the homestead exemption is to protect
the residence of the debtor and the debtor's family or, in a sale situation, a
limited portion of the sale proceeds. See
Moore, 179 Wis.2d at 458, 507 N.W.2d at 158-59. The purpose of the homestead exemption
should not extend to those outside this “zone of protection.” We therefore agree with Judge Mueller's
ultimate decision rejecting Commonwealth's argument.
Our
conclusion does no violence to the principle stated in Mogilka
that we are to construe homestead statutes in favor of the debtor, and that
homestead rights are to be preferred over the rights of creditors. See Mogilka, 131 Wis.2d
at 468, 389 N.W.2d at 362. The contest
here is not between the debtor (Pfost) and his creditors. Rather, the contest is between a subsequent
purchaser (Commonwealth standing in the Simonelics' shoes) and Pfost's
creditors. That juxtaposition does not
implicate the homestead exemption or the public policy underpinning the
exemption. Commonwealth's argument
would extend the purpose of the homestead protection beyond its constitutional,
statutory and public policy purposes.
The
language of Hoesly v. Hogan, 229 Wis. 600, 282 N.W. 5 (1939),
supports our conclusion. In rejecting a
claim that the homestead exemption should prevail over a judgment lien, our
supreme court (quoting from an earlier case) stated:
While
the homestead exemption provisions of the constitution should be liberally
applied to carry out their manifest purpose, they were not intended to be so
applied as to permit an injustice to be done.
The purpose of the organic provisions is to secure homestead exemptions
where they properly attach under the law and not to deprive lienholders of
their vested rights in property to which the homestead exemption may afterwards
be extended.
Id. at 604, 282 N.W. at
7 (quoted source omitted).[12]
Commonwealth
also argues that Larson v. State Bank of Ogema, 201 Wis. 313, 230
N.W. 132 (1930), and Eloff v. Riesch, 14 Wis.2d 519, 111 N.W.2d
578 (1961), should be read in its favor.
In
Larson, the creditor bank purchased a portion of the debtor's
property at execution sale. Thereafter,
the debtor conveyed a portion of the same lands to his wife. The wife brought an action seeking to set
aside the sheriff's sale to the bank.
She argued that the homestead exemption applied to the acreage in question. The supreme court agreed, holding that it
did not matter that the exemption was not asserted until after the sheriff's
sale. See Larson,
201 Wis. at 318, 230 N.W. at 134-35.
Commonwealth reads Larson to say that in all circumstances
a third party may invoke the debtor's homestead exemption after the debtor has
conveyed his or her interest in the homestead property.
We
disagree. The Larson
court addressed two issues: (1) whether
the amount of land claimed as the homestead exemption qualified under the
statute, and (2) whether exemption had been timely claimed. See id. at 317-18, 230
N.W. at 134-35. The supreme court,
however, did not expressly address whether the wife had standing to invoke the
homestead exemption of her husband after he had conveyed his interest in the
homestead property to her. That,
however, is the issue here: may
Commonwealth resurrect Pfost's homestead protection after he has conveyed the
property?
Even
if we address Commonwealth's implicit reading of Larson, we
reject the interpretation which Commonwealth asserts. The dispute in Larson was between the debtor and
his wife on the one hand and the creditor who had purchased the property at the
sheriff's sale on the other. The
supreme court decision had the effect of invoking the husband's homestead
exemption for the benefit and protection of the wife—a person clearly within the
“zone of protection” as we have previously described. Thus, to the minimal extent Larson speaks to this
case, it supports EPF, not Commonwealth.
The
same is true as to the Eloff case cited by Commonwealth. Although the facts of the case are complex,
those relevant to this case are these:
after the husband/debtor had quitclaimed his interest in the homestead
to his wife and abandoned the property, the wife sought to invoke her husband's
homestead protection against a claim asserted by her husband's creditor. See Eloff, 14 Wis.2d at
521, 111 N.W.2d at 580.
The
supreme court identified the issue as whether the husband/debtor's interest in
the property was exempt under the homestead exemption from the lien of the
debtor's judgment at the time of the conveyance to the debtor's wife. See id. at 523, 111
N.W.2d at 581. The court held that the
husband's interest was exempt. See
id. at 525-26, 111 N.W.2d at 582. The language and reasoning of the court tracks the “zone of
protection” analysis we have described above.
We quote the Eloff court:
Concededly
[the husband/debtor] did not personally occupy the premises after March,
1956. It does not appear that his
leaving was excused by any conduct of his wife; that there were any divorce
proceedings, nor that his obligations to provide for his wife and children were
altered in any way. Nor does it appear
that he made another home available to them which they declined to occupy. To the extent of his interest in the property,
he continued to help provide them with a home.
Under these circumstances, continued recognition of the exemption
would tend to fulfil the purpose of the exemption statute.
Id. at 524, 111 N.W.2d at 581 (emphasis added).
It
is clear from this language that the supreme court saw the debtor's wife and
family as within the “zone of protection” contemplated by the homestead
exemption.
This
case is similar to Larson and Eloff only to the
extent that Pfost, like the debtors in those cases, had previously conveyed his
interest in his homestead property.
Commonwealth would stop the analysis at this point, and therein lies the
flaw in its argument. Commonwealth
fails to ask the further important question:
is the entity which seeks the homestead protection within the “zone of
protection” accorded by the homestead law?
In Larson and Eloff, the beneficiaries of
the protection fell within that zone.
In this case, Commonwealth does not.
CONCLUSION
We
uphold Judge Mueller's ruling denying Commonwealth relief from Judge Simanek's
order pursuant to § 806.07, Stats. We also uphold Judge Mueller's further
ruling denying Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
[1] The parties'
briefs do not advise us as to the amount of the homestead exemption recognized
by bankruptcy law at the time of Pfost's bankruptcy. However, the parties do not dispute that the amount of the
exemption exceeded Pfost's equity in his homestead property. Our research indicates that the amount of
the allowable exemption was $7500. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West
1993). This exemption was later
increased to $15,000. See 11
U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West Supp. 1997).
[2] Section
806.19(4)(a), Stats., provides:
Any person who has secured a discharge of a judgment debt
in bankruptcy and any person interested in real property to which the judgment
attaches may submit an application for an order of satisfaction of the judgment
and an attached order of satisfaction to the clerk of the court in which the
judgment was entered.
[3] Actually, the
appellate record shows that Pfost sought satisfaction of only the judgment in
favor of Val Al Greenhouses. However,
the parties' briefs represent that Pfost also sought satisfaction of the
judgment in favor of Ener-Con. Since
the resulting order from Judge Stephen Simanek directed satisfaction of both
judgments, we will accept the parties' briefs on this matter.
[4] Once again we
note a discrepancy between the appellate record and the parties' briefs. The appellate record does not reveal the
Tiedes assignment. But again, since the
parties do not dispute that EPF also is the assignee of the Tiedes judgment, we
accept that representation.
[5] EPF was required
to obtain circuit court permission to execute on the judgment liens. See § 815.04, Stats.
[7] Commonwealth's
motion did not specify the statutory basis for its motion. However, at the hearing on its motion,
Commonwealth relied on § 806.07, Stats.
[8] The case file of
the proceeding before Judge Simanek was before Judge Mueller at the hearing on
Commonwealth's motion. The appellate
record does not include this file.
However, it does include Pfost's application and Judge Simanek's ensuing
order. It may be that this was the
extent of the case file in the proceeding before Judge Simanek. We say this because Judge Mueller observed
at one point that the case file of the proceeding before Judge Simanek was
minimal.
[9] Section
806.19(4)(b), Stats., reads as
follows:
(b) The
application and attached order shall be in substantially the following form:
APPLICATION FOR
ORDER OF SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS DUE TO DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
TO: Clerk of
Circuit Court
....County
1. .... (Name of judgment debtor) has received
an order of discharge of debts under the bankruptcy laws of the United States,
a copy of which is attached, and .... (Name of judgment debtor or person
interested in real property) applies for satisfaction of the following
judgments:
.... (List of
judgments by case name, case number, date and, if applicable, judgment and lien
docket volume and page number.)
2. a.
Copies of the schedules of debts as filed with the bankruptcy court
showing each judgment creditor for each of the judgments described above are
attached; or
b. Each judgment creditor for each of the
judgments described above has been duly notified of the bankruptcy case in the
following manner: ....(statement of
form of notice).
3. The
undersigned believes that each judgment listed above has been discharged in
bankruptcy, and no inconsistent ruling has been made by, or is being requested
by any party from, the bankruptcy court.
Dated this ....
day of ...., 19....
.... (Signature)
Judgment Debtor,
Person Interested
in Real Property
or Attorney for
Debtor or Person
ORDER OF
SATISFACTION
The clerk of
circuit court is directed to indicate on the judgment and lien docket that each
judgment described in the attached application has been satisfied.
Dated this ....
day of ...., 19....
.... (Signature)
Circuit Judge
[10] In conjunction with this argument, Commonwealth cites to
In re Spore, 105 B.R. 476 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1989). However, we agree with Judge Mueller's
observation that Spore actually supports EPF, not
Commonwealth. Spore
explains that § 809.19(4), Stats.,
establishes a procedure by which a debtor discharged in bankruptcy can obtain a
satisfaction of the judgment from the court which entered it. See Spore, 105 B.R. at
480.
[11] Commonwealth did
not identify which subsection of § 806.07, Stats., applied to its motion. We will assume that the applicable subsection was (1)(e) which
allows relief from a judgment which has been “satisfied, released or
discharged.” Such relief is not subject
to the one-year limitation set out in the statute. Rather, it must be sought within a “reasonable time.” See § 806.07(2).
[12] We acknowledge
that this case is factually different from Hoesly v. Hogan, 229
Wis. 600, 282 N.W. 5 (1939). There, the
judgment creditor acquired a lien against the property before the debtor used
the property as her homestead. See
id. at 601, 282 N.W. at 5-6.
Here, it appears that the judgment creditors did not acquire their
judgment liens until after Pfost acquired his homestead property. Nonetheless, because Commonwealth is a
stranger to Pfost's homestead rights and is attempting to “piggyback” on those
rights, we conclude that the principle stated by the supreme court applies to
this case.